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LUNA SHAMIEH

**The Impact of Counterinsurgency on Human Security
in Fragile States**

**Supervisor
Professor ZOLTÁN SZENES, CSc**

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Introduction

“...the world is entering a new era in which the very concept of security will change – and change dramatically. Security will be interpreted as: security of people, not just territory. Security of individuals, not just nations. Security through development, not through arms. Security of all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment” (Axworthy, 2001, p. 19).

This change in the traditional perception of security has resulted in a change in the perception of threats to security; it affected the way responses need to be considered “with human security as the objective, there must be a stronger and more integrated response from the communities and states around the globe” (UN, 2009, p. 2). Also, it affected the perception of the impact of insecurity; according to Nef (1999) no region in the international community is immune to the risks that affect human security of others.

With this change in the perception of security, the question arises if the traditional or new responses are able to respond to the real needs and are they able to achieve the human security. How peacebuilding, peacemaking, counterinsurgency, responsibility to protect ensure security of the humans?

If the state is not able to fulfil the social contract, not able to provide stability and security and fails to provide human security; then who should provide human security. Human security could be missing due to unwillingness of the government to provide those securities, and their focus on the political elite. When it is a matter of unwillingness how could this be approached. Human security could be missing due to global changes that are beyond the capability of the state. Whether it is public health problems including epidemics; environmental threats including global warming or hurricanes; or economic threats with increasing prices all have impacts on human security and ability of the state to ensure this security. When it is a matter of lack of capacity, how should this be tackled.

Can an outsider provide human security for the people if and when the state fails? Who should be those providers and how to organize this provision? Is humanitarian intervention the best solution? Is humanitarian assistance the answer? Does the responsibility to protect provide protection? And most importantly, what do the people need and what do they really

want? And eventually, are these solutions welcomed by the people? These are all questions that should be considered when discussing human security provided through counterinsurgency or responsibility to protect.

Academic Problem

The key problem lies with the fact that counterinsurgency through third parties in fragile states adopts strategies that are state-centric rather than human centric. It is focused on protecting, safeguarding and safe-guiding the state from aggression rather than protecting the lives of citizens. This is especially the case when insurgency starts after external support of regime change. Such regime change creates states that are characterized by the following:

- A fragile state that is not able to protect its citizens
- A state that lacks the trust of the citizens
- A state that is providing support for the new political elite in the country

The counterinsurgency strategies in cases of insurgency following external support of regime change are state centric. This strategy is highlighted with the following factors:

- Number of civilians killed through the interventions exceeded the number of civilians killed before the regime change or even during the start of the insurgency.
- The extensive use of military intervention that included destruction of civilian constructions and sites.
- The government's concern to prevent insurgents from overthrowing the government as a first priority, which is intensively supported by the external counterinsurgents.

Research Questions

Despite the debate over the definition of human security, it is agreed that any denial of human basic needs lead to frustration and aggression, which drives more conflict. The state's inability or unwillingness to provide basic needs to all the people is a main driver to people's aggressiveness.

Counterinsurgency have started in Iraq and Afghanistan following regime change and in Libya after responsibility to protect and regime change measures, and the question is how did those measures affect the people, how it started, why it started, is there any similar sequence

in the events and are there any similarities between the resultants of each case? All these questions will be addressed throughout the discussions of this thesis. Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions:

1. How does the divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare affect human security?
 - a. How does the divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to increase in the level of conflict?
 - b. How does the divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to an increase in the number of people engaged in the conflict
 - c. How does the divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to a vicious cycle?
2. How does the vicious cycle affect the cohesion of the community?
 - a. Does the vicious cycle increase the influx of refugees and IDPs?
 - b. Does the vicious cycle increase the possibility of separatism?
3. How does the vicious cycle affect human security?
 - a. How does the vicious cycle affect the personal security?
 - b. How does the vicious cycle affect the community security?
 - c. How does the vicious cycle affect the political security?

Hypothesis

Based on the research questions, the thesis sets up the following hypothesis:

1. A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare deteriorates human security dimensions.
 - a. A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to increase in the level of conflict.

- b. A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to an increase in the number of people engaged in the conflict.
 - c. A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to a vicious cycle.
- 2. The vicious cycle diminishes the level of cohesion within the community.
 - a. The vicious cycle increases the influx of refugees and IDPs.
 - b. The vicious cycle increases the possibility of separatism.
- 3. The vicious cycle creates different centers of mass and deteriorates human security.
 - a. The vicious cycle deteriorates personal security.
 - b. The vicious cycle deteriorates community security.
 - c. The vicious cycle deteriorates political security.

Research Methodology

The thesis aimed at investigating the impact of counterinsurgency on human security in a particular way that studies the structure of the community, and how the heterogeneous structure combined with a regime change and the engagement of multiple players creates a new structure that is completely different from the original community structure thus leading to a deteriorated human security.

A qualitative research approach was used to help understand the phenomena and the underlying relevant factors. This method ensures a multifaceted interpretative approach that ensures analyzing the full picture and considering all the underlying factors.

The literature review guided the researcher to help build the metaphor under analysis to be able to include all the relevant factors and variables. The metaphor is used for the transference of concepts; transfer from natural science to the socio-political theories. It compares a holistic system of natural science to a holistic socio-political system. This comparison included definitions of the different relevant variables along with the relationship between those variables.

The case study approach helped in ensuring an intensive holistic description of the context, history and socio-political system. This approach helped in analyzing the case over a

prolonged period of time. It analyzed the structure and the context of the three cases under study including Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. The study aimed to analyze the sequence of events: the divergent community structure in each country, how these formed a heterogeneous structure with lack of human security, the start of insurgency, regime change, and expansion of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and finally state collapse.

Analysis of the cases is based on primary and secondary data. Primary data were gathered through observation and interviews conducted in each country. Secondary data included analysis of various reports and available data in the three countries.

Interviews conducted were tailored to the participant's context and situation. It was based on in-depth interviews, where the researcher encouraged elaboration through probing questions whenever needed. Ethical considerations in conducting interviews were regarded, where participants provided verbal consent to be interviewed. Additionally, the researcher used pseudonyms when participants requested their names and positions not revealed.

Interviews were transcribed and answers were categorized under the human security dimensions. Secondary data were also analyzed under the metaphor suggested. The relevant variables under three cases were reflected on the metaphor to help answer the research questions.

Research Structure

The thesis is divided in two parts; the first part contains the literature review and the second part included the case studies. The first part contains four chapters; the first three chapters represent the theoretical background and literature review of the two basic terms human security and counterinsurgency. The fourth chapter illustrates the metaphor and model that explains the impact of counterinsurgency on human security. The second part contains the bulk of the substantive analysis that explains the application of the case studies on the metaphor suggested in the earlier chapters. It is composed of three chapters for the three case studies. And, the last chapter includes the conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter one addresses human security concept and the different perspectives of human security. As such, the chapter answers the following questions:

1. What is the definition of human security?
2. What are the different perspectives of human security?
3. What are the critiques of the human security concept?

4. What are the principles of HS?
5. What are the threats of human security?

Chapter two addresses counterinsurgency. It includes two main parts, the first is about insurgency and examples of insurgency, and the second is about counterinsurgency and different doctrines and strategies of counterinsurgency.

The third chapter addresses providers of human security in fragile states. It discusses how and what is provided through the state, insurgents, counterinsurgents, humanitarian organizations, civil society organizations, humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. This chapter is then concluded by discussing the dynamics of the various players.

The fourth chapter presents the metaphor that explains the impact of counterinsurgency. It is composed of two parts; the first part is the core theory that explains the impact of counterinsurgency on human security and community structure. The second part discusses the impact of counterinsurgency on the neighboring countries.

The second part illustrates the description of the three case studies in three chapters; Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Each case study is discussed through the same mechanism with a presentation of the following: historical and political context, community structure, insurgency, counterinsurgency, viscous cycle, and the impact of the viscous cycle on human security. The same structure was used for the analysis of the three cases to allow comparison and lessons learnt from each case. The analysis gives the opportunity to understand the case study as a standalone case, while ensuring the comparison to illustrate the use of the suggested metaphor.

The Final chapter is the Conclusion and Recommendations. Conclusions are addressed in reference to the research questions and hypothesis. It also presents scientific findings resulting from the application of the metaphor and the analysis of the cases.

Chapter 1: Human Security

Inception and Development of the Term

The term security is not a new concept; it is a concept that accompanied the states development within the international system. Traditionally, the term security meant protection and sovereignty of states from external military threats. As such the term security was an integral part of national security.

Traditionally, security has always been referred to as military and insurance of territorial security. Hence, the main concern of the concept was originated from national security, and protection from wars and conflict between nations. The question of whom to secure was not considered in this conceptual framework.

Traditionalists define security as a freedom from any objective military threat to the survival of the state. Stephen Walt, adherent of the realist school of thought, defines security as the “studies of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt, 1991, p. 212). A concept that is mainly focused on the principal of state sovereignty and that extends support and legitimacy to the instruments of the states.

Human Security as a term originated long before the 1994 UNDP report. Although not mentioned clearly, human security goes back to the cold war era. During the cold war, security was state centric though many attempts were made to give an inclusive, comprehensive and universal concept of security through different reports.

During the cold war era, the escalating threats to human existence were a main consideration, and accordingly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was announced in 1948. The declaration recognized all members of the human family that protects security of the person. Although the charter did not mention human security it included the dimensions of human security within. Also, the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation of 1968, emphasizes on the human security deviating from the traditional security paradigm.

In the 70's the human security values and questions were addressed in the World Order Models Project (WOMP). The WOMP contained three core foundational themes relating directly to human security: the emphasis on fundamental values including peace, economic

well-being, human rights and environmental balance; systematic solutions from a global context; and human centrality (Johansen, 1994).

Another significant acknowledgement of human security is the report of Willy Brandt Commission of 1978, titled "To ensure survival." In his introduction, Brandt wrote about means of survival "This not only raises traditional questions of peace and war, but also tries to overcome world hunger, mass misery and alarming disparities between the living conditions of rich and poor" (Brandt, 1978, p. 13). This illustrates the vitality of focusing on the need to consider the wider human centric rather than the state centric concept of security. He illustrates the threats including war, mass hunger, economic disaster, environmental catastrophes and terrorism. In the report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt, Brandt mentioned that "we should not think only of reducing the traditional threats to peace, but also of the need to change from chaos to order" (Brandt, 1980, p. 3).

With the end of the Cold War, new thoughts of security matters grew rapidly. The Stockholm initiative on Global security and Governance published the "Common Responsibility in the 1990s" that discussed challenges to security out of the political rivalry borders including threats stemming from "failures in development, environmental degradation, excessive population growth..." (Stockholm Initiative, 1991, p. 17)

In the Post-Cold War era, the concept of security became multifaceted. Barry Buzan presented a holistic and broader concept of security. He defined the term with a wider and deeper perception, he expanded the concept from the military exclusivity to the political, economic societal and environmental sectors, and from the centrality of the state to the individuals, social groups and the humanity in general. According to Buzan (1991, p. 18): "Security is a pursuit of freedom from threats" with reference to three levels: individuals, states and international systems.

The concept of human security was first formulated within the UN in the 1992 agenda for Peace proposed by the UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who stressed on the role of the UN in "an integrated approach to human security to address root causes of conflict, spanning economic, social and political issues. (UN 2009, p. 55)

All these reports illustrated the human security thoughts; however, it is only in the 1990s that the term Human Security was articulated upon which much literature basis its development on. The 1994 UNDP Human Development report was a key step in the development of the concept "human security". It initiated the idea that human security is freedom from fear and want. The report revealed that territorial security does not ensure individual security, it moved

from the concern of the individual nation to the global perspective, and it helps in measuring and analyzing threats at a subnational level (Owen, 2008; King, Murray, 2002).

For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them. Human security is not a concern with weapons – it's a concern with human lives and dignity.” (UNDP, 1994, p. 3)

Mahbub Ul Haq, former Pakistan Finance Minister and consultant of UNDP, was associated with the idea since the beginning. The Human Development Index and Human Governance was prepared under his initiative. Moreover, his paper ‘New Imperatives of Human Security’ that was published in 1994, paved the way for the acceptance of the new concept. Haq identifies major threats against human security; these include drugs, disease, terrorism and poverty.

The Copenhagen School also looked into this shift in the concept of security. The approach broadened the concept and included non-military threats to the states. It also, emphasized that non-military issues could be regarded as threats even if they are not considered as threats to the states, these are existential threats (Buzan et al. 1998)

The concept continued to develop and further reports were published. The concern of people as the referent for international peace and security is clearly evident in Kofi Annan report “We the people”. The report distinguishes between the freedom from want and freedom from fear with a chapter on each (Kofi, 2000).

On December 2004 the report “A more Secure World: Our shared Responsibility” was presented by the UN High Level Panel on threats, Challenges and Change. The report presented the greatest threats to worldwide security in the twenty first century including “continued poverty, environmental degradation, terrorism, civil war, conflict between states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime” (UN, 2004).

The reform package proposed by Kofi Annan to the General Assembly on March 2005 through his report “in Larger freedom” was another step in the advancement of the concept human security. Although the term was not mentioned directly, it clearly emphasized the

linkages between development, security and human rights. In his report Kofi Annan indicated that although poverty and denial of human rights are not the causes of civil war, but they do increase the risk of instability and could have catastrophic consequences (Kofi, 2005). The report stressed on the three freedoms: freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity (Kofi, 2005).

As noted in General Assembly resolution 66/290, “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.” It calls for “people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people.” (UNTFHS)

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) was established in 1999 shortly after the UNDP Human Development report. The UN Trust Fund works with diverse partners and governments in addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of local communities, their projects help “advance empowerment and capacity building measures that increase the resilience of vulnerable communities and people.” (UNTFHS)

A UN General Assembly resolution (66/290) provided a consensus in 2012 on a broad definition of human security. According to the resolution the General Assembly agree that the “human security approach identifies and addresses widespread and interrelated challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people.” Based on this, a common understanding of human security was agreed upon: “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.”¹

Human Security Definition

Debate about the definition of human security has started since it was developed, this included scholars who were reluctant to accept the concept as a new one, and especially that it was considered the same as human development or for some as human rights. However, no single singly definition is accepted. Moreover, there has never been a consensus about the general framework of the concept for measurement purposes.

The term security comes from the French word *sécurité* or Latin *securitas*. The English Oxford Dictionary defines security as the “state of being free from danger or threat”.

¹ UN Trust Fund, UN General Assembly Resolutions and Debates, and Reports of the Secretary-General on Human Security. Available at: <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/reports-resolutions/> (Accessed: January 15, 2019)

According to the Meriam Webster Dictionary it is the “means or method of defending.” In general, most dictionaries define security as freedom (from danger, deprivation etc.) while others define it as a state or condition.

The term security by itself is contested; in its generic sense security means safety from and protection against danger. Traditionally, it has been equated with the threats to a country’s border, and the tools were arms to protect security. The term was monopolized by the International Relations field of study with a narrow perspective related to military power (Møller, 2000). Security may be expanded to include national and the defense of a nation, it could also imply crime prevention, security technology and loss prevention (Brooks, 2010), which illustrates the ambiguity and vagueness of the term. However, two features are shared by most definitions of security; the first includes some form of threats that endanger certain objects’ survival, and the second is cherished values (Williams, 2008).

The term human in human security was mainly taken as a contrast between individual and the state. For Mahbub Al-Haq, the main founder of the current human security discourse, human refer to human beings rather than simply individuals (Lama, 2010). Which helps answer the question “Security to whom?” or “security for whom?” The human in this term are not isolated individuals they are social entities seeking for survival.

According to the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 “Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And, second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life- whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP, 1994, p. 23). The list of threats considered included: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP, 1994).

In the International Workshop on Human Security, the Secretary General Kofi Anan defined Human security “in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment (these are the interrelated building blocks of human- and therefore national- security)” (Kofi, 2000, para 4).

The trust fund later adopted the definition of human security presented by the Commission on Human Security in their report “Human Security Now” In 2001, where human security seeks;

“...to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.” (CHS 2003, p. 4)

Emma Rothschild (1995) explained the new approach to security as an extension in four dimensions. The first dimension is the downward extension “from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals.” The second is the upward extension “from the security of nations to the international systems.” The third extended horizontally explaining the entities cannot be secured with the same means; hence, it extends “from military to political, economic, social, environmental or human security.” And the fourth is the “political security for ensuring security” in all directions “from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market.” (p. 55)

Different definitions focused on the freedom from need and vulnerability. Nef (1999) indicated that human security is the security of environment, economy, society, politics, and culture. King and Murray (2002) defined human security as an individual’s “expectation of a life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty.” Hammerstad (2000, p. 395) indicated that “according to both ‘critical’ and ‘human’ security approaches, security is about attaining the social, political, environmental and economic conditions conducive to a life in freedom and dignity for the individual.” According to Leaning and Arie (2000, p. 37) “Human security is an underlying condition for sustainable human development. It results from social, psychological, economic, and political aspects of human life that in times of acute crisis or chronic deprivation protect the survival of individuals, support individual and group capacities to attain minimally adequate standards of living, and promote constructive group attachment and continuity through time.” Van Ginkel and Newman (2000, p. 79) defined human security in policy terms as “an integrated, sustainable, comprehensive security from fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation, and hunger resting

upon positive and negative freedoms.” Owen and Taylor (2004, p. 383) suggested that human security is “the protection of vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats”.

Other important debates not only consider the definition of the term but also on the added value of the term (Paris, 2001). Debates are considering what this concept has added to the field of security from one hand, and to what it has added to the field of Human Development and even to the field of human rights. The most important agreement that has been in place is that human security is about security of people. Paris classifies security studies into studies concerned exclusively with military threats and studies of non-military security threats including economic deprivation or environmental crisis. Studies also, according to Paris, conceive states as the core unit of analysis, while others conceive individuals and groups as the main unit of analysis. Hence, he illustrates four types of security: national security (military focused on states), redefined security (military and non-military focused on states), intrastate security (military focused on individuals and groups), and Human security (military and non-military focused on individuals and groups).

The World Bank produced a constructive contribution to the concept, although it did not directly mention the term human security. The ‘World Development Report 2000/2001, identifies three pillars of poverty reduction initiatives: empowerment, security, and opportunities. Security in the report addresses “the risk and vulnerability which poor nations will increasingly face in the global economy, and which the poor in poor nations have always faced and which traps them into poverty. At the macro level this will require national and international action to mitigate risks and then to react to crisis when they do occur, in a manner which protects the poorest. At the micro level this will require a whole range of interventions which enhance community level schemes, market-based schemes and national level schemes where appropriate.” (WB, 2001, p. 13)

King & Murray (2002) initiated a new concept called years of individual human security (YIHS). It is the “expected number of years of life spent outside the state of generalized poverty”. He suggested that this is a four-dimensional factor; these include income, health, education, and democracy and political freedom. Generalized poverty occurs when an individual fall below the threshold of any key domain of human well-being.

Wide vs Narrow Definitions of Human Security

The different definitions of human security are focused into two main categories: the broad and the narrow definitions. The difference between these two approaches is illustrated

through answering the three main questions: Security of whom? Security from what? And security by what means?

The question of security for whom is answered similarly amongst the different approaches. The main concern is the people, it is not a state-centric, it is an individual centric. The question of security from what poses the main difference between the two approaches. The narrow approach perceives violence as the main threat to security; the concern is freedom from fear (King & Murray, 2002). While the broad approach perceives that threats to security expand to those affecting survival, well-being and dignity; it includes freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity (Tadjbakhsh, 2014). 'Security by what means' varies since the threats vary. For the narrow approach that focuses on freedom from fear, the main mechanism is arms and humanitarian intervention. While for the broad approach, the main mechanism is humanitarian intervention, but also it is concerned about prevention protection and empowerment. It is tackled through comprehensive policies not only military means (Tadjbakhsh, 2014).

Governmental Definitions of Human Security

The end of Cold War has affected the international environment and foreign policy of states, on the other hand new threats including political and economic instabilities have risen. All these challenges have shifted the perspective of states towards

Although the human security concept was proposed as a human centered rather than a state centered; the concept was adopted in foreign policies of governments faster than civil society organizations (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2009, p. 28). The first governments to adopt human security were Japan and Canada. However, these middle powers adopted human security as a pillar in their foreign policy rather than their domestic policy.

Japan: Freedom from want

Shortly after the UNDP presented the concept of human security; the Japanese adopted the concept in its foreign policy. The concept is in line with Japan constitution, which stipulates that "we recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want."² Article 9 of the constitution also prohibits the use of force to solve disputes³. The

² The constitution of Japan.

https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Accessed: 17 April 2019).

³ *ibid*

concept is also in line with the policies adopted in Japan. This is apparent in the Prime Minister's Report of 1979, which stated that "comprehensive security means that both military and non-military aspects are considered regarding objectives and methods when formulating national security policy" (Wan, 1995). It is also apparent in Japan's enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) and their participation and contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and humanitarian relief missions (Cornelis, 2006). The concept was also in compliance with the Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy of Japan, which was announced by the Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's to the UN General Assembly Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development in 1995. The policy was referred to as "human-centered", where social development was the focus for the ODA (Fukushima, 1999). This was also underpinned by Ryutaro Hashimoto who spoke of security of human beings at the UN General Assembly in 1997. Japan has been one of the leading countries to provide funding for human security, driven by its desire to attain a permanent seat in the UN (Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy, 2009).

The financial crisis in Asia erupted in 1997, which had a strong impact on the policies of the Government of Japan. As a result, in 1998, the prime minister Keizo Obuchi launched the foreign policy and program of human security, which considers all threats of human survival whereby using the more comprehensive definition of human security.

Human security was described in the 1999 Diplomatic Bluebook in a manner that covers all threats to human survival, daily life and dignity; and strengthens efforts to face those threats. The 2002 Bluebook witnessed a change in the policy to include "realization of the abundant potential inherent in each individual" (Cornelis, 2006, p. 57); which included the broad development of human beings that is more emphasis and broadening of the 'fear from want'.

This was also coined through the establishment of the Commission on Human Security (CHS) and setting up the largest trust fund in the UN (Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy, 2009). In 2003, the recommendations of the CHS led to the creation of the Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) aiming at advising the UN Secretary-General on the management of the UNTFHS (Remacle, 2008). With its comprehensive definition, the Government of Japan has focused on the developmental and economic aspect of human security, where it played with the help of other UN agencies the dominant role in the ABHS.

The Japanese conceptualization of human security strength lies in its holistic nature to accomplish sustainability in creating human security; which is the perspective of "freedom from want" that is at the center of the UNDP's definition. However, it remained a foreign policy rather than a policy targeting their citizens. The framework of this policy includes

peacemaking, post-conflict peacebuilding, and the dispatch of troops for humanitarian relief (ER, 2006). Collaboration with other governments in practice did not take off, although intentions were as such. Japan established the Friends of Human Security in 2006 that focused on multilateral and not bilateral cooperation (Edström, 2011).

Japan's failure in its campaign for a permanent seat on the Security Council affected its drive for human security (Edström, 2011). However, Japan continues to pursue human security as a pillar in its foreign policy (Thaemar & Tana, 2015).

Canada: Freedom from fear

Canada was the first country to adopt human security in its foreign policy. Given the transnational security implications, the Minister of foreign affairs in Canada Axworthy saw the need to adopt the refined concept of security, where he identified human insecurity as a potential threat to Canadian security. This policy development was in conjunction with the International security.

The MFA Axworthy (1997, p. 184) presented his perception of human security in his article Canada and Human security:

"The forces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedom, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament...lasting stability cannot be achieved until human security is guaranteed."

Core issues that were adapted in the Canadian foreign policy were the establishment of a peacebuilding capacity, the banning of landmines, the reduction of the flow of small arms and conflict commodities, protecting children against sexual abuse, child labor, and violence, the promotion of international criminal justice, and later on a renewed approach to development assistance, in addition to promotion of rules-based trade to spur economic development (Hampson et al, 2002). for this end Canada's strategy was based on developing policy initiatives and building coalitions with other countries and institutions (Remacle, 2008). With this definition Canada included both the "freedom from fear" and freedom from want" aspects of the definition; however, it ended up to be freedom from fear (MacLean 2000). In practice

Canada narrowed its definition of human security due to the lack of capacity and most importantly to strengthen its national identity especially after the domestic challenge and the failed Quebec referendum (Lui, 2012: p151).

Within the narrow definition, Canada has played an effective role in the development of human security. Canada played a pivotal role to establish the International Criminal Court and contributed to its development. This started by chairing a coalition of state called the “like-minded group” that helped to motivate the international community to adopt it. It also contributed to a United Nations Trust Fund that enabled lesser developed countries in ICC negotiations (Oosterveld, 2018).

The failure of the UN in Rwanda in 1994 led to a re-evaluation of the principle of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the obligation of the UN to maintain security. At the G-8 meeting in Cologne in 1999, Axworthy illustrated the following:

“Human security is going to have to be reconciled with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Kosovo illustrates this particular contradiction well. ... The norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states remains basic to international peace and security, and the intervention in Kosovo must not be held as a precedent justifying intervention anywhere, anytime, or for any reason. However, in cases of extreme abuse, as we have seen in Kosovo and Rwanda, among others, the concept of national sovereignty cannot be absolute” (Bosold & Werthes, 2005, p. 113).

As a result, the Canadian government initiated the creation of the ‘International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’(ICISS). The final report in 2001 was titled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, where humanitarian intervention was discussed as per the Canadian definition of human security (Bosold & Werthes, 2005).

The change in government in 2006 did witness a change in the perception of human security. Human security was removed as a foreign policy issue. As a result, Canada’s human security website was removed; the Human Security Policy Division was renamed Human Rights and Democracy Bureau. However, despite these changes, Canada continued its initiatives to protect human beings from threats; Canada was involved in Libya intervention under the pretext of ‘the responsibility to protect’ (Petrasek & Tiessen, 2016).

Human security has helped both Japan and Canada to become members of the G-8 but not in the UNSC and to strengthen their international status. This could not have been the case given

the regional context in each; the financial crisis in Asia for Japan, and the marginalized role within NATO for Canada (Remacle, 2008).

Europe

The interest in human security in the EU did not start in the early 1990s, only with some minimal individual initiatives. Sweden took with Japan the initiative to start the commission on Human Security. While Canada with the help of Norway collaborated with Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia to take part in the Human Security Network (Remacle, 2008).

In 1999, the European states changed from the status of justifying the absence of military dimension in the European Commission to the status of justifying the need to develop a military arm in accordance to the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki meetings of the European Council (Remacle, 2008).

In December 2003, the European Council agreed on a European Security Strategy under the name “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.” The strategy defined five key threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organized crime. The Strategy had three main objectives. The first objective addresses the threats including local and distant threats, which doesn’t necessarily have to be purely military that could be contained through “political, economic and pressures while the underlying political causes” (EC, 2003, p. 5). The second objective emphasizes on building security in the neighborhood, these include neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict and weak states. The third objective is international order based on effective multilateralism, which requires stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions, and international order (EC, 2003). The strategy was then expanded in 2008 and again in 2016. The strategy emphasized that the root causes of insecurity is instability which needs to be addressed through development, human rights and good governance. The strategy also called for practical and principled way in peacebuilding and for fostering human security through multilateralism.

In September 2004, under the request of the EU Secretary General Javier Solana, an independent group released “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”; a doctrine for the implementation of the European Security Strategy. The doctrine comprises three elements: a set of seven principles (primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of

force), a human security response force, and a new legal framework to govern decisions and operation.

Elements and principles of human security

Human security is a shift from the traditional state-centric perception of security concerned about protection from military aggression to the human centric perception concerned about empowerment and protection from threats that cut across the different aspects of human life.

Human security integrates three freedoms. *Freedom from fear* refers to protecting individuals from violence threats that may arise from the state, other groups, other individuals or other states. *Freedom from want* refers to protecting individuals so that they satisfy their basic needs. *Freedom to live in dignity*, which refers to improved quality of life and welfare of individuals.

The UNDP report (1994), presents four characteristics of human security: universal, interdependent, preventive and people centered. *Universality* means that human security is relevant to all people everywhere in rich and poor nations. *Interdependent* refers to the interdependency of the impact of insecurity; when the security of people is endangered the region and all nations are likely to get engaged; many threats travel the globe as in the case of terrorism, pollution, trafficking etc. *Prevention-oriented* reflects the importance of addressing the root causes of insecurities to ensure protection and empowerment; human security is best ensured through early protection. The fourth characteristic is *people-centered* which means that the individual is placed at the center of analysis.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security described five characteristics or features of human security; these include: people-centered, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention oriented. *Comprehensiveness* requires cooperative responses from different actors and multi-sectoral interventions taking into consideration security, development and human rights. *Context specific* characteristics refer to the fact that insecurities vary across different settings and as such solutions vary according to these contexts (UN, 2009).

There are seven dimensions of human security, these include: (UNDP, 2014)

1. *Economic security* requires an assured basic income employment and access to social safety net for individuals. Threats within this category ranges from persistent poverty to unemployment.

2. *Food security* requires that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. It is about the access to basic nutrition and food supply. The threats here include hunger and famine.
3. *Health security* aims at guaranteeing protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles, this implies a wide range of threats considered within: access to safe water, living in a safe environment, access to health services, access to safe and affordable family planning and basic support during pregnancy and delivery, prevention of HIV/AIDS and other diseases and to have basic knowledge to live a healthy life. Threats include: deadly infectious diseases along with unsafe food, malnutrition and lack of access to basic health care.
4. *Environmental security* aims to protect people from the short and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature and deterioration of the environment. This covers issues related to prevention of water pollution, prevention of air pollution, prevention from deforestation, irrigated land conservation, prevention of natural hazards such as droughts, floods, cyclones, earthquakes, etc. threats include environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters and pollution.
5. *Personal security* aims at protecting people from physical violence from the state, sub-state actors or other states; from individuals or groups; from domestic abuse or from predator adults. Personal threats include physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, and child labor.
6. *Community security* aims at protecting people from loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian ethnic violence. It covers conservation of traditional and cultures, languages and commonly held values. Community threats include inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions.
7. *Political security* aims at ensuring political participation and protecting against political repression including freedom of speech, freedom of press. It is also concerned with protection of human rights and well-being of all people.

These seven types of threats are interconnected in a way that one threat can cause the other and that these threats can have negative implications on the regional and international security.

The two main strategies to achieve human security are the protection and empowerment. Protection refers to the “norms, processes and institutions required to protect people from pervasive threats” (UN, 2009, p. 8). Protection implies a “top-down” approach, where the

states have the responsibility to provide protection measures for their people against threats in a systematic, comprehensive and preventive ways. Also, international and regional organizations, civil society organizations, and nongovernmental actors also play an important role in protection.

Empowerment refers to “strategies that enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations” (UN, 2009, p. 8). Empowerment implies a bottom-up approach. Bottom up approach of human security attempts to explicitly involve people living in conflict areas in the human security policies (Faber, 2008). Empowerment means enabling individuals to participate in solutions to ensure human security for themselves and for others. Combining the top-down and the bottom up approaches builds a mechanism that enables governments to reflect people’s needs in policy making and then deliver services that respond to their needs (JICA, 2010).

“Human Security complements state security, strengthen human development and enhances human rights” (CHS, 2003, p. 2) Human security complements state security with its concern to include individuals and communities, with its concern to consider a wider range of threats, with a wide range of actors and with a concern to more than protection but also empowerment and inclusion (CHS, 2003, p. 3).


The concepts of Human development and human security are interrelated. “Human development focuses on absolute levels of deprivation whereas human security emphasizes the risk of sudden changes for the worse” (Tadjbakhsh, 2014, p. 50) Human development seeks to expand choices and opportunities with a focus on ‘growth with equity’ (CHS, 2003). Human security and development are both concerned with the basic freedoms with similar goals and different scopes. “The human security concept draws attention not just to levels of achievement, but to securing gains made by deliberately focusing on downside risks” (Tadjbakhsh, 2014, p. 50).

Human security and human rights clearly overlap. Human security identifies rights at stake, whereas human rights promoted human security (CHS, 2003). Human security and human rights are similar in the sense that they both aim for human dignity, concerned about morality and are applicable with universality of the term. However, there are many differences between the two. Human rights are legally binding; however, human security alarms about threats and allows prioritization.

According to Tadjbakhsh (2014, p. 52) human security is a convergence of the security, human rights and development. She visualizes human security in a triangle formed by the three approaches. She describes what human security adds to each approach: ads focus on

people in security, adds focus on threats in human rights, and adds insurance against risks in human development.

Figure 1: **Human Security, Development and Human Rights**



Source: Tadjbakhsh, 2014, p.52.

Critiques of Human Security

As the concept of human security has evolved so have criticism from different perspectives of the concept increased. However, despite this criticism, the populism and spread of the concept was not affected, it maintained its momentum on different levels. The concept is a leading approach to identify problems, diagnosis, prioritizations, responses and evaluations. It has spread into different fields of studies including gender studies, environmental studies, and migration research; it has also framed peace efforts that go beyond military interventions. However, the concept has received criticism from different scholars and different schools. Criticism of human security could be categorized according to the following:

1. Lack of accurate definition

One of the major critiques about human security is related to the definition of the concept. Some scholars claim that since there is no consensus about the definition the field loses its credibility. Extreme critiques targeted the concept as a whole as is the case with Buzan and Paris, while moderate critiques targeted the broad perspective of the concept (Owen, 2004).

Paris argued that human security lacks a precise definition; it is “like sustainable development- everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinary expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being... human security is powerful precisely because it lacks precision” (Paris, 2001, p. 88). Similarly, Newman (2010) referred to human security as normatively attractive and analytically weak. Others expressed weakness of measuring the threats and the outcomes (King & Murray, 2002).

However, lacking an accurate and firm definition does not imply a lack of utility, novelty or importance of the term. Comparing the term with sustainable development indicates that despite of the vagueness and critiques, the term is utilized and is part of policy making for governments, NGOs and international organizations.

2. Old wine in a new bottle

Main critiques of human security indicated that the term brought nothing new; it is only the old wine of ‘human rights’ in a new bottle ‘human security’. Others mentioned it is repackaging of a liberal humanitarian order. Krause (2004, p. 367) described it as “a loose synonym for bad things that can happen”

Its an inter-disciplinary research that requires coherent and interconnected solutions from different actors to accomplish the security of the individuals and communities within the state.

3. No possibility to measure

The concept’s subjectivity and lack of consensus of the definition, makes it impossible to measure. However, “a human security measurement will always be context-specific... applicable indicators and norms will emerge as concept is integrated into policy making” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2009, p. 67).

4. Critiques on policy grounds – lack of prioritization power

Human security was criticized due to its inability to be incorporated on a policy level. Labeling all potential harms as security threats makes it impossible to prioritize political actions and interventions. The nature of the concept doesn't allow policy makers to prioritize between competing goals and security needs (Paris, 2001); if all the threats are considered then we are prioritizing everything (Khong, 2001). As such it is hard to apply on policy level. However, human security has been built on the notion that threats are complex, interconnected, interrelated and interdependent. Hence, analysis of the threats should be context-specific with different actors taking part in addressing those threats. It should be addressed using a bottom-up approach as well as top-down approach aiming not only at protecting but also empowering individuals and communities.

5. A Matter of hegemonic interest of Middle Powers

Some critiques of human security reflect the fact that adopting human security as a foreign policy for some was a matter of hegemonic interest. Soeya (2004) said "what is peculiarly Japanese in Japan's context and approach to human security is that the motivation is closely connected with the desire to play a bigger role in international society under the assumption of proactive pacifism.

Critiques also targeted Canada's foreign policy and human security agenda. Most critiques considered that Canada's promotion of human security was due to the lack of power and capacity. Bosold & Bredow (2006) labeled Canada's foreign policy as "pinchpenny diplomacy" and pulpit diplomacy, due to the willingness to minimize efforts and budget while maintaining a major role in the international politics.

However, having the political interest doesn't contradict the fact that efforts have been made in support of human security initiative. Also, having worked on humanitarian and economic themes doesn't contradict with security interventions, rather it compliments other intervention. These countries have dealt with areas of conflict not as source of insecurity but as a means to security.

6. Human security is a threat to state sovereignty

Some critiques of human security claim that securitizing threats is a justification for continued surveillance and engagement, it may increase the potential of military interventions and impose military solutions, and for some it is a neo-colonial means.

However, human security is not in favor of military solutions. Human security addresses the root causes of the conflict which are in most cases non-military interventions. Although R2P is a means created by the UN to prevent human catastrophe: “the failure of past military interventions encourages a move towards preventive, non-military enforcement of human security” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2009, p. 64). Also, if the state is not able to perform their responsibility of intervention, then intervention enables the state to fulfill their responsibility. This means that human security is not a breach to sovereignty of the state. Considering the wide range of security threats; however, means including different actors to take role in the solution including international organizations, civil society and the state.

Despite all the criticism, human security and its impact is still apparent, especially in the advancement of the peacekeeping. The Ottawa Treaty of banning anti-personal mines, Rome Treaty of ICC, UN Security resolutions on Child and Armed Conflict and Women, Peace and Security and R2P. Moreover, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security has funded more than 200 projects since its establishment all aiming freedom from want (Sadako, 2013). Additionally, as has been discussed the EU has developed its security strategy based on the human security principle of “freedom from fear and freedom from want”. Even the NATO is also addressing human security principle “freedom from fear” through the R2P. Also, echoing the human security principles, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development assures a “world free of poverty, hunger, disease and want... free of fear and violence... with equitable and universal access to quality education, health care and social protection...”⁴

International Security and human security

To understand the shift in security studies to human security and to a broadening perspective of security, this section provides a description of the relationship between theories of international security and human security.

Realism

Realism is an old approach to security that dates back to Thucydides. The theory is very rich and has evolved overtime. Realists view the international system as anarchic and power as the main feature of the international environment; where the states are the unitary actors and

⁴ <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/agenda-2030/> (Accessed 15 March, 2019).

power is based on military forces with key elements including wealth, population and technology (Glaser, 2016, p. 14).

Neorealism is promoted by Kenneth Waltz in his work “theory of international politics” (1979, p. 102). He stated that “the state amongst states, conducts its affairs in the shadow of violence. Because some states may use force at any time, all must be prepared to do.” This shows that for neorealism the state is the key actor when it comes to security, while pursuing offensive military capability to defend themselves as stronger military implies better security. Security is about strong military and preparing for war whether it comes or not.

Although economic security is important for neo-realism; however, it is important because it’s an input for military purposes (Glaser, 2010). Hence, neorealism view of security is narrow and doesn’t acknowledge environmental, economic, personal, community, or social issues in security

Human security advocates criticize realism in four main areas: referent object, values, perceptions of threats and means of protection (Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy, 2007, p. 84). The main referent object in human security is the individual; whereas realism and neo-realism is a state-centric approach to national security that ignores citizens. Human security is an ethical and methodological school; its concern of security is beyond the state to reach individuals and communities; and not just through power but also through human rights and development.

Realism is a “value-free theory” (Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy, 2007, p. 84) as its main concern is power. Its main value is the state survival, which leads to arms race. Realists are generally pessimistic towards human nature and view the inevitability of war. Whereas human security values security, stability, sustainability, and protection of values, which leads to ensuring development, human rights and peace.

For realists the main source of threat to state security is military power, they perceive the state as the sole actor that seeks hard power as a remedy to threats. Human security, on the other hand, considers a wide range of threats that includes military and non-military risks. Human security is based on multilateralism, which requires stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions, and international order (EC, 2003) and empowerment and participation of the people. People have an active role in human security; communities in human security may have different perception and solutions that needs to be taken into consideration.

Liberalism

Liberalism is often associated with John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Liberalism perceives that the role of institutions, political relationships and economic interdependence are all means to strengthen peace and security (Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy, 2007, p. 86). Liberalism is centered on two main principles; individualism and liberty. Liberalism places individuals at the heart of the society; allowing them to reach their full potential by giving them more liberty (Nugraha & Madu, 2013). Liberalism is features by universalism, which is a feature of human security as well. Liberalism considers individuals as the primary actor in international relations, where these individuals are rational. Additionally, liberalism emphasizes the importance of economic interdependence among states to hinder conflict. This could be achieved through cooperation between states (Nugraha & Madu, 2013). Liberalism values freedom, human rights, rationality, progress and democracy.

Although human security and liberalism share ontological and epistemological elements, human security has a broader perspective. In answering the question security for whom both schools consider individuals as the referent object. Liberalism answers the question security from what threats through conflict, political, economic and commercial as the main threats, while human security has a broader perspective. In answering the question security by what means, although both paradigms consider military and non-military measures through international organizations, NGOs, representatives of the civil society along with the states, human security go beyond this to include active engagement and empowerment of individuals and good governance.

Although liberals have widened the perspective of security but their policy still rests on one premise to defend national security interests. "The liberal school has little to do with moral concerns about human security" (Peou, 2014, p. 87).

Constructivism

Constructivism was introduced to the field of international relations by Nicholas Onuf (1989), this was then further developed by Alexander Wendt who rejected neorealist positions. Constructivism is a move from the materialist view to the ideational view. A shift from the perspective of the power and national interest as the driving force to a perspective that considers ideas that makes up material power (Jackson & Georg, 2006, p. 166). Wendt argues that the state's policy for survival and security is defined by identifying identities and interests that are shaped by interaction between states (Wendt, 1992) and interaction with its own

society (Hopf, 2002). Hence, constructivism broadened the analytical perspective to include identity and culture as causal factors that helps shape the national security policies and global insecurities (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 537).

The main characteristics of constructivism include the following:

1. Constructivism emphasizes the sociological concepts of ideas, norms, identity and culture.
2. Constructivism perceives that norms, culture, customs and learning shape the behaviors and interests of country's citizenry.
3. Social structure has three components: shared knowledge, material resources and practices.
4. Constructivism believes that interaction between countries generate interests and identity.
5. The interaction between international community and the structure of international political system is a two-way process (Wendt, 1992).
6. State's interests are constantly evolving which affects international security (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2009).

Constructivism share many features with human security as they both criticize the overemphasis on material concerns and seek to emphasize on subjective, psychological and human elements (Tsai, 2009). "Constructivism reinterprets traditional material, state-centric society; similarly, human security reinterprets traditional theories of military force and national security" (Tsai, 2009, p, 24).

Both schools rely on human perception; human security reflects the influence of values and norms on security studies. Human security is an attempt to reconstruct the interpretation of the roots of insecurity emphasizing on underdevelopment, poverty and humiliation; which are themes considered by constructivism (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2009). Human security considered a comprehensive analysis and ontology which formed institutions and norms.

In constructivism the interaction between states to achieve common interests implies promotion of human security as the process determines interests and identity; and identity constitutes the interests. And since these are subject to change, this would lead to considering a security that is people centered; which reflected in both human security and constructivism.

Critical theory

Critical theory is a school of thought that questions and critiques social and political life. The school was inspired by György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci and then the Frankfurt School. The theory explored the cultural and ideological aspects of power that aims at social transformation (Peou, 2014, p. 124).

Critical theory perceives realism negatively in its emphasis on state-centric military primacy, they are also dissatisfied with the liberal paradigm, they are dissatisfied with the status quo. Critical theory claims that security is a contested concept due to its influence by individuals and state commitments. Also, critical theory doesn't adopt human security, as human security embraces universalism, while critical theory perceives that individuals are different and this requires different solution not a universal paradigm.

Critical theory perceives that individual is the referent object of security. However, the theory specifies this object as the "disadvantaged, the voiceless, ... women and other oppressed" (Peou, 2014: p. 128). Hence societal and political transformation should be targeting the marginalized.

In answering the questions security from what and by what means, critical theory adopts the broadening perspective of security. Hence it includes pandemics, environmental, economic, political and societal threats. However, according to the critical theory, human security should be considered from a critical theory approach to consider structural power and distribution of power (Nugraha & Madu, 2013).

Postcolonial

Post-colonialism holds a historical and ideological connotation, which focuses on colonial experience from the colonized society point of view. It emphasizes a separation system: Europe vs non-Europe, strong vs weak, powerful vs powerless and north vs south. This approach is of importance as it considers the security issues in post-colonial countries different from Eurocentric security issues and it also considers that the methods that work in each are also different.

This perception reflects the refusal of universalism given the binary system reflected; the post-colonial and the other. As such, postcolonialism reflects the perspective that the North is civilized, humanist and progressing; in contrast with the south (Nugraha & Madu, 2013). Chandler (2008) indicted that human security is used to exaggerate new threat sources and ties these threats with the developing world and the south countries.

Feminism

Feminism, albite the wide range of theories, they all share the same view that patriarchy is the dominant factor in social systems. The basic goal of the feminist movement is the creation of a theory based on the experience and using the language of women and to ask questions previously ignored. “In doing so, the emotional involvement of the researcher is permitted” (Gasztold, 2017, p. 182).

Feminist IR dates back to the 1980s, with an attempt to bring feminist theory into the discipline of international relations. It has questioned IR’s assumptions and concepts about states and citizens (Tickner, 2004). Feminist has considered a bottom-up approach analyzing the impact of war on micro-level; it has focused on the impact of war on women and civilians. They have also questioned the role of the state in providing security.

Feminist approach differs from human security in that they adopt gender as the main category of analysis (Peou, 2014, p. 159). Feminists focus on the unequal social structures due to gender hierarchies affect the security of individuals and groups.

Human security differs from the perspective of feminism in the universality feature. Although some feminist scholars indicate that all women share the same victimhood due to the social structures, others perceive that women do not suffer the same way; hence they don’t perceive it as universal theme. However, both feminism and human security encompass a multidimensional approach through broadening the threats to security. We can consider that feminism contributes to human security in gender equality (Peou, 2014, p. 187); and in complementing norms with policy-making (Tickner, 2004).

Conclusion

Human security has helped direct the perspective of security towards the protection of the individual. It has shifted the concern from the state to individuals and shifting the focus from military threats to political, economic, societal and environmental threats. With the primacy of human rights, human security altered the security policies and development; it has shifted the means of military interventions, humanitarian operations and protection of civilians, and also the primacy of human development as opposed to growth of national economies.

States and regional and international organizations incorporated human security in their security policies aiming to resolve conflicts and address sources of insecurity. However,

policies should tackle insecurities and sources of insecurities. Multilateral institutions should expand their presence to provide early warnings and to help in articulating their policies. This presence could incorporate institutional building within the areas of intervention, support of education and social services, and focus on development support. These policies should not be limited to areas of conflict but also extend to areas prone to insecurity.

Human security could be considered a paradigm shift as no one school considers security norms of the different actors targeting security threats. Human security ensures human rights and human development by engaging states and non-state actors through mechanisms ranging from development, empowerment, local ownership, while balancing between diplomacy military and human rights with the aim of empowering and protecting individuals of the state. In this dissertation human security will be considered as maintaining the joint focus of freedom from want and freedom from fear, maintaining the multi-dimensionality and multilateralism of the concept. It will consider the broad definition of human security.

Chapter 2: Counterinsurgency

Insurgency

Background

Insurgency has existed throughout history; however, its significance has increased recently. Today the challenge of insurgency has confronted organized existing strategies and doctrines. Two main factors are challenges to governments and existing systems that are unable to defeat insurgents with limited capacities; these are protractedness and ambiguity.

Different types of insurgencies have existed throughout history. In some cases, it has formed “background noise” during conflict between great powers, and in other cases it was fully an internal issue affecting local stability (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 1).

When considering insurgency, the questions to be addressed are: how are they recruited, moral and emotional motivation, their composition and how they are sustained? This section helps answer those questions.

According to David Galula (1964, p. 7) an insurgency is fluid since the insurgents neither have responsibility nor concrete assets. This fluidity remains until a balance is reached with the counterinsurgent. Operations are mainly based on a hit-and-run operation, with a freedom to choose the time of the battle and the decision of whether to be engaged in the battle.

The nature of insurgency has evolved due to the ever-changing environment. Currently, insurgencies are not the single-party organization, like Mao’s and Ho Chi. Insurgent organizations are composed of “loose coalitions” of local and global networks (Hammes, 2006). These organizations reflect the social organizations they come from. They operate locally and globally, they also operate through local and transnational organizations like the Afghans who fought in Bosnia. (Hammes, 2006). Taliban is another example that changed from being a purely local movement into a global jihadist community (Mahadevan, 2014). Although these coalitions share a common battle; however, they need not have the same goals, each party can fight for their cause. In Syria insurgency coalitions have different objectives ranging from an aim to form a secular government to those who aim at forming a strict Islamic one; however, they form coalitions of insurgents.

Insurgencies are now adapting to the changing environment; many are “trans-dimensional and transnational”. (Hammes, 2006) They are using electronic warfare, Computer network operations, psychological operations, and military deception. They have moved from simple communications and propaganda to online recruitment, vetting of recruits, training, and e-marketing. They are using the social media widely and intensively.

Insurgency poses challenges threatening political and social stability, and in many cases, they stem from the lack of political, economic and social orders. Globalization has set the standards and expectations high, states are not able to keep pace with the growing development, this has resulted in discontent and in many cases the rise on insurgencies (Metz & Millen, 2004: 1).

Insurgency Definition

Terms of terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare are used interchangeably. The word originates from mid-18th century: via French from Latin insurgent- ‘arising’, from the verb insurgere, from in- ‘into, towards’ surgere ‘to rise’. According to Oxford Dictionary the word insurgent is “a person fighting against a government or invading force; a rebel or revolutionary.” Whereas terrorist means “A person who uses unlawful violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.”⁵ While in Merriam-Webster Dictionary terrorist is an advocate practitioner of terrorism as a means of coercion.

According to Ünal (2016), “insurgencies directly oppose the state’s authority and challenge the regime through politico-military actions intended to weaken the control of a constituted government through an organized protracted war. Terrorists, however, are mostly marginalized underground groups employing indirect violence to create public fear, intimidation and anxiety in order to evoke political reaction.” Many scholars perceive that terrorism is a tool used by insurgents (Ünal 2016, Kydd & Walter, 2006, Merari, 1993). According to Kiss (2014), insurgency is the most common form of asymmetric warfare.

According to the Federation of American Scientists, “Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations” (FAS, 2009). According to NATO, insurgency is “the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the

⁵ Oxford Dictionary. LEXICO available at: <https://www.lexico.com/definition/terrorist> (Accessed June 17, 2019)

population through the use of violence and subversion” (NATO AAP-06 Edition 2019. p.94). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) perceives insurgency as, “Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations” (GAI, 2012, p. 1)

Insurgency is the most prevalent type of armed conflict. “Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources, organizational expertise, propaganda and demonstration, and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.” (O’Neil & Bard, 2005)

Types of Insurgency

Most analysis of insurgents categorized these groups based on goals of the insurgency and its strategies. However, every insurgency is unique and depends on the culture, history, geography and the overall context in which it grows. Insurgents’ categorization is also dependent on the affiliation of the group and on the goal. Some are perceived as expressions of popular will, while others are condemned as violent disruption of political order; some are blacklisted while others are perceived as the saviors; and hence approaches to confront insurgencies range from counterinsurgency to conflict management.

The most known insurgency is the Maoist People (1930s). Mao’s views were affected by the Chinese literature before being exposed to the Communist Manifesto by accepting basic Marxism in his theory (Schram, 1969). This form is also known as people’s war. This is an example where the central government of China considered them as insurgents, whereas the Maoists described themselves as liberation revolutionary movement.

Metz (1993) introduced two types of insurgencies psychological and commercial. The psychological or spiritual insurgency is the search for meaning. Insurgents in this case strive for self-fulfillment by those who feel abused, repressed or alienated. These perceive themselves as agents for justice. Commercial insurgency is the search for wealth. Insurgents in this case pursue material possessions, in search of personal satisfaction that has been affected by the globalization.

Metz & Millen (2004) suggests two types of insurgents: national and liberation. In the national insurgency the main antagonists are the insurgents and the national government. The

insurgency is based on economic, class, ideology or any other political factor; which insurgents strive to change. This insurgency could also be of a triangular form; where a third party could be involved in the process by supporting one or the other. The liberation insurgency is against a ruling group that is seen as an outsider or an occupier; hence the main objective of insurgents in this case is to liberate the nation.


O'Neill (2005) suggests nine types of insurgents: anarchists, egalitarians, traditionalists, pluralists, apocalyptic-utopians, secessionists, reformists, preservationists, and commercialists. Anarchists are those seeking to destroy the existing political systems as they perceive them illegal and unnecessary. The egalitarian insurgents seek a system that is based on distributional equality and centrally controlled structures to accomplish a desired social change. Traditionalists recall for sacred values rooted in ancestral ties and religion through a centralized ruling elite with passive involvement by the majority. Apocalyptic-utopian is a group of insurgents who believe that spreading cruelty and injustice is the way to achieve spiritual salvation. Pluralists seek individual freedom to establish a system that values liberty and compromise. Secessionists insurgents also called separatists seeks to withdraw from the existing political system or community to form an independent autonomous system. Reformists are those seeking policy reform, these target policies that determine distribution of the economic, psychological, political, and environmental benefits. Preservationists seek preserving the system without any change, they carry illegal and violent acts against those pursuing change. Commercialists' main objective is the acquisition of material resources through gaining political power.

Insurgency Life Cycle

Kilcullen (2009), presented an analogy of a disease to describe how guerrilla warfare develops and spreads. Although his model is made especially for Al Qaeda, this model can be generalized for other insurgency movements. The first phase of the life cycle is the infection where extremists enter into a vulnerable area; the second phase is contagion where the insurgents spread their influence. The third phase is the intervention. In this phase outside forces (often western partnered) engages in security services. And the final phase is the rejection phase; where the population reacts negatively towards this intervention. This model presents an important recommendation for external interventions during counterinsurgency. It suggests that those interventions should advocate well-being and human security and not imposing a western or outside system. Thus, such interventions should help build trust,

empowering local systems, ensuring credibility of local systems. Figure 2 below illustrates the model suggested by Kilcullen.

Figure 2: **Kilcullen model of guerrilla warfare**



Source: Kilcullen, 2009


Despite the limitation of the model it is still relevant in many cases. The model is focusing mainly on Al-Qaeda, though Al-Qaeda is only one form of insurgents and does not represent the development process of other movements. Also, the insurgents do not necessarily form in remote, ungoverned areas; they might start in urban areas. Moreover, counterinsurgency is not necessarily dependent on external force; it could be based only on national forces. Despite all these drawbacks, the model is relevant since it could be adapted to other insurgents according to the following: infection: insurgents establish presence resulting from a cause or objective; contagion: the insurgents use the opportunity to spread their virus where there is weakness and opportunity to affect; intervention: counterinsurgency starts its operation; rejection: more population joins the insurgents as members or supporters. This model of insurgents' growth is important as it could be used to build counterinsurgency strategies that is designed in coherence with the phase of insurgency development.

The model also is restricted to a certain phase of the insurgency lifecycle as it limits itself to the growth of the insurgency while neglecting the possibilities of insurgency decline or any other possibilities. The following is a suggested insurgency lifecycle that includes life span starting from the establishment of the insurgency up to the end of the conflict. The life cycle of insurgencies passes through five different phases: initiation, growth, peak of operations, decline and death. Since it is a protracted conflict, the life span could extend for years, though it varies from an insurgency to another. Figure (3) below illustrates the life cycle of the insurgency.

The first phase is the initiation; it is the evolution of the insurgency. This is motivated by the notion to obtain political or ideological objectives after failure to do so in a conventional manner. In this phase the insurgents are still weak and not organized. There are two approaches in this phase; the first is: establishing a reputation- brand identity” (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 3), and the second is maintaining an underground approach without publicity (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 3). Initiation of insurgency is easy; dozens may be able to start an insurgency movement, and are able to destabilize the situation. With weak states and weak services provided, it is also easy to recruit new members; according to Fearon (2007), the number of civil wars is directly related to the GDP/Capita. However, assuming the reason behind engaging in these groups is purely economic is overly simplistic (Chai, 1993); a combination of complex factors leads to their engagement. “History suggests that it requires a specific set of conditions. The importance of these is determined in part by the effectiveness of the regime” (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 5).

The second phase of the insurgency lifecycle is growth. In this phase insurgents start the branding process, recruiting new members, and start direct operations. Branding of insurgency is just as branding in businesses (Clifford, 2005, p. 28). Insurgents develop their vision, end state, and identify their stakeholders’ contribution to the cause as is the case in the business world. Brand management is achieved by differentiation, credibility and authenticity (Beverland, 2005). Insurgents differentiate their services, vision and areas of operation; for this end insurgents use physical and non-physical symbols (linguistic, behavioral, socio-cultural, and ideological). They develop a brand name, a unique logo, slogans, and have a specialized spokesperson (Matusitz, 2014). Recruitment strategies will be discussed later on in this chapter. Psychological offensive operations also start in this phase designed for recruitment and gaining more power.


Figure 3: **Insurgency Life Cycle**



Source: own design

The peak of conflict is when the insurgency is mature through having a clear structure and strategy. In this phase the insurgents reach to a point when they are self-supporting through businesses or criminal activities (Hammes, 2006). During the peak of the conflict the insurgents maintain their unity with full operations through carrying out propaganda, terrorist attacks, and other subversive activities, while government forces defend the territory with substantially larger forces. During this phase insurgents will have developed their brand and reputation. The insurgents also unite with other forces and with those discontent against the government. This is also accompanied by establishing safe havens which is vital for their strategy (McCuen, 1966, p. 54). This is the point of optimum use of power while maintaining resources, having strong leadership, and carrying effective operations. “Insurgents are rational, strategic actors who attempt to optimize the distribution of their attacks overtime in such a manner that the insurgents preserve their resources while maximizing the antiwar...” (Kott & Skarin, 2010, p. 241). In this phase the mass population is neutral and prefer to stay away from the conflict and from associating themselves to any of the parties.

Figure 4: **Insurgency Life Cycle in a protracted situation**



Source: own design

Upon reaching the optimum level of the conflict, the mass population is affected deeply and they tend to switch from a neutral position into supporters to any of the parties; which is the flip point that leads to the change. If more population attempts to support the insurgents this would lead to another level of growth; however, if on the other hand they support the government then that would be the decline phase. The decline phase is when the insurgents' unity is shaken and people start taking sides. Indicators of decline may include desertion, defection and infiltration. Desertion is when insurgent or government members flee from the group; defection is when members join the opposing side; while infiltration is the covert turning of belligerents to act as informants (Connable & Libicki, 2010). During this phase the government or the insurgency starts losing credibility, resources, and unity of operations. Insurgents lose when insurgency is deprived of resources (Leites & Wolf, 1970). However, if the government fails to take advantage of the shaken unity and to attract more supporters, the insurgency moves to another phase called the chronic insurgency. The insurgents will then

fight to maintain the status quo (Mockaitis, 2011), which might lead to another higher peak of conflict as is shown in figure 4 above.

The last phase of the insurgency lifecycle is the conflict resolution. The end of the conflict could result in more than one option. According to Connable & Libicki (2010) there are four possible results, these include: government loss, government victory, negotiated settlement, or inconclusive or ongoing outcome. Mockaitis (2011), suggests four possible results, these include: insurgent victories, government victories, success through co-option, or degenerate insurgencies into something else. Hence, victories of one or the other are not the only possible results. The result could be an ongoing protracted violence and lack of stability and development, but it could also be a change from insurgents to other types of terrorism. Insurgent movements that fail to achieve their objectives degenerates into mere extremists and terrorists groups or criminality. This results from failing to win a peace following the conflict. In general, sustaining insurgency operations requires more than the insurgents and fighters on the ground. It requires ongoing political, financial and logistical support.

Motives and Opportunities

Insurgencies do not arise of thin air it results from motives and capitalizes on opportunities. Insurgency results from either greed or grievance. Greed reflects the elite position to acquire and control valuable resources. Grievances reflect those who engage due to economic, ethnic, and political grievances; which lead to individual frustration. Insurgency capitalizes on “grievances within the state” (Kleinfeld & Majeed, 2016), and creates horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2000).

It is not only the motives but also the conditions that allow insurgencies to boost. Some scholars believe that “opportunities are more important in explaining conflict than are motives” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001, p. 2.). However, opportunities are facilitators, whereas motive is the main variable leading an individual to start an insurgency or join an insurgency (Brooker, 2010). Brooker believes that motive is a necessary and sufficient condition for starting an insurgency, the strength of the motive is directly related to the extent of contribution danger. Other scholars perceive that motives are necessary but not sufficient as it should be accompanied by incentives and “private goods” (Good win & Skocpol, 1989). Azam (2006) discusses this with a description of such factors he calls “pull factors” as compared to impact of non-engagement he calls “push factors.” There is a difference between the motive of the insurgents and those of its supporters; also, there is difference between the

motives behind joining the insurgency and those behind continuing to remain a member, where this motive is strengthened and reinforced during fighting.

The main factor underlying engagement in insurgency is the motivation. Motivation could be related to attractions that are mainly ideological, social or seeking adventure; duty to support a homeland or people; or financial rewards (Davis, et.al. 2012). In many cases insurgents chose to participate as a result of a cost-benefit analysis based on considering the private benefit along with the public benefit (Olson, 1965). Gurr (1971) suggested that the motive is the frustration. Gurr developed the frustration-aggression theory, which illustrates that frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt it leads to anger and thus to violence. The motive is in general a benefit for the self and the others. Individual insurgents work for their own benefit and for the benefit of the community or social group (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). The motive of the insurgents affect their tactics and utilization of violence, studies have shown that insurgents with stronger ideological commitments commit less attacks and opt to use violence against military targets (Ugarriza & Weintraub, 2015).

Opportunity is the second important factor underlying engagement. It is about the context and the opportunity not only the frustration faced (Jost et.al. 2012). The opportunity according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is the availability of finance and the cost of rebellion that changes as per the season. The passive population is the opportunity according to Galula (1964). The uncertainty-identity theory of Hogg illustrates that self-uncertainty is a specific driving mechanism of group behavior, since self-uncertainty describes the loss of confidence in one's identity, values, beliefs, and wellbeing. The self-uncertainty can motivate people to associate with social groups that could provide distinctive identity, which could happen to be the extreme groups and behaviors (Hogg & Adelman, 2103).

Public support for terrorism and insurgency can be described through four main factors: effectiveness of organization, motivation for supporting group or cause, perceived legitimacy of violence, and acceptability of costs and risks (Davis et.al. 2012). Effectiveness of organization includes leadership, ideological package, resource mobilization, opportunism, and presence and tactics. Motivation is about attractions, duty, and rewards. Perceived legitimacy of violence includes religious, revenge and desperation. Acceptability of costs and risks include intimidation, assessment of victory, personal risks and social costs.

However, there is never a clear simple reason behind the evolution of insurgency; reasons overlap and intertwine. One reason could be the spark, or the communicated message, but often there is no one single reason (Cox & Ryan, 2017). Moreover, in some cases the motive

and message change and develop by time as is the case of Boko Haram that started by attacking only political targets and only in 2009 it started targeting Christians with focus on Sharia (Pérouse, 2014).

Recruitment

Recruitment strategy of insurgents is similar to a market growth strategy, which is illustrated with the Ansoff marketing matrix;⁶ it is a growth strategy model of operations to maintain existing members and recruit new members. It provides a framework enabling growth opportunities. As is the case in the market growth strategy, the model presents four alternative growth strategies. The two main dimensions that define the strategies are the services insurgents provide and the second is the region they operate in. The first dimension in this matrix is the 'services' that could be existing or new; while the second dimension is the 'region' that could be existing or new. According to the model, four strategies are presented: insurgency penetration (existing services and existing regions), insurgency development (new services and existing regions), insurgency expansion (using existing services and new regions), and insurgency diversification (using new services and new regions). Figure (5) below illustrates the recruitment strategy of insurgents.

Each strategy is achieved differently, and each one faces different levels of risk. The insurgency penetration involves promoting existing services and propaganda to existing regions to gain higher acceptance amongst local community. This targets the adversary, but most importantly targets the neutral communities in the region they operate. This strategy carries the lowest risk compared to the other strategies, as insurgents are aware of the community and the needs and interests of this community. This can be achieved by promoting their ideology through local media and local recruiters. Direct contact of potential members is the most common method in this strategy as those members are possible to be identified by some surveys and intelligence.

⁶ The Ansoff Matrix is a matrix that describes the market growth strategy. It entails that market growth strategies are dependent on two factors: the markets (either work on existing markets or new markets) and the products (either work on existing products or new products). If a company decides to work on existing market and existing product this is called penetration strategy; if it works on existing markets and new products, this is called product development; working on new markets and existing products is market development strategy; and working on new markets and new product is diversification.

Figure 5: Insurgents Matrix for Insurgency Growth Strategies

		Services	
		Existing	New
Region	Existing	Insurgency Penetration	Insurgency Development
	New	Insurgency Expansion	Insurgency Diversification

Source: own design

The insurgency expansion strategy is about promoting existing services and propaganda in new regions. This can be achieved by expanding the ideology to new regions, which is associated with a high level of risk depending on the financial capacity, the new regions, and the knowledge about those regions. This strategy is also possible through new distribution channels such as the cyber-insurgency; where insurgents are able to recruit new members through the internet. This would require high levels of trainings and developed skills in the use of ICT. ISIS is a good example of this since they are using the internet to expand their operation and recruit new members from the globe.

“Insurgency development” strategy is about introducing new services to existing markets. This growth strategy needs clear knowledge of the needs and interests of the local community to be able to satisfy those needs. ISIS used this strategy by providing different services to develop the organization, through which they were able to recruit new members. ISIS provided financial, medical and educational services.

“Insurgency diversification” is the growth strategy that is achieved by developing new services for completely new regions. Hence, it is associated with a very high risk because of the lack of experience in the new region and the new service. Main examples of insurgency diversifications are the mergers of two different insurgencies in two different countries for example Al-Shabab insurgency group in Somalia united with ISIS to expand and diverse their operations. (Aziemah & Huzaifah, 2015) Diversification is also present in insurgency through the backward diversification, this is apparent through ISIS associated places of worship that supported their operations in those regions.

Insurgents usually develop highly sophisticated strategic communications campaigns, “this has been the pattern since Ho Chi Minh.” (Jones, 2009, p. 7) Insurgency have developed recruitment strategies that helped them recruit new members locally and globally through services related directly or indirectly to their operations.

Means and Approaches of insurgency

Although insurgency is a political struggle not a military struggle, it utilizes tools of struggle that are relevant to the tools used by the conventional forces. The tools used by insurgents expands beyond political and organizational to reach propaganda and deception. They compete with those used by the national forces and sometimes they even win against them. “Insurgency since 2001 has proven that even a non-state actor can pursue the modest goal of area denial against vastly superior conventional armed forces, via asymmetric warfare.” (Mahadevan, 2014, para 5)

The approach paradox is a dilemma faced by the insurgents; the question is how to work with wide exposure while remaining secure, how recruit more while maintaining the existing members within the available limited resources, how to grow bigger while maintaining full control, etc. According to Frisch (2011), there are five dilemmas faced by the insurgents: actions vs secrecy, growth vs control, recruitment vs retention, success vs longevity and resources vs constituencies. Action vs secrecy dilemma refers to dealing with the paradox of

increasing action and communication while maintaining secrecy of operations. Growth vs control dilemma refers to the ability to balance between the growth in number of members engaged and presence expansion in the geographical areas from one side and the control of this expansion from the other side, which is possible through charismatic leadership. Dilemma three is the recruitment vs retention, which refers to the importance of recruiting new members based on understanding the reason behind them accepting to be engaged, while ensuring the survival of members who face an enormous risk of dying as a result of the violent context, and how such risks wouldn't affect the recruitment negatively. The fourth dilemma is the success vs longevity through focusing on both strategic and tactical operations, and by attaining short-term and long-term goals. The fifth dilemma is about resources verses constituencies and how to balance between resource extraction and constituent alienation. Ivan Arreguín- Toft (2001) suggests that winning or losing the war depends on the approach used by counterinsurgents and insurgents who can fight either directly or indirectly (Jobbágy 2017. p. 135). If both use the same approach the stronger wins, while if they use different approaches the weak wins. Figure 6 below illustrates the model presented in Arreguín- Toft research.

Figure 6: Ivan Arreguín- Toft (2001) model

		Weak Actor	
		Strategic Approach	
		Direct	Indirect
Strong Actor Strategic Approach	Direct	Strong actor	Weak actor
	Indirect	Weak actor	Strong actor

Source: Toft (2001) model

Leites and Wolf (1970) describe the insurgency as an operating system. This system illustrates that insurgencies receive inputs from the environment, which are processed and retrieves outputs back to the environment. Inputs are elements needed for the growth of the insurgency including the population and financial aids, while outputs are the actions taken against the government. This in turn feeds back into the environment that the insurgents consume. Thus, the environment is subject to change and accordingly is the position of the population.

Insurgents' military operations are organized in accordance with their strategy. They do not attack randomly, they act along several broad lines of operations: counter-coalition with attacks against the coalition, counter-collaboration through attacks on those working with coalitions, counter-mobility, counter-reconstruction with attacks on contractors and infrastructure, and counter-stability by attacking civilians and officials (Eisenstadt & White, 2005).

According to Bard O'Neill (2005) insurgents' strategies are the systematic and integrated instruments of power to achieve their goals. These strategies include conspiratorial, protracted popular war, military focused, urban-warfare, identity focused and composite.

Counterinsurgency

The definition and analysis of insurgency helps clarify what counterinsurgency is; it also provides a base for clarifying counterinsurgency approaches and tools. This section presents the definition of counterinsurgency, theorization of the concept along with approaches, critiques and impact of its operations.

The term counterinsurgency was of little interest until the war on Iraq started; the US did not want to get engaged in another Vietnam-like war. However, the assumption that a military trained for big wars will be effective to handle less violent operations through counterinsurgency and peacebuilding was proven wrong after the war on Iraq. "In 2003, the military found itself in Iraq without an effective military doctrine" (Rekkedal: 2012, p. 215).

Counterinsurgency Definitions

The term counterinsurgency is composed of the prefix "counter" and the term insurgency that has been defined earlier. Thus, counterinsurgency consists of the measures taken by the government and its supporters to defeat the insurgency and tackle the root causes of

insurgency. Oxford dictionary defines counterinsurgency as the “military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.”

According to NATO Doctrine “counterinsurgency is defined as a comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” (JP, 2018, p. xiii). The doctrine also uses the term ‘counter-insurgent’ to refer to the set of actors executing COIN actions, whether they are part of the contested government, the Alliance or members of other supporting countries or agencies.

The British Doctrine defines counterinsurgency as “those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes” (MOD, 2009, p. 1-6). This definition reflects the multifaceted approach suggested by the doctrine; thus, not limiting the approach to military but also consideration of the root causes of the case.

The US counterinsurgency doctrine MCWP (2006) perceives that Counterinsurgency operations include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve. The doctrine perceives that the strategy is decided on a case-by-case analysis.

The French doctrine of 2010 defines counterinsurgency (at the tactical level) as “a course of action that consists of neutralizing an organization that practices armed violence in the form of guerilla warfare or terrorist attacks, by reducing that organization’s freedom of movement through confinement, or even eliminating it through the effects of reduction and/or dispersion. The level of engagement in this type of struggle depends upon the national or international political option chosen, upon the balance of forces on the ground and the attitude of the population” (FEDC, 2010).

Pouw (2013) presented four settings of counterinsurgency depending on the context and the party carrying out the COIN operations. The first COIN is the NATCOIN that refers to the counterinsurgency on a State’s territory. The second is the OCCUPCOIN that refers to counterinsurgency carried out by an occupying power. The third is SUPCOIN that is counterinsurgency in support of another state. And, the last is the TRANSCOIN that refers to the transnational counterinsurgency.

Theorization of Counterinsurgency

David Galula is considered the preeminent scholar on COIN warfare. In his book “Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice” (Galula, 1964), he presented four laws that formed the basics for COIN doctrines in the 20th century. The first law is that population is

paramount, counterinsurgents and insurgents need the support of the population. The second law is the active engaged minority. Population support is guaranteed by the active minority. Active minority willing to support counterinsurgency operations should be supported in their efforts to rally the neutral majority and neutralize those supporting the insurgency and the hostile minority. The third law indicates that the support from population is always conditional; “the minority hostile to the insurgent will not and cannot emerge as long as the threat has not been lifted to a reasonable extent.” Also, the population must have the belief that “counterinsurgents have the will, the means, and the ability to win.” The fourth law is the “intensity of effort and vastness of means.” Given the large concentration of resources and efforts needed, operations should focus on selected areas and resources moved as needed.

Galula differentiates between two periods of insurgency; “in the cold” and “in the heat” periods. The cold is when the activities remain “on the whole legal and nonviolent” (Galula, 1964, p. 27). As a result, counterinsurgents response should act directly on the insurgent leaders and indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency. The counterinsurgent can also infiltrate the insurgency; and most importantly, should reinforce the counterinsurgent’s political machine. The counterinsurgency in the heat is when the insurgent’s activities become illegal and violent. This period requires a more complex effort. Galula proposes an eight-step strategy to defeat insurgents in this phase that ranges from political to military interventions. Galula concludes his book with the statement “whether in the cold or in the hot revolutionary war, its essence can be summed up in a single sentence: Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward” (Galula 1964, p. 81).

Galula describes four instruments of control needed in the governmental infrastructure: political structure, administrative bureaucracy, police, and armed forces (Galula, 1964, p. 27). The administrative bureaucracy is related to the day to day activities that are impacted by the political structure and the political leadership. The police force is the first line of interaction between the government and the people; thus, they are key to sustain a positive relationship and to maintain security for citizens. Loyalty of armed forces is also a must to maintain security.

According to Thompson (1966) defeating communist insurgency is based on five principles: a clear political aim, functions in compliance with the law, an overall plan, defeat the political subversion rather than the guerrillas, and have a clear base of operations. Paget (1967) illustrated five primary principles for the civil military operations: a joint-command and control structure, good intelligence, mobility and training.

Galula, Thompson, and Paget asserted that the propaganda is an essential part of the counterinsurgency and that it should be focused on both the insurgents and the population. They also focused on the importance of considering the political along with the military operations, and on the coordination of efforts focusing on a unified direction. They also agree that efforts should be made to defeat the insurgents while maintaining security for the population.

Charles Callwell presented ideas for successful counterinsurgency. He suggested that a single blow often achieves results, but a succession of blows paralyzes the enemy. His criteria of success included matching the enemy in mobility and inventiveness, collecting actionable intelligence, seizing what the enemy prizes most (FMI 3-24.2: 3-10).

Metz and Millen (2004) indicated five key activities for effective counterinsurgency planning. The first is fracturing the insurgents through military, psychology, and political means to divide one part against the other. The second is delegitimizing the insurgent movement in the eyes of the local population and the international community. The third is demoralizing the insurgents through military pressure and psychological operations. The fourth is delinking the insurgents from both internal and external support. The fifth is de-resourcing the insurgent by eliminating its funding and wasting its existing resources.

Kilcullen (2006) presented the three-pillar model of counterinsurgency identifying the base of counterinsurgency along with main areas of intervention. The model states that information is the basis for all activities, since it helps control and influence groups within the population. Information includes intelligence collection, analysis distribution, information operations, media operations and measures to counter insurgents' ideology and motivation, census data, public opinion and other relevant information.

Security, political and economic measures are equally important pillars considered with military and civilian engagement that rest upon the information base. The security pillar includes military security, police security, human security, public safety, and population security. Political comprises mobilization, governance extension, institutional capacity, and societal reintegration. The economic pillar is about the humanitarian assistance, development assistance, resource and infrastructure management, and growth capacity. The three pillars must be supported with balance. These pillars support the optimum objective of control rather than stability as the model suggests.


Kilcullen suggests that this model presents a framework for counterinsurgency. Those involved in counterinsurgency identifies the means and methods of collaboration that fits the

framework and fits their strategy. The model “provides a basis for measuring progress and is an aid to collaboration rather than an operational plan” (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 4).

Zambernardi (2010) presented the trilemma of counterinsurgency, which states that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve “force protection, distinction between enemy combatants and noncombatants, and the physical elimination of insurgents.” This model suggests that there is a tradeoff between these three goals. Hence, counterinsurgents need to choose two out of the three goals depending on the context.

Gordon McCormick’s strategic counterinsurgency process was presented through the Diamond model (Wilson, 2006). This model defines the interaction between the host government, the insurgents, the population, and the international actors (Figure 7 illustrates the McCormick model). The government’s goal is to destroy insurgents or limit their growth. The insurgents’ goal is to grow and take over the control and achieve their specific objectives. The effective counterinsurgency according McCormick is ensured through the government’s understanding of its own advantages and disadvantages as compared to the insurgents, where “the winner of this context will be the side that can most quickly resolve its disadvantage” (Wilson, 2006).

Figure 7: McCormick Diamond Model



Source: Culp, 2011

For Gordon McCormick the internal environment is addressed in the upper half of the model. The internal government lies in the upper half of the model. The state focuses on people's needs and security; thus, receiving information that exposes the threat infrastructure. This leads to identifying and striking the insurgents (Culp, 2011). This is similar to Kilcullen model that perceives information as the basis for all activities; though in McCormick model activities lead to the base. McCormick perceives that at the outset of the conflict the state has the force advantage; however, it suffers the lack of information necessary to see the insurgents. Rectifying this disadvantage can be ensured through the five strategies presented in the model; these include: building trust with the population, disrupting the insurgents' capability to influence the population, attacking the insurgents directly, disrupting the relationship between the insurgents and the population, and building relationship with the

international community. These are the same strategies that the insurgents should use in order to rectify their disadvantages.

Hoffman and Taw (2014) claims that for counterinsurgency campaigns to be successful they need to include four elements: command and coordination, effective antiterrorist legislation combined with measures to build public trust and support, coordination within and between intelligence services, and foreign collaboration amongst governments and security forces. These elements could be used singly or in combination for any successful counterinsurgency regardless of geographic regions, time periods, and political systems.

Counterinsurgency Doctrines

The question that arises before getting into the various doctrines is to define what a doctrine is. Doctrine bridges between the theory and practice based on experiences. “Doctrine is not in itself a prescription for success as a set of rules. What it does provide is the basis for thought, further selective study and reading which is the personal responsibility of all of us” (Nagle, 2005, p. 7).

US Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The United States developed an interagency counterinsurgency doctrine in 1962; called the ‘Overseas Internal Defense Policy’. The doctrine “lays a framework for whole-of-government counterinsurgency, assigns responsibilities and resources, and explains what each agency brings to the fight” (Kilcullen, 2006, p. 1).

The US published FM 90-8 “Counter-guerrilla Operations” in 1986⁷, the manual emphasized that countering the insurgency is done through alleviating conditions which may cause insurgency. The manual also indicated that “counter-guerrilla operations are geared to the active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end, counter-guerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of the counterinsurgency effort” (FM 90-8, 1986, p. 1-5). It mainly addressed the military aspect of the insurgent movement while focusing tactical operations. In 2004, the US produced FM-Interim 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations. The Doctrine indicated that achieving success in counterinsurgency involves accomplishing protection of the population, establishing local

⁷ Wickham, John A. & Dilworth, R. L. (1986). Counterguerrilla Operations. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 29 August 1986. Available at http://pdf.textfiles.com/manuals/MILITARY/united_states_army_fm_90-8%20-%2029_august_1986%20-%20part01.pdf Accessed 29 August 1986.

political institutions, reinforcing local governments, eliminating insurgent capabilities, and exploiting information from local resources (FMI 3-07.22). In 2006, the US published the Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24. The doctrine included five means of mobilization including persuasion, coercion, and reaction to abuses, foreign support, and apolitical motivations. COIN operations are composed of a spectrum of activities conducted to achieve the desired end state. It is a mix of defensive, offensive and stability operations; where the proportion of the components and the efforts depend on the situation and the mission. The stability component includes civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, and economic and infrastructure development.

In 2014 a new manual was published that builds upon the previous one. The 2006 edition defined insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” In the new edition, insurgency now means “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region” (FM 3-24, 2014). The reference to a government has been removed in the new definition, and insurgency is conceived as a tactic rather than a movement. It focused on the sensitivity and specificity of each conflict.

The US counterinsurgency doctrine stresses on the need to consider the local context; however, it is not possible to understand the norms shared by the population from distance. “FM 3-24 is somewhat schizophrenic on the subject of what ought to be done with them [rebellions]” (Gawthorpe 2017, p. 845). Gawthorpe goes further in his critiques to mention that although the doctrine uses the population norms as a basis for the legitimacy; however, the doctrine fails to understand that sub-societies have their unique norms that might be different from the others.

NATO COIN Doctrine

According to NATO Doctrine (AJP-3.4.4) of 2011, COIN must be carried out in a comprehensive manner by civilian and military entities to defeat an insurgency and ensure stability and secure environment. This requires a wide range of interventions ranging from humanitarian assistance to major combat operations. Therefore, COIN should be population centric with operations that focus on securing the population. It should also be opponent centric by defeating the opposing group. The aim of military contribution to COIN is to secure the population, isolate the insurgents from their support, neutralize the insurgents’ subversive strategy and armed organization, and support other organizations in planning to create unity of effort (AJP 3.4.4).

NATO principles of counterinsurgency includes: political primacy, develop and promote the legitimacy of the contested government, hand over responsibility to the local forces as practicable, secure the population, understand the human environment, defeat the insurgent, operate within international, national law and respect domestic law, prepare for a protracted campaign, and learn and adapt. The first principle is the political primacy that addresses the root causes and political drivers of an insurgency. Therefore, according to NATO “the political strategy coordinated with the contested authorities, combining civilian and military resources, principles and attitudes will provide the direction and guidance for all COIN planning” (AJP 3.4.4).

The counterinsurgency operations operate in a complex environment characterized by the presence of many players: local, regional, national and international. Insurgent’s presence is invisible as they hide amongst the population. And the operating environment is an amalgamation of operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure PMESII (AJP 3.4.4).

The possible generic responses in a COIN operation ranges from direct to indirect support. The direct support provides security through military and law enforcement. The indirect support provides development and diplomacy. However, the sequence of operations and the proportions is dependent on the situation; however, the preferred sequence is starting with indirect support.

As part of its comprehensive approach, NATO relies on civil-military cooperation CIMIC as one of its military facilitators. CIMIC is defined as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (CCOE, 2012). The manual focuses on the humanitarian relief and on training military personnel to provide humanitarian relief. However, the primary purpose of CIMIC is not the provision of human security, but to free the commander from the burden of caring for the civilian population in the war zone, and allow him to carry out his primary mission, the defeat of the insurgents.

British COIN Doctrine

The UK produced their COIN doctrine since the 1980s. In 2004 they produced a manual of doctrinal relevance to COIN, named: “The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations”. In 2008 COIN manual was developed, which marked a turning point in the UK doctrine operations and strategies (Hazel, 2008). The British principles of COIN included:

political primacy and clear political aim, gain and secure the consent of the people, coordinated government machinery effective communication with the people, focused intelligence, neutralize the insurgent, and plan for longer term post-insurgency conditions. (Hazel, 2008.). The UK doctrine identifies COIN as a “distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the people, the government, and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three groups generally determines the outcome of the campaign” (MoD, 2009:1). UK doctrine perceives insurgency and counterinsurgency as two sides of a very complex form of warfare, “where a group or groups resort to violence and take up arms to achieve political objectives. Typical objectives are replacing an existing government, securing the status quo and challenging a nascent or emerging state” (MoD, 2009, p. 1).

The British used high levels of force during COIN operations. Their operations in Malaya was not in any way a “hearts and minds” they used excessive force. Repression measures included forcibly resettling 500,000, mass arrests, death penalty for carrying arms, detention without trials, deportations, control of food and shops, arson against the homes of communist sympathizers, collective punishment, different massacres, and treating prisoners as criminals (Dixon, 2009). In Ireland they also used a considerable level of coercion.

COIN Strategies

There are two basic strategic approaches in counterinsurgency: military and multidimensional. The military strategic approach is mainly focused on the use of power to physically defeat the insurgents. However, this approach entails the use of extreme power on both the insurgents and the population. The Argentinian government used this approach in the 1970s against the junta (called the National Reorganization Process), which led to more political disorder (Moore, 2007). The other strategic approach is the multidimensional that looks into the military strategy but also includes empowering the political, economic and social aspects, while tackling the root causes of the problem. This strategy might also require political accommodation of insurgent groups (Moore, 2007).

Watts et.al. (2014:19-20) discussed four strategies for counterinsurgency: classic counterinsurgency, strong state repression, informal accommodation, and containment. This typology is based on three variables: bounded accommodation (armed opposition has the opportunity to share in power), discriminate violence, and provision of public goods. The first strategy is the *classic counterinsurgency*; this includes high levels of political accommodation of reconcilable opposition, discrimination in use of violence against

irreconcilable opposition, and public goods provision to disaffected communities. The second strategy is the ***strong state repression*** strategy where the regime is unable or unwilling to offer accommodations to any part of the opposition, relies on indiscriminate use of force, and offers substantial services to the general population to buy off discontent. The third strategy is the ***informal accommodation*** strategy where the government is unable or unwilling to provide public goods to discontented people, able to reach agreements with insurgents, and high discrimination in use of violence against irreconcilable. The fourth strategy is the ***containment*** especially used by weak states. This strategy is based on the use of indiscriminate force to repress insurgents, low provision of public goods, and low political accommodation.

In summary, to counter insurgency, the strategy should contain a wide spectrum of policies including diplomatic, political, economic, ideological and military. These could be applied in different combinations. The tasks of counterinsurgency strategy should include: establishing and maintaining security, providing humanitarian relief and essential services, promote effective governance, sustain economic development, support reconciliation, and foster social change (Moore, 2007). Whatever combination is decided, the strategy should not be implemented in phases, all tasks and policies should be intermingled.

International Law in regulating Counter-insurgency

One of the most challenging issues in COIN is to determine its legal framework. The United States characterized its response to the attacks of 11 September as “armed conflict.” Hence, their responses towards these attacks is according to the law of war. However, this law applies when a state conducts military operations in the territory of another. Yoram Dinstein suggests that there are two cases when armed conflict could be used as the reference: “first, when the operations are derived from an armed conflict with the state sponsor of a terrorist organization; and second, when the actions of terrorist organization can be attributed to the sponsoring state as the result of terrorist authority over organs of the state” (Corn, 2011, p. 24).

Military interventions are normally governed by the domestic laws when is it conducted by the incumbent government against insurgents. The challenge is when international organizations or countries are countering the insurgency, such as the NATO. International law allows the use of force against other countries in cases related to self-defense or if the security Council decides that. “It is not an exaggeration to state that state-intervention in such

situations has been subject to political issues rather than that of international law” (Bordas, 2014, p. 583). Otherwise the human rights law should be applied. However, human rights law doesn’t specify when civilian and civilian objects could be attacked (Bordas, 2014).

Impact of counterinsurgency

Most existing empirical studies revealed that the state’s indiscriminate violence incites escalation of insurgents’ attacks. This is prevalent in some researches that show positive relationship between the counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties and levels of future violent incidents by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan (Condra et al, 2010). On the other hand, Lyall (2009) tested the indiscriminate violence effect on insurgents’ attacks using Russian artillery fire in Chechnya during the period 2000 to 2005; this indicated a reduction in insurgents attacks compared to control villages.

Other researches illustrated the relationship between soft power and level of insurgents’ violence. Iyengar (2011) showed that labor-intensive development programs and employment growth reduces violence during insurgencies. Similarly, other researches indicated that improved service provision reduces insurgent violence particularly for smaller projects since the “surge” began in 2007 in Iraq (Berman et.al. 2008).

COIN Assessment

What is a successful counterinsurgency? This question is difficult given the different definitions available for counterinsurgency and the ever-changing objectives and goals in the conflict overtime. Different variables may be considered in this aspect: human security failure in the region achieving the publicly stated political and military goals, the control of the incumbent government of the majority of the population, or simply the perspective of the people. Despite the complexity in assessing COIN operations it is important to identify success from failure. “If an agent cannot determine whether a strategy is succeeding or failing, then how does an agent determine what should be done” (Axelrod, 2000, p. 124).

“While we were unable to discern any single most important COIN practice, the data suggests that good practices occur together (along with success) with such regularity that we cannot even rank their importance. Victory, it appears, does indeed have a thousand fathers—a substantial collection of effective practices and a host of complementary and mutually

reinforcing lines of operation is what wins the day in COIN.” (Paul, Colin & Beth, 2010, p. 2).

Assessing the counterinsurgency is complex as it needs to consider the process, the outputs and the outcomes of the operations. It is complex as it need to consider security, economics and politics. Additionally, it is dependent on population perspectives and views of their well-being and roles of the different actors; this is the idea behind the concept of ‘winning hearts and minds.’ It also requires measuring the empowerment and legitimacy of the local actors as it aims originally to enhance their capabilities to control the local situation (Campbell, 2009).

A new paradigm was also presented for assessment in counterinsurgency that overlooks the current state of the war while keeping an eye on future challenges and opportunities. The paradigm considered two main aspects to measure: the strategic and the campaign assessments. The strategic is a narrative description of the strategic environment. The campaign assessments are standards that help gauge accomplishment of campaign tasks (Schroden, et.al. 2013)

The US used a quantitative analysis to assess counterinsurgency. Although COIN is operated on a decentralized mechanism, the assessment is suggested on a centralized level. They used two methods: the effects-based assessments and the pattern and trend analysis. The effects-based assessment rests on quantifying events on the ground to produce centralized and highly accurate reports. The ‘pattern and trends analysis’ is a centralized quantitative analysis which includes mostly impressionistic with some deterministic analysis about the campaign (Connable, 2012). Connable criticizes the US COIN assessment claiming that “centralized assessments built from aggregated data do not produce transparent or credible reports”; also, “there is general agreement that information and data sets in COIN assessment materials are inaccurate and incomplete to a significant yet unknown degree.”

Critiques of Counterinsurgency

Applicability of counterinsurgency was criticized by many scholars, especially by considering the impact on Iraq and Afghanistan. Gventer (2014) presented the paradox of counterinsurgency “to apply rigid doctrine to circumstances that defy rigidification” (P. 54). Hence, Gventer perceives that asymmetric warfare should be tackled uniquely. Gventer ensures this paradox through the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq counterinsurgency did not release the level of violence. And, in Afghanistan counterinsurgency is very difficult

given the absence of a competent and legitimate host government and the existence of insurgents in neighboring countries.

“Insurgencies, like cancers, exist in thousands of forms, and there are dozens of techniques to treat them, hundreds of different populations in which they occur, and several major schools of thought on how best to deal with them. The idea that there is one single ‘silver bullet’ panacea for insurgency is therefore as unrealistic as the idea of a universal cure for cancer” (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 1)

Scholars criticized counterinsurgency using Clausewitz as a reference (Gventer, 2014 & Smith, 2014). Smith (2014) uses Clausewitz to show that since wars are different in each and every case, it is not possible to categorize wars into conventional and irregular. Smith claims this is “trying to divide war into something that is inherently indivisible” and that wars don’t possess “comparable characteristics with other wars beyond describing their universal essence to achieve goals of policy through violence.”

Other scholars criticized external counterinsurgency (Buntak & Mikac, 2011). These criticisms perceive that activities conducted by domestic administration are effective and more accepted than when the same task is conducted by the intervening forces. External intervention is perceived as occupation in many cases.

Some criticism favored peacebuilding processes among counterinsurgency. “Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism people need to start talking more with the peacebuilding and development community, and they both need to talk much more with the rule-of-law community ... We need to look at our theories of top-down state building and recognize what empirical evidence from the field is telling us: that bottom-up, civil society approaches are having much greater success than top down, state-based approaches” (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 160).

Legitimacy is a central issue while criticizing counterinsurgency. According to the US counterinsurgency doctrine legitimacy is achieved through the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control, which are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

Conclusion

No two insurgencies are alike. Insurgency-counterinsurgency warfare differs since the context is different, the strengths of the two parties are different, the context and the support of the population is also different. The motives behind insurgency are different, the external support is different, and the strength of each is different. Therefore, there is no unified mechanism and strategy that should be used to tackle each case. In general, one size does not fit all.

Galula presented the insurgency; “in the cold” and “in the heat” period; the categorization is important as it helps drive the counterinsurgency direction. It is also important as in many cases the governments miscalculate the possibility of the insurgency turning from cold to heat; and hence it doesn’t resolve the political issues until a military one is needed.

As insurgency erupts out of political or economic dilemmas, the steps needed for countering its inception should tackle the root causes. A governmental strategy that is sensitive to human security and bridges between policy and implementation is the one that is able to counter insurgency. Additionally, external counterinsurgency should mainly tackle the root causes. According to Galula, building or rebuilding the political machine should be from the population upward. It is mainly a political means with 80% political and 20% force.

Counterinsurgency, by definition, is a long-term conflict. It affects the lives of people, human casualties and human wellbeing is perhaps the biggest challenge for the international community. However, the first step in counterinsurgency is establishing security for and of the people. Every countering step should be focusing on the root causes and tackling the different dimensions of human security.

Counterinsurgency is a game of winning the legitimacy; it is the struggle between competing legitimacies. Both the insurgents and the government claim their legitimacy. The insurgents seek to develop their own legitimacy by jeopardizing the legitimacy of the host government while attempting to develop their own credibility. On the other hand, the government will try to attack the credibility of the insurgents while strengthening their own. The conflict of legitimizing their role is the basis for building counterinsurgency doctrine as they are mainly focused on winning the population. Furthermore, counterinsurgency is fundamentally a struggle over the people and over the territory. Winning the hearts and minds means winning the population and acquiring more information, more support, and more stability.

This chapter presented the life cycle of insurgency and suggested that counterinsurgency should be planned according to the different phases of the life cycle. If insurgency wins the population in the maturity phase, it will get to the level of chronic insurgency.

Chapter 3: Human Security in Fragile States

Introduction


Human security employs a hybrid approach that is based on protection and empowerment principles. This requires an assessment of the vulnerabilities and capacities of the communities; moreover, it involves strategies that enhance institutional structural capacities to protect the people. Different questions stem from this practicality. Who provides human security to the people? Who are the main players? What are the different roles they play? What are the available initiatives local and international? Does it really lead to human security?

In an asymmetric conflict many citizens (if not all) lack the freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. However, various actors in the conflict come to the fore to provide or claiming that they will provide these securities. The services and protection they provide may incidentally meet the citizens' security needs but the motivating factor is usually not to provide human security rather to realize political goals.

A complementary map of humanitarian players has been illustrated by the Global Humanitarian Assistance program (see Figure 8). The range of actors is broad and diverse. There is the local government and the international governments who provide humanitarian funding through the UN, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, NGOs, and the local government. The map also includes the UN organizations that provide direct support. The list includes the private donors who provide financial support for the different partners. Additionally, the map includes the military actors with specific reference to the peacekeeping missions and the military actors deployed to support humanitarian response.

In order to answer the main question of this research "What is the impact of counterinsurgency on human security?", this chapter considers the players having a role during counterinsurgency. These include the insurgents who have their own objectives; the state that is trying to regain the control; the humanitarian organizations that are there to ensure humanitarian presence, and often there are international peacekeeping or peace enforcing missions, whose functions and capacities depend on the context of their mandate. This section illustrates human security provided by each and an analysis of the intervention with respect to human security aspects.

Figure 8: Map of Aid players



Source: Scott, 2014.

State

The state has the primary responsibility for the well-being of its citizens. It is the duty of the state to respect all human rights, to protect individuals from a third party that might threaten the human rights or the quality of life, and to fulfil needs derived from rights. It is thus the responsibility of the state to respect the human security needs of its citizens; to ensure economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. It is the state responsibility to protect citizens from threats including poverty, hunger, diseases, pollution and environment degradation, all forms of violence, discrimination, and political repression.

The contractarian view of the state suggests that citizens adhere to the government for a guarantee of protection (McCord, 1999). According to Thomas Hobbes (2001) living without the state is “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Hence, it is the security of the citizens that justifies the state’s existence. According to Immanuel Kant, the State is the necessary instrument of peace, and that peace will follow if states had liberal governments and if they opened themselves to trade with other similar states in a liberal league. Kant’s theory is based on two core principles:

respect of the human beings and the legal principle that underlies the government (C.J, 1949). According to John Locke, people entered into two contracts, one is social and the other is political. In the social contract people unite as a community, while the political contract is issued with the government to enforce the law (Obo & Coker, 2014).

For Marxists the state is primarily an apparatus used by the class of wealthy people. The state is based on the material basis in relation to "relative scarcity." In general, the state is controlled by the economically dominant class, enabling it to maintain its control over the exploited classes, which implies a separation of the ruling class from the state. Additionally, the state is part of the "superstructure" of society; where the base is made up of the instruments of production, the social class and laboring classes and the relations between these classes. The highest form of the state is the democratic republic, in which the capitalist class exercises its power indirectly (Obo & Coker, 2014).

From the political systems perspective, according to David Easton, the essential variables on which the life of the political system depends on the values for the society, which will then need to be induced and then become binding principles. With this, he considers that the main function of the state is the distribution of values for its citizens. According to Easton, the political system model focuses on a system with defined inputs and outputs, which is based on the confining variables of the systemization, scarcity, allocation, maximization, self - regulation, an feedback. (Easton, 1965). As such Easton focuses on the values and the feedback, if this system functions then there is a stable political system; however, if the system breakdown then the political system will be dysfunctional. Almond and Coleman list seven functions of all political systems such as political socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rulemaking, rule application, and rule adjudication (Almond & Coleman 1960). Apparently, the state in this regard provides for the interests and wants of its citizens thus supporting freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity.

Charles Tilly, on the other hand, perceives the states as "relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory" (Tilly 1985, p. 170). For him the state is a "protection racket"; it offers protection from local and external violence. Tilly also suggests that the prices charged from the citizens are in return to the protection provided; which is generally perceived as insufficient by the states (Tilly 1985). Accordingly, there are four different activities carried out by the state: war making (eliminating or neutralizing rivals outside the territories), state making (eliminating or

neutralizing rivals inside the territories), protection, and extraction (Tilly 1985). According to Tilly, the state is the main provider of human security of the people; the state provides protection and services. The state is the source that ensures the freedom from fear and freedom want.

Gildenhuis (1988: 4-9) presented the role of the state based on four dimensions; the laissez-faire capitalism, socialism, social welfare state, and the economic welfare state. The primary goal of the laissez fair is providing an environment of free competition amongst citizens while protecting the individuals and their property and defending the national community. The role of the state in socialism is to control markets, redistribute income, and to provide welfare services for all citizens. In the social welfare state, the goal is to ensure an enabling environment to provide citizens the good life through education, pensions, medical care, housing, and protection against loss of employment or business. The state based on economic welfare creates an environment where individuals aspires their personal economic welfare.

Critical theorists and feminists have different perspectives of the role of the state. Critical theorists perceive that the state force protected people to accept the power and values of the state that are often inconsistent with those individuals thus neglecting the voice of the people. Feminism considers the state as the center of power dominated by masculine nature and patriarchal ideologies, which have created wars and human sufferings. Therefore, critical theorists and feminists consider the state as the threat producer (Peou, 2014: 146-175). Apparently, suggested definitions reveal that a state could be the human security provider, but could also be the threat-producer. Although the definition of the state relies on a basic function which is protection of the individuals, implementation could be much different.

According to international law another responsibility of the states is to provide human security for non-citizens living in its territories. Non-citizens are those with permanent resident status, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, foreign students, temporary visitors, and other non-immigrants and stateless people (UN, 2006). According to international law non-citizens should be guaranteed their full rights:

“Non-citizens should have freedom from arbitrary killing, inhuman treatment, slavery, arbitrary arrest, unfair trial, invasions of privacy, refoulment, forced labour, child labour and violations of humanitarian law. They also have the right to marry; protection as minors; peaceful association and assembly; equality; freedom of religion and belief; social, cultural and economic rights; labour rights (for example, as to collective

bargaining, workers' compensation, healthy and safe working conditions); and consular protection. While all human beings are entitled to equality in dignity and rights, States may narrowly draw distinctions between citizens and non-citizens with respect to political rights explicitly guaranteed to citizens and freedom of movement." (UN, 2006, p. 5)

Hence, international law suggests that it is the responsibility of the state to provide all aspects of human security to non-citizens under its protection. However, despite the fact that non-citizens are guaranteed human security through international law, the reality on the ground is often very different; as the treatment of asylum seekers in eastern Europe has shown in the summer and fall of 2015 (Hegedüs, 2016).

Based on the above, human security is the basic responsibility of the state. However, sometimes states are not able to protect their people, this is due to lack of state effectiveness and "fragile state" (Stewart & Brown, 2009). The Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity provided an operational definition of fragile state based on three factors. First, authority failures; these include significant organised political violence and a high level of crime. Second, service failures where the state fails to ensure all citizens access to health services, basic education, water and sanitation, basic transport and energy infrastructure, and reduction in income poverty. The third factor is the legitimacy failure that occurs where the state lacks legitimacy with no popular support. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), defined fragile states as: "States in which the government is unable to deliver basic services and security to the population" (Corinne, et al 2015).

The OECD has presented a new term for fragile states; namely, "states of fragility". This term helps identify countries that are most vulnerable to five dimensions of risk and vulnerability linked to fragility: violence; access to justice for all; effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions; economic foundations; and capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters (OECD, 2015). The African Development Bank defines "situations of fragility" as: "A condition of elevated risk of institutional breakdown, societal collapse or violent conflict" (Cooke & Downie, 2015, p. 7). Despite the lack of a consensus on a definition, all definitions presented above entail that fragile states are generally not capable of providing the various elements of human security for all.

DFID perceive that state fragility is mainly linked to weak state institutions and that any other factor is necessary related to the main factor of weak institutions:

“...the central driver of fragility is weak state institutions. All other factors associated with fragility are in themselves linked to weak state institutions as a driving force. For example, we shall see that poverty is certainly linked to fragility, but not all poor areas are necessarily fragile. Fragility can occur when poverty or economic decline are combined with the presence of weak state institutions that cannot manage the very real grievances caused by, for example, inequitable distribution of resources or unequal access to formal institutions. Essentially, this means that in fragile states political institutions are not strong enough to manage effectively the natural conflicts that occur in society. This ‘fragility’ or weakness will be most evident at any time that the state undergoes processes of economic, political and social change.” (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, 2005, p. 7)

Failed states fail to provide human security. They are typified by enduring violence, where civil wars stem from ethnic or religious enmity. Failed states are not able to control their borders or some parts of their sections of territory. Therefore, states fail to provide security or freedom from fear, they also oppress their citizens while privileging some elite and limiting the goods and services provided, with effective education and health services only privatized and discriminate economic opportunities. Additionally, failed states are associated with criminal violence, criminal oppression of the citizens leads to criminal gangs taking over the control. Failed states also lack the proper judiciary system, while the armed forces are highly politicized. Moreover, they are characterized by deteriorated or destroyed infrastructure and shortage of food. Failed states have high levels of corruption (Rotberg, 2003).

Another measure to consider the failed states is the state effectiveness criteria. The crisis affecting state effectiveness is mainly discussed in terms of stages and crisis which the political system has to pass through while achieving political development (Pye, 1966 & Binder et.al, 1971). The identity crisis is the first factor affecting state performance; there must be shared identities and sense of loyalty amongst population. “The absence of national identity could be a powerful centrifugal force” (Wang, 2007, p. 5). The second crisis is the legitimacy crisis which refers to people’s recognition of the political authority as legitimate and valid. The third level is the penetration level which ensures that the political system reaches to every level of the society in regards of policies and services. Participation crisis is the fourth level, which refers to the degree of people’s participation in political decision making and the influx of new participants. The fifth is integration crisis that reflects “the

extent to which the entire polity is organized as a system of interacting relationships.” The distribution crisis is the sixth criteria that refer to the equal and egalitarian distribution of goods and services.

Goodfellow (2015, p. 3) defined state effectiveness as “situations where the stated aims of government, codified in policies, laws, and regulations, are translated into accomplishment”. Therefore, the concern is about the implementation. Every state is more effective at some things than other; even the weakest states have their own strengths.

In fragile states, in lease effective states, and even in failed states a certain percentage of the citizens will defend the legitimacy of the state and its capacity to provide human security. This segment usually benefits in some way from the status quo of the state. Its members are among the decision makers, or depend on the state for their economic prosperity and its association with the existing state, or are associated in some other way with the existing government. They feel that the government is their source of human security to live free from fear, free from want and free to live in dignity; they perceive that the attrition of the state is an attrition of their own human security. Others may have an ideological commitment to the state in its current form, and defend it even if it is contrary to their economic or other interests. Hence, they defend the state as a means to defend their existence and their human security, which may be perceived by external observers as irrational and sometimes immoral.

Insurgents

Insurgents reasons for being differ from case to case; however according to Bard O’Neill (2005) there are nine types of insurgents each characterized by a different goal: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, apocalyptic-utopian, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist, and commercialist. Here we will discuss the most prominent type that poses the highest threat in the twenty-first century. The traditionalist insurgents “articulate primordial and sacred values” O’Neill (2005); values that are religiously or ancestrally rooted. Traditionalist insurgents perceive that their belief is the only right belief, and they feel contempt towards any who do not share their belief. Most traditionalist insurgents try to restore old systems. This type seeks to establish political structures lead by autocratic leadership. The Islamic State as such falls under the traditionalist insurgency: its adherents fight to turn back the clock to form a government that fits the 9th century, and to retrieve what they claim as their God-given rights. They are revolutionaries aiming to build a world order based on the *Sharia*.

According to Galula (1964: 9-10) an insurgency is fluid since the insurgents neither have responsibility nor concrete assets; therefore, any service provided for their associates is perceived as value added for the insurgents. They will provide all possible services and use their propaganda value to recruit new adherents and gain more control. All efforts are designed to weaken the government's control and legitimacy while trying to gain more control, legitimacy, and more popular support for the insurgency.

Public support of insurgents is due to provision of human security or an alternative to state effectiveness. One main factor underlying public support for insurgency is the effectiveness of the insurgents, which includes strong leadership, ideological package, resource mobilization, opportunism adaptation, and presence and tactics. The second factor is the motivation for supporting the group or the cause. Those motivation factors could be due to ideological, religious or even glory excitement attractions; duty and honor; or financial, power or prestigious rewards Davis et.al. (2012). Stewart (2015) indicates that some insurgencies divert financial and personnel resources to benefit both supporters and non-supporters, while other groups limit the benefits to their supporters. Providing social services are means used for recruiting new members. The third factor is the perceived legitimacy of violence; this legitimacy could be due to religious and ideological purposes, revenge purposes, cultural propensity or necessity and desperation. The fourth reason is the acceptability of costs and risks which could be due to intimidation, assessment of likely victor, personal risks and opportunity cost, or countervailing social costs and pressures.

External support to insurgents is also related to insurgent's effectiveness. "External support is more likely for moderately strong groups where support is more likely to be offered and accepted, in the presence of transnational, international rivalries, and when the government receives foreign support" (Salehyan et.al. 2011). External support to insurgents exists when insurgent have a clear central leadership that exercises control over its activities. It is also possible to receive this support when the state itself receives external support (Salehyan et.al. 2011, p. 64).

The insurgents usually provide human security for a segment of people who are strongly committed to them. These people usually deny the government's legitimacy and capacity to provide human security. They are the elite of the insurgents; they are the most provided with security; hence, their association with the insurgents provides them a perspective of freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity. It is a mutual benefit as insurgencies achieve their strategic goals to expand and get empowered through their affiliates; by winning hearts and mind.

Counterinsurgents

Counterinsurgency is the state's (and sometimes international actors') response to an insurgency. As the insurgents apply violence to seize power, the state responds with more violence, and this is how the counterinsurgency starts. According to Galula, "Counterinsurgency cannot be defined except by reference to its cause" (Galula, 1964, p. 1). It is an asymmetric condition that results from the difference between each party's assets and liabilities; asymmetry also lies in the diplomatic power and the legitimacy. Though the Government strives to sustain its services to all during counterinsurgency, sustained operations carry high political and economic burdens. The escalation in insurgent operations results in the government's increase in the expenditure on counterinsurgency as in the case of Malaya and Algeria (Galula, 1964, p. 9). Hence, insurgency affects the ability of the state to provide human security to all. The state also loses control over some territory and is unable (even if the resources are otherwise available) to provide services to the people in lost or contested areas.

According to NATO doctrine counterinsurgency is defined as the "comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances" (NATO AAP-06 Edition 2019. p. 60.) It is the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address core grievances. From the definition it is clear that counterinsurgency employs various methods and tactics; it is not only based on military, it is also based on political, economic social, information, and infrastructure activities. In fact, the military aspect – however important it may be – is only a relatively small, subordinate part of the whole. NATO also emphasizes that in a fragile state counterinsurgency is needed as people will lack human security. Although NATO doctrine focuses on the military interventions per se, it describes major indicative activities and tasks in counterinsurgency that reflect non-military intervention; these include (but are not limited to): build human security, stimulate economic and infrastructure development, and foster host government capacity and legitimacy.

The US doctrine defines counterinsurgency as the "comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes" (US Army, 2014, JP 3-24). It also defines counterinsurgency using the military and nonmilitary measures: "the military role should be coordinated with the other instruments of national power that include diplomatic, informational, and economic parts" (US Army, 2014).

The involvement of external forces in the counterinsurgency does not reinforce the legitimacy of the state. Although the fragile state is in need for support, usually foreign counterinsurgents are not welcomed, and do not strengthen the position of the state. On the contrary, their intervention may lead to more opposition towards the government and to a more active insurgency – as the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown.

The direct impact of military intervention on the people is visible. It affects the daily life of the people; it affects economic and social structures. The result is the deterioration of all services including education, health, the operation of all economic facilities, etc... It affects the targeted areas along with areas not directly targeted by the various belligerents. It deteriorates freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

Humanitarian Organisations

The humanitarian organisations play a non-military role through relief and ensuring humanitarian presence. They also focus on denunciation of rights violations (Breakey, 2012). The humanitarian aid usually aims at preventing the disastrous consequences of the conflict; it is simply aid for victims of the conflict (Perrin, 1998). “The need for outside help arises when the parties to a conflict are unable or unwilling to shoulder that responsibility” (Perrin, 1998, p. 1). According to Albert Schweitzer “Humanitarian consists in never sacrificing a human being to a purpose” (DuBois, 2018).

The humanitarian assistance is based on the international humanitarian law. Several initiatives attempted to set the principles for humanitarian action. There are the providence principles identified by the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994 Code of Conduct) (ICRC, 1994). Variations of the principles also emerged in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response elements of the Sphere Project (Donini and Gordon, 2015). In 2003, a set of “*principles and good practices of humanitarian donorship*” was agreed in a meeting convened by the Swedish Government. The 23 principles and good practices provide both a framework to guide official humanitarian aid and a mechanism for donor accountability⁸. These include: responding to humanitarian needs, integrating relief and development, working with humanitarian partners, implementing international guiding

⁸ <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EN-23-Principles-and-Good-Practice-of-Humanitarian-Donorship.pdf>

principles, and promoting learning and accountability. In 2007, the Humanitarian Response Index HRI was developed that aims to identify and promote good donor practice and contribute to greater transparency, accountability and impact in humanitarian action. This index contributes to efforts to improve effectiveness and impact of relief and recovery efforts (López-Claros & Hidalgo Silvia, 2007:3).


Humanitarian assistance is based on the principles: humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality (Rufini & Ozerdem, 2005). According to the ICRC, the principle of impartiality means that the organization “makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.” The principle of neutrality entails that “in order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature” (ICRC, 1994, para 4)

There has been a shift in the humanitarian aid from the delivery of emergency relief to long term developmentalism (Chandler, 2001). This has been flagged through the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016; where Ban Ki-moon called for the shift from delivering aid to “ending need” (Ban Ki-moon, 2016). The World Humanitarian Summit was held on May 23, 2016 to set a new vision for addressing the growing humanitarian needs. The event called upon states, international organizations, and all the relevant stakeholders to commit to Ban Ki-moon’s five core responsibilities of the agenda for humanity. These responsibilities include to prevent and end conflict, to uphold norms that safeguard humanity, to leave no one behind, to move from delivering aid to ending need, and to invest in humanity (Ban Ki-moon, 2016). DuBois (2018) also focused on the idea of “emergency aid and beyond”. He included two main principles: (a) a disequilibrium or set of extraordinary circumstances that marks a significant departure from ‘normalcy’ (the average); and (b) consequences (immediate needs that endanger or diminish life) that surpass existing or customary response capacities. According to Nascimento (2015), humanitarianism promised a “combination between the immediate needs and future development, reinforcement of local services and structures, empowerment, participation and enhancement of the population’s capacities, human rights promotion and protection (including gender issues) and contributions to peacebuilding.”

The Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship defines the objective of humanitarian programming “to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity ... as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations” (Scott, 2014, p. 1). In reality, not all organizations have the same role. Interventions range from the advocate to

the influence and finally the do (see figure 9). There is a limited margin of what actors are able to do or control, some wider margin of what they can influence, and some due to the limited power or mandate can only advocate for others to act (Scott, 2014).

Figure 9: **Do, Influence, Advocate Interventions**



Source: (Scott, 2014)

However, in reality humanitarian assistance is politicized as it operates in a politically sensitive area “[all] actions are political; even to do nothing is political, since it implies acceptance of the status quo” (Rufini & Ozerdem, 2005).

Research has found that “the preponderance of the evidence indicates that aid has not been effective” (Doucouliagos & Paldam 2009, p. 433). In some cases, the aid modality leads to negative impact and increase in the level of conflict. One of the main challenges faced is when the assistance falls into the hand of the belligerents. For example, “in Bosnia, militias commandeered UNHCR relief” (Addison Tony 2000), and in Afghanistan border areas humanitarian aid was diverted to some terrorists based in refugee camps (Addison Tony 2000). Moreover, gathering people in refugee camps can give some belligerents the opportunity to recruit fighters, regain their power and intensify their attacks.

ICRC identified several negative effects of humanitarian aid on the victims of the conflict and their local systems. Aid leads to a dependent community on the long term, while prompting national leaders to allocate resources to arms rather than socio-economic programs. This would affect community expectations and government misuse of resources (Perrin, 1998, p. 324). In some cases, the humanitarian organizations face accusation of being on one side of the conflicting parties. This is usually a result of the difficulty to secure aid delivery as it was the case in supporting Rwanda refugees (Addison, 2000).

One of the main challenges facing humanitarian organizations during conflict is their access to the different areas of conflict. In some cases, humanitarian organizations are not able to monitor the work and are working through subcontracts with local NGOs. The UN monitor group to Somalia has revealed “corruption within the delivery of WFP food assistance” (Gha, 2010). On the other hand, during the intensive level of conflict humanitarian organizations face extreme restrictions on their work due to security reasons. In certain conditions, they cannot access areas of conflict, and they are able to provide only limited aid in comparison to the humanitarian needs.

At the essence of humanity is the idea that human beings are connected; however, in many cases humanitarian support lacks this connectivity. This is manifested through the physical separation between the humanitarian agencies and decision makers from one side and the communities affected by the crisis from another side. This is justified by the securitization of the humanitarian field mission, and is displayed by remote management of interventions. The Western humanitarian sector works from within ‘a highly visible and separate “island of modernity that exposes the exclusivity of the international space and its unequal relationship with the surrounding environment” (DuBois, 2018, p. 9). DuBois (2018) also addresses another separation, this time between humanitarian work and humanitarian outcomes. He mentioned that the effort is mostly on output level and doesn’t reach the level of the outcomes describing it as the “growing gap between being busy and being productive” (p. 9).

The aims and objectives of the humanitarian organizations is based on human security. This is evident through the change in the vision from pure emergency to development, from planning for the people to planning with the people, and from working all for the case to working as one for all. However, the implementation is not always as envisioned, this is due to the lack of coordination with the other organizations and the local people along with the impact of the context they are operating in.

Civil Society Organizations

Civil society organizations (CSOs) means “everything between the citizen and the state” (Oxfam, 2013). According to the UN, the CSOs are “Non-State, not-for-profit, voluntary entities formed by people in the social sphere that are separate from the State and the market. CSOs represent a wide range of interests and ties. They can include community-based

organizations as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the context of the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, CSOs do not include business or for-profit associations.”⁹ It is the organized society outside the sphere of the government and the private sector. It includes the development organizations operating locally and internationally including: media, labor unions, political parties, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), traditional and religious institutions and sport and welfare associations (Leeuwen & Verkoren, 2012).

The CSOs’ capacity to respond to individual concerns is unique due to its knowledge, experience and organizational nature. They “could be the most able to mount a rapid response to sudden downturns in their areas” (Michael, 2002, p. 8), especially that they are engaged in the people’s daily life and are aware of the changes that are taking place. Those CSOs emerge as a result of the local needs and through active engagement with the people. CSOs operate through a bottom-up approach, which position individuals at the center of concern, thus fostering freedom from want and freedom from fear. This is ensured through motivation and mobilization of the people to take part in the implementation (Michael, 2002).

CSOs work on preventing threats to human security. They address health, education and economic development needs (Michael, 2002). They are the “imagined agent of development” (Pearce, 2005, p. 41), and the “imagined agent for peace” (Leeuwen & Verkoren, 2012). They are able to provide protection, prevention and empowerment (Michael, 2002). According to Oxfam (2013) empowerment is accomplished through encouraging active citizenship, especially among marginalized groups; protection is attained by making sure that the state is accountable to all the citizens and by providing services to complement the state. CSOs help support the vulnerable to be able to control their own lives, while addressing poverty through ensuring inclusion of all. Peinado (n.d.) considers humanitarian aid equally important to building capacities and empowerment of the vulnerable.

In fragile states, the role of CSOs is vital, and different from other countries. In fragile states, when public services are broken, CSOs become the hope for development. The role of the CSOs change from advocacy to “public service delivery, improving governance and participatory decision making, and peacebuilding and conflict management” (World Bank, 2005, p. 6). In this case even donors channel their support and resources towards the NGOs. However, this implies reliance on a limited number of CSOs and hence on limited number of

⁹ Source: <https://www.ungpreporting.org/glossary/civil-society-organizations-csos/>

people or section of the people. As in most cases the CSOs do not serve on a national level. And in many cases CSOs are politicized and their activities are politicized too. Under conflict situations, these CSOs are supported for the time-span of the conflict thus hindering sustainability of operations and services. In Guinea Bissau, community-based organizations CBOs are being created to overcome the state inefficiency; however, they are supported on a project-by-project basis giving it no potential for institutional development or sustainability (World Bank, 2005). Operations are threatened by repressive legislations and restrictions of authoritarian governments. In Togo, the repressive state and the donor cutbacks affected the services provided by both the state and the CSOs. This enabled NGOs to take advantage of the poor communities. In Afghanistan, the CSOs face different challenges including: lack of financial sustainability, the possible internal corruption in some segments of the CSOs, the perception of NGOs as donor or charity-driven, fund dependent agents, and imported models (Nemat & Werner, 2016).

In Europe the CSOs play a key role in the provision of social services and they facilitate social inclusion (Neumayr, 2009). In central and eastern Europe CSOs have become important partners of the public sector by advocating for social services.

“They are seen as drivers of change, a space for initiatives and society's development. They are also providers of alternative economic models and social innovations. Their work is affected most by the emergence of new and diverse needs that require new types of responses. It seems that civil society is considered a panacea for almost all EU problems.” (Divjak, Forbici, 2017, p. 6)

The CSOs in general are in the field directly working with the people and therefore they are able to provide human security. However, there are always preventing factors that halt the support and avert the impact. These could range from lack of financial capacity, corruption, or lack of governmental support.

Humanitarian interventions

In humanitarian intervention the target is the state that does not consent or request the intervention. The beneficiaries- as perceived by the intervener- are the people of the target

state. The reason behind the intervention is extreme violation of human rights from the target state towards its citizens. In theory, it aims at preventing human misery and enforcing justice.

The UN Charter in 1945 defined the use of force and consequently the humanitarian intervention. The basic law regarding the prohibition of the threat or the use of force is laid in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Two exceptions to this prohibition are clearly mentioned: (1) the right of individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack against a state (Article 51 of the UN Charter), (2) the use of force can be mandated by the UN Security Council in case of a threat to or a breach of international peace or an act of aggression (Chapter VII, Articles 39 and 42 of the UN Charter). These prohibitions were not present in the NATO intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). On 24 March 1999, the NATO started its Airstrikes against the FRY with the justification that the FRY did not comply with the demand of the international community regarding the actions in Kosovo. Thus, this intervention does not comply with the two prohibitions: self-defense and actions authorized by the UN Security Council (Chesterman 2001:1). However, additional exceptions have been discussed that allow for humanitarian intervention. Ian Brownlie (1974) included an additional exception "the threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an international organization, with the object of protecting human rights."

"When a state commits cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind that matter ceases to be of sole concern to the state and even intervention in the interest of humanity might be legally permissible" (Chesterman 2001, p. 2).

The Danish Institute of International Affairs presents the competing discourse for and against the humanitarian intervention. Proponents of humanitarian interventions perceive that justice is a prerequisite for state stability and hence for stability on the international level. Critics of

humanitarian intervention perceives that order is a prerequisite for justice and humanitarian intervention endanger this order (DUPI, 1999, p. 44).

Critics perceive that in civil wars humanitarian interventions cause more armed resistance and high levels of conflict. The Danish Institute of International affairs argues that “military intervention in civil wars between oppressed minorities and central governments as well as sharp rhetoric about the universal protection of minorities involves a risk of changing the calculations of leaders of minority groups and encouraging armed resistance against government coercion” (DUPI, 1999, p. 42). Therefore, humanitarian interventions do not lead to human security for all; on the contrary it leads to a vicious cycle of more conflicts and more suffering.

Responsibility to Protect R2P

The UN Security Council is the principal body established to maintain international peace and security. Ever since its founding, the main concern was the interstate relation. Only rarely that the UNSC turned to focus on the wellbeing of individuals. With the ever-changing global forces of economy information and mass migration flows the focus changed to individual human security. Within this change and with attention to the Canadian initiative of human security and responsibility to protect, the international practice of UN operations was affected. International law recognizes the right to military intervention following the principle of “the responsibility to protect”. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. However, “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001). The responsibility to protect is restricted to the following cases as identified in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document that include atrocity crimes of genocide crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (GA: UN, 2005).

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

“138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such

crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” (UN, 2005)

Article 138 refers to the responsibility of the local individual state ensuring that it is an internal responsibility. Article 139 comes next to clarify that in case of the state's unwillingness or inability to protection, then it is the responsibility of the international community.

Another important milestone in the development of the R2P is the work done by the Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that was established by the Security General. The Panel included the concept in their report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. The

Panel suggested indicated that it is the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens; however, when the state is not able or willing to do so this responsibility is handed to the international community. The important aspect in the view presented is the collective vision of the responsibility to protect aiming to strengthen collective security (Stahn, 2007). This implied the use of military force as a last resort. The Secretary General embraced this in his report “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All”. In this report the responsibility to protect was “removed from the context of collective security and the use of force, and replaced to that of the rule of law in the chapter on the freedom to live in dignity” (Sulyok, 2013, p. 742); this ensured that the military intervention is the last resort, which should be authorized by the Security Council.

Another important milestone in the R2P came in 2009 through the UN report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” (UN, 2009). The report introduced the three pillars on which the responsibility to protect stands. The first pillar is the protection responsibilities of the state. This is the enduring responsibility of the state to protect its population. The second pillar is the international assistance and capacity building. This pillar ensures the commitment of the international community to assist states to meet these obligations. The third pillar is the timely and decisive response when a state is failing to provide such protection.

The responsibility to protect includes three responsibilities: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react, and responsibility to rebuild (Massingham, 2009). The responsibility to prevent is the first responsibility of the sovereign state and the communities and institutions within. This requires ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities that guarantees accountability, good governance, and protection of human rights, promoting social and economic development, and ensuring a fair distribution of resources. However, in certain cases this prevention needs the support from the international community, through means of development assistance, addressing root causes of the conflict, support initiatives of good governance and rule of law, or mediation efforts (ICISS, 2001).

The responsibility to protect also entails responsibility to react to situations requiring human protection. When the responsibility to prevent fails or the state is not willing or unable to comply to the preventive measures, the responsibility to react is followed. This responsibility is ensured through political, economic or judicial measures and in extreme cases through military action (ICISS, 2001).

After reaction the responsibility is to follow up and rebuild. This implies that following any military intervention there is a responsibility to build a durable peace and promoting good governance and sustainable development. This requires working closely with the local

government who will progressively take over this responsibility to rebuild in a manner that ensures sustainability of reconstruction and rehabilitation. This includes financial and technical support to the local authorities and local institutions within (ICISS, 2001). The post intervention responsibility is equally important to the military intervention otherwise the conditions that prompted the intervention will be worst. This will need to prioritizing and working on the following:

“encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery.” (ICISS, 2001, p. 66).

The commission regarded the Security Council as the appropriate body to authorize intervention. However, it also indicated that the permanent members have the right to call for alternative solutions if this body fails to discharge its responsibilities (ICISS, 2001, p. 53).

According to the report of the Secretary General “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” the responsibility of protect rests on three equally important non-sequential pillars. Pillar one is the ‘protection responsibilities of the state’ aiming to protect its population. Pillar two is the ‘International assistance and capacity building’ aiming to support the state in meeting those obligations. Pillar three is the responsibility of member states to respond collectively in a ‘timely and decisive’ manner. These responses could range from “pacific measures under Chapter VI of the Charter, coercive ones under Chapter VII and/or collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements under Chapter VIII” (UN, 2009d). The responsibility to protect targets four violations within this document, these include: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This implies a narrow consideration of human security. It is also clear that pillar two (assistance and capacity building) is the responsibility of the international community, which includes countries and organizations; while pillar three is the responsibility of the member states.

With this structure the R2P helps provide human security for the people. However, the question is whether this is the reality on the ground, or implementation is different. In reality, the focus is mostly on the responsibility to react and the use of military intervention (Sulyok,

2013). Although all documents admit the importance of early warnings, of the prevention and the concern to human security, they all in fact focus on the reaction and the military aspects. Mostly such interventions don't even consider the engagement of the local community or authorities as was the case in Lybia.

The responsibility to protect stands on the state (pillar one), the international community (pillar two) and the member states (pillar three). Pillar two is the responsibility of the international community; however, the international community is not defined in this case. Pillar three is the responsibility of the member states; "the use of R2P is predicated on the assent of the UN Security Council" (Stark, 2011); it is the structure of the UN Security Council that affects the decision of the R2P (Stark, 2011). This will define the type and duration of the intervention.

The question is: does R2P provide human security. In its first pillar the focus is on the obligation of the state, this ensures prevention and punishment of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As mentioned earlier the role of the state is not only to prevent but also to provide human security in its broad sense. Pillar two is about the assistance and capacity building; however, this responsibility is not clear as to what it includes and when to interfere; therefore, although this is a means to support the provision of human security, it is not clear how this will indeed support human security. Pillar three is the right to intervention of the member states.

The Libyan counterinsurgency is an example of official planning that focuses on humanitarian aspects and unofficial aims that utilizes military measures only. The aim of the operation mandated by the UN Security Council was "No-fly zone, the protection of civilians, and the enforcement of arms embargo" (Ucko & Egnell, 2014). The intervention in reality was commenced by NATO without deploying ground forces with the unofficial aim of "regime change in favour of the National Transitional Council" (Ucko & Egnell, 2014, p. 70). This model depicts that although the R2P focuses on human security; however, when it starts the political factors are then the drivers of the situation.

The analysis of the R2P reveals that in theory this is a noble concept; however, the impact of political background always comes to the surface. In its doctrine the R2P includes the military actions while including human security and preventive measures. This has limited to some extent the state sovereignty by complying to the international law and state's observance of the domestic situation. Human security perceives that the ultimate goal is the security of the people is the freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. As such, human security did not advocate for intervention; "[i]n its essence and in its broad conception,

the human security framework does not advocate responsibility to intervene to protect but one to engage in order to prevent” (Tadjbakhsh, 2010).

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

According to the United Nations, the term UN peacekeeping means:

“an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the “enforcement action” of the United Nations under Article 42. (UN, 1990., Article 42)

The first characteristic of the peacekeeping is the nonuse of the enforcement powers “without enforcement powers.” This ensures that the mission carries out its duties with the utmost impartiality. However, the Security Council authorized the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) by its Resolution 837 (1993) to take “all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and for publicly inciting them, including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment.” To implement resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM II initiated military action on 12 June 1993, conducting a series of air and ground military actions in south Mogadishu (UN, 1995). This has also been the case with the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC). With Resolution 169, the Security Council further authorized ONUC to ‘take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension’ of all non-UN foreign personnel (Aksu, 2003). Thus, the ‘non-enforcement’ is not fully accounted in reality. However, not all operations involve military personnel, as is the case with the United Nations Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Civilian Police in Haiti (MIPONUH), as these missions are accompanied by non-UN peacekeepers for a post-conflict community (UN, 1991).

The second characteristic of peacekeeping is the consent of the disputants before deploying forces. The UN and the host country sign the ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ that covers the jurisdiction of the operation and the rights and responsibilities of the force (IPA, 1984). Peacekeeping is ensured through the support of the disputants to carry out its duties. As this is

distinct from peace enforcement. Thus, peacekeepers are lightly armed in the classical peacekeeping operations (Hearn, 1999). The third aspect of peacekeeping is that it is a tool for reaching resolution. “its overall aim should be in attempting to enhance the conditions for peace whilst a settlement is being sought” (Hearn, 1999, p. 4).

There are many types of UN peacekeeping operations, and there are many attempts to classify these operations. On the other hand there are two policy documents that define the nature of peacekeeping operations: An Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi Report¹⁰. Mats (1993) classifies the peacekeeping missions into: (1) electoral support, (2) humanitarian assistance, (3) mine clearance and training and awareness programs, (4) observation and verification of cease-fire agreements, buffer zones, and foreign troop withdrawal, (5) preventive deployments, (6) separation of forces, their demobilization, and the collection, custody, and/or destruction of weapons, (7) establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and (8) disarming paramilitary forces and private and irregular units. John and Jarat (1992) use the following categories: (1) conventional observer mission, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) preventive peacekeeping, (4) supervising a cease-fire between irregular forces, (5) assisting in the maintenance of law and order, (6) protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, (7) guaranteeing rights of passage, (8) sanctions, and (9) enforcement. According to the UN the types include: (1) supervision of cease-fire, (2) regrouping and demobilization of forces (including their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons), (3) design and implementation of de-mining programmes, (4) return of refugees and displaced persons, (5) provision of humanitarian assistance, (6) supervision of existing administrative structures, (7) establishment of new police forces, (8) verification of respect for human rights, (9) design and supervision of constitutional, judicial, and electoral reforms, (10) observation, supervision, organization, and conduct of elections, and (11) coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The goals of peacekeeping missions have changed since its first mission in 1948. It changed “from assisting in the maintenance of ceasefires during cold war peacekeeping operations during the 1990s increasingly becoming peacebuilding missions” (Ndulo, 2011, p. 7). This change entails a wide range of experience needed and wide range of support promoting political transitions, assisting in political structuring, demobilizing armed forces, humanitarian relief, establishing rule of law, electoral support, and economic support (Ndulo, 2011).

¹⁰ https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03_1.pdf

According to the ex-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali peacebuilding is the “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (UN, 1992, para 21). This definition was expanded in the “2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” declaring that “peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining... making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners” (UN, 2000).

The goal of peacebuilding is lasting and sustainable peace with and between states. “The activities, strategies and goals pursued by international actors in the name of peacebuilding have ranged from grassroots development projects to ambitious statebuilding and stabilization operations” (Tschirgi, 2013, p. 197). Peacebuilding emerged in a manner that links security with development. It sees security and peace as the ultimate objective through human wellbeing initiatives focusing on socio-economic solutions. Thus, this approach changed the interest from pure state-centric to human centric (Tschirgi, 2013, p. 197).

By definition, the peacebuilding considers the root causes of the conflict through a people-centered multidimensional approach. Barnett et.al (2007) categorized peacebuilding activities into four sectoral interventions: (1) security and military (2) social, economic, developmental, humanitarian (3) political and diplomatic (4) justice and reconciliation. It includes different levels of intervention and “an overall strategy of human security” (Dulic, 2008, p. 2). It is an extension of peacekeeping that develops by time to be able to respond to needs and challenges through activities related to election monitoring, provision of humanitarian aid, demobilization, reintegration of civil society and nation building exercises (Krishnasamy, 2015)

In reality, the peacebuilding initiatives were criticized due to its state-centric approach (Gitau, 2018). Call (2007) perceives that peacebuilding is a state building mechanism ensured through effective and transparent performance of the state. Peacebuilding is characterized by a language of power; it is concerned about the integrity of the state considering the political stability as the means rather than the end (Conteh-Morgan, 2005). Peacebuilding operations include good governance initiatives that are basically state-centered. These interventions are mainly supporting transparency and efficiency of institutional capacity; however, these interventions mainly do not address the grassroots, rather they form a layer of bureaucracy that they can easily operate through (Ginty, 2013, p. 4).

“The ‘peace-building community’ seldom refers to human security dimension as an integral element of overall nation-building and state-building strategies. Moreover, human security has been neglected or underestimated when international peace-building missions prioritized state-building, under the pretext that individual rights are best protected through a system of relatively strong states; and that among three variables - state, democracy and human rights, state is the most important as conditio sine qua non” (Dulic, 2008, p. 2).

Past experiences revealed frequent failures in peacebuilding interventions due to the challenges and drawbacks faced (Paris, 2004; Dobbins et.al. 2007). Ismail (2008) mentioned that there are no criteria to tell success from failure. Peacebuilding is seen as an external intervention; thus, it is planned and implemented by those who are not familiar with the culture and traditions (Topalovic, 2017). Peacebuilding must seek to establish consent and real partnership with the local community. Also, being external and state-centered, peacebuilding is foreseen as illegitimate by the people, given the mass violence and the lack of common societal consensus (Gitau, 2018). Moreover, the skewing of peace accords to co-opt and reward potential spoilers legitimizes new relationships of power and relocates violence from the public (state-level) to domestic, private and community domains (Ismail, 2008). According to Hazen (2007, p. 324), “peace building has remained a largely amorphous concept without clear guidelines or goals. International interventions in post-conflict countries exhibited few clear examples of success.” Another main critique is the “strategic direction agenda-setting, timing of entry and exit” of peacebuilding (Ismail, 2008, p. 22).

Human Security Now Report (HSC, 2003:59) identified four gaps in the post-conflict strategies; these are: security gaps, governance gaps, gaps in international response and resource gaps. The security gaps is related to the ill-equipped military troops to deal with public security issues, exit strategy not related to the security needs of the people, and that security strategies do not consider the needs of humanitarian and development actors. The governance gap is related to the lack of national institutions and people ownership of the process, minimal attention to coexistence of divided communities and too much focus on national elections. Gaps in international response include the desire to accomplish speedy interventions with no consideration to the impact of those activities, and the lack of integration of efforts. The resource gaps, the lack of financial sustainability and the improper distribution of funds form another shortcoming of the post-conflict strategies.

The conception of peacebuilding is human security centered while practice is largely skewed towards domestic and international priorities of interveners, mostly state-centric. Therefore, the impact of such interventions excludes the roots of the conflict and the interests of the masses.

Dynamics of the Various Players

The various players on the ground strive to accomplish their desired objectives; the officially announced ones and the hidden agendas. Some agendas complement each other while others contradict and conflict with the others. Some aims at the human security for all, while some target a limited group of people and some try to resolve the problem while others try to tackle the consequences.

The insurgents and counterinsurgents specifically have the most conflicting agendas. The actions of insurgents and the counterinsurgents are shaped by two factors, which are the willingness to control and the necessity to gain more popular support. The people also might have conflicting agendas. Those benefiting from the existing state are keen to maintain the status quo, and those benefiting from the insurgents maintain their support either because they are benefiting directly, or because their ideology matches those of the insurgents.

The competition between the insurgents and the government is played out to attract those who are neutral; it is high-stakes competition, made even more so with international intervention. Those neutral (generally the majority of the population) are eager to return to the normal situation, but they favour a nationalistic approach. Mostly, they do not perceive the insurgents as providers of human security; neither do they perceive the intervention forces as the saviour especially with the collateral damage they cause during military operations. They believe that their source of human security is national, and mostly they see it through a different national party. It is not the government because it proved to be more fragile than ever - on the contrary they see it a source of insecurity. It is not the insurgents because they have experienced the conflict through this group. It is not the intervention forces, either since these are perceived as another source of violence and damage. This competition leads to more disintegration; new parties or new insurgents arise at this point. As a result, the conflict becomes a vicious cycle, in which an insurgency is leading to more conflict and more disintegration. External military intervention in this case intensifies and aggravates the situation, leading to an inexorable decline in human security.

Though the humanitarian organisations have a critical role in this framework, their intervention is usually insufficient due to the restrictions they face and the escalating crisis conditions that require ongoing assistance. In such a framework, the humanitarian organisations are not able to reach all the targets, they are usually working in cooperation with the counterinsurgents, and sometimes they are perceived as partial. With more conflict, more disintegration is engendered, this leads to insecurity; hence, humanitarian organisations are not able to provide sufficient assistance due to more restricted areas, more conflict, more players on the ground, and insecurity to access different conflicting areas.

No single approach will have all the answers. However, the dynamics of the players should tackle the individual sources of human insecurity, the institutional sources of human insecurity, and the cultural sources of human insecurity. The individual sources of insecurity include the harm directed by the people. The institutional sources are related to harms directed by the failure or the politicization and neglect of institutional performance; this is when the institutions are not providing services for all or fail to provide services or even salaries to the people. Cultural sources are the harmful actions resulting from modes of thinking of the local people or even the international community which results in conflicts between groups (Conteh-Morgan, 2005)

Conclusion

Governments have the responsibility to ensure their citizens' human security; however, in many cases they might not be able or might not be even appropriate for this task. Hence, there are different players who take part in ensuring human security either voluntarily, aggressively or by invitation of the host government. Those players could be groups, organizations or governments; they could also be local or foreigners. The question is if the state is not able to ensure human security, who is there to ensure human security for all? And is there any other party who is really capable of an all-inclusive approach? The analysis in this chapter illustrated that different parties provide human security; however, these do not and cannot replace the state. They could be vital players within a fragile state, they might be able to complement, but they cannot compete with a strong state willing to ensure human security for all.

Power dynamics are a major factor in determining the effectiveness of the support and the mitigation of insecurity. In a fragile state, the dynamics of the players is vital to ensure human security to save lives, and alleviate suffering. However, many groups never cross paths. There

are no shared planning, sharing of success criteria, or sharing of data. And, in many cases the competition amongst those players leads to a more devastated condition worse than the lack of support as each provides the support that fulfills the individual and in many cases competing agendas even if they are all supporting the government.

A combination of a bottom up approach along with a top-down approach is crucial to address human security. Thus, although interventions should tackle the state governance effectiveness, it should also involve transformation of social, economic and political aspects. Additionally, it should be based on a participatory approach, where people and local organizations should be included and empowered. Moreover, it should be noted that human security incorporates a short term along with a long-term intervention.

Chapter 4: Impact of counterinsurgency on Human Security

Introduction

This chapter clarifies the impact of counterinsurgency on human security taking into consideration the humanitarian and military perspectives. This is analyzed through a metaphor that highlights the different variables affecting the situation. The chapter helps identify the impact of counterinsurgency on the population as a whole depending on the context and on the composing elements of the society. The impact is illustrated through a metaphor from natural sciences. The use of metaphor has been beneficial in different utilizations and different fields.

Numerous theories transfer from natural science to the socio-political theories. Tolstoy used the physics metaphor to explain war. He said:

“As in a clock the result of the complex movement of numberless wheels and pulleys is merely the slow and measured movement of the hands pointing to the time, so also the result of all the complex human movements of these hundred and sixty thousand Russians and French -all the passions, desires, regrets, humiliations, sufferings, bursts of pride, fear, rapture- was merely the loss of the battle of Austerlitz, the so-called battle of three emperors, that is, a slow movement of the world-historical hand on the clock face of human history” (Tolstoy, 1962, p. 258)

Several terms were transferred from different fields to the military and became commonly used terms. Military has used center of gravity from physics, the term operational art was

derived from design studio, and enemies that operate asymmetrically and as networks come from the biological sciences.

Clausewitz used the term “friction” from the field of thermodynamics. He said: “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper” (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 119). Clausewitz used Newtonian mechanical concepts of mass, force, friction and center of gravity.

The aim here is to provide a model that uses a simple analogy between human security under the influence of asymmetric warfare in fragile states and the intermolecular forces and Newtonian laws. It provides a proxy model that helps understand the relationship between different variables while mapping the structure of the two domains.

The thesis utilizes a process model that considers both the concepts and the processes. The process model of the metaphor comprehension and inference is usually set through analogical reasoning and parsing process. First the concepts of the target and the source concepts were identified. Then, an analogical mapping of the domains, sub-concepts and relations from the two domains is analyzed to ensure that they map each other. Then knowledge from the source domain is transferred to the target domain (Carbonell & Minton, 1983).

This chapter is composed of two parts; the first is the impact of counterinsurgency on human security of the people, and the second is the impact of counterinsurgency on the human security of the neighboring countries. The first part is completely driven from the metaphor of centrifugal force; while the second is analyzed through the consideration of the economic, political, social, educational, and health factors (called crossover effect).

The Impact of Counterinsurgency on human security of the People

The Metaphor

Suspension, colloids, and soluble vs elite, minorities and neutral

In general, the elements of the society (individuals, groups and classes) behave as particles within a solvent. Some particulates in the solution are dissolved and homogeneously distributed within the solvent, just like dissolving salt in water, it becomes part of the system that you cannot even see the salt when it is dissolved; it is part of the solution. When light is passed through a true solution, the dissolved particles are too small to deflect the light. These dissolved particles are the individuals who are immersed in the society and are part of the

system; they cannot be separated easily from the system. They cannot be separated by the natural forces (gravity forces).

Other particles are colloidal dispersions that appear to be homogeneous; which cannot be separated from the solvent by filtration. It is a heterogeneous system. These are individuals who appear to be part of the system; however, they can be separated through certain internal or external factors or agents. In colloidal dispersion one substance is dispersed as very fine particles in the dispersion medium. In case of dust, solid particles are dispersed in air as dispersion medium. Both the dispersed and the dispersion medium could be liquid, gas, or solid. Colloids are not like solutions because their dispersed particles are larger than those of a solution. Dispersed particles of a colloid cannot be separated by filtration. Mayonnaise and milk are examples of colloids. Mayonnaise is formed of vinegar and oil that do not mix. However, adding egg yolk (the emulsifying agent) causes the mixture to become stable and not separate. When light is passed through colloids, the dispersed particles are able to deflect the light as is the case in a diluted milk solution. The particles in colloids are larger than those in solutions. These particles are the individuals who seem to be part of the society, only with certain factors they are dispersed, and they can be separated from the medium under certain conditions and the effect of external factors.

The third type, is the suspensions type, which is heterogeneous mixtures that settle down as a result of the gravitational force F_c . In this type the solute does not get dissolved, rather get suspended in the liquid. The particles in suspensions are larger than those in colloids, which is the reason why they settle down easily as a result of the natural gravity. These particles are the elite who settle down as a result of the gravitational force.

The state is like the blood, it is a solution, a colloid, and suspension. The blood is a solution (of salts, glucose, urea and a few other small compounds), a colloid (of plasma proteins, including albumin, transport proteins and antibodies), and a suspension (of blood cells and platelets). The state is composed of the suspension-like individuals, these are the elite; the solution-like individuals, these are the neutral; and colloids-like individuals, these are the marginalized.

Every particle in the fluid is subject to three different forces: (1) the gravitational force; (2) the buoyant force, which is parallel to the gravitational force but in an opposite direction; and (3) the drag force, which affects the particles when there is a relative motion between the particle and the fluid. The gravitational force is the power that pushes the particle to the ground in the direction of center of gravity. The buoyant force is the force that holds the particles in the system with a direction opposite to the gravitational force. It is the force that

we feel pushes us upward while swimming. The drag force is the force that acts in an opposite direction to the relative motion of an object moving with respect to a surrounding liquid.

Similarly, elements of the society are subject to three forces affecting the different elements in the same manner. Individuals in the state are affected by three forces: (1) Gravitational force to the state (perception of human security, support received and the state strength); (2) up thrust or uplift force (these are the ambition and aspiration of the people); and (3) the governments precaution measures to preserve the system (imposed whenever there is a difference between the individual's disposition and that of the government).

The first force is the gravitational force F_g . This is dependent on two factors: the mass of the particle (m_p) and the gravitational acceleration (acceleration due to gravity of the ground) (g). This factor is constant regardless of the particle under study.

$$F_g = m_p g \quad (1)$$

The mass of the particle (m_p) is equal to the density of the particle (ρ_p) multiplied by the volume of the particle (V_p).

$$m_p = \rho_p \times V_p \quad (2)$$

$$F_g = (\rho_p \times V_p) \times g \quad (3)$$

In the state this gravitational force is the amalgamation of the perception of human security, the received support and the strength of the state. The factor that is constant regardless of the individual is the strength of the state. This is measured by the state fragility index.

$$g = \frac{1}{\text{State fragility Index}} \quad (4)$$

The mass of the particle (in this case the mass of the individual) is composed of two factors. The first factor is the volume of the particle (V) that is reflected here by the received support (whether internal or external, government or opposition) (S). The second factor is the density of the particle (ρ), this is reflected by the willingness to control the government or be part of the government.

Support (W).

Support in this model could be through different resources and of different means. Individuals receive support through the government or through other organizations that could target minorities. Although the government provides support for all, but the elite receive the maximum support while the marginalized and minorities receive the minimal support. Pareto (1935) mentioned that these include the two types of elites: the governing elites and the non-governing elites. According to Mills (1956), these include the political, economic, and military elites. As Dye has mentioned, the US public policy does not emanate from the masses, rather it is based on the elites such as the think tanks, special interest groups and the prominent lobbyists. Minorities on the other hand are the least to receive support from the government; however, there are different organizations or entities that help support minorities due to religious or ideological reasons. The support provided could include economic, political and cultural support. According to the theory of “ethnic bargaining” such support can give rise to mobilization that is possible to create collective desires for more radical demands. “Minority leaders then use these demands to bargain for greater concessions from the central government” (Jenne: 2007, p. 10). The support is in many cases economic and political; however, it is expanded to reach cultural support. The right to culture is vital to enjoy other rights including education, health, language, and livelihoods. As in equation (5) below, the support to the elite is greater than the support of the neutral that is greater than the support for the marginalized.

$$S_e(elite) > S_n(neutral) > S_m(marginalized) \quad (5)$$

While preliminary speaking the minorities have the least control of the government and the least participation; however, their conscious and support leads to more demand and willingness to control. The elite on the other hand holds high interest of maintaining the control of the government due to the optimum benefit they receive. Hence the willingness to control will be higher for the elite, and least for the marginalized.

$$W_e(elite) > W_n(neutral) > W_m(marginalized) \quad (6)$$

The ***gravitational force*** that attracts the individual to the system is the amalgamation of the *strength of the state, the support received by the individuals or groups and the willingness to gain control of the government.*

$$F_I = S \times W \times g \quad (7)$$

where F_I is the force affecting the individual.

S is the support provided (internal or external)

W is the willingness of the people to control the government

g is the strength of the state

The Second force is the one that reflects the **buoyant force** (F_b). It is the upward force exerted on objects submerged in fluids. It is the power that keeps objects floating in fluids. In the state it is the individuals' ambitions and aspirations that affect the individuals and balances what is being provided to the individuals. It is **the aspiration for development for gaining more services and for inflicting change**. It is similar to the buoyant force affecting particles in a solvent. For some individuals this force is very low in relevance to the gravitational force F_g ; hence, these particles settle down as is the case of the suspensions.

The third power is the **drag force** (F_D). Whenever a difference in velocity exists between the particle and its surrounding the fluid exerts a resistive force. Similarly, whenever the individuals or groups move in a different direction or in opposition, **the government exerts force on them to maintain the situation by resisting the opposition force**.

Particles in the solvent behave in accordance to the three forces; similarly, the individuals and groups within the society are affected by the three forces. The *suspensions* in the solvent settle down as a result of the gravitational force due to their large volume. These are the individuals and groups benefiting from the government and receiving all the services. F_G is high as a result of the benefits gained by the government and their willingness to maintain the control of the government. These resemble the elites and the pro-government part of the community; where F_g is high compared to F_b . These are part of the system, but they are settled down maintaining all the possible benefits compared to their ambitions and aspirations. The support they receive is huge and is driven by their high connections with the government

The solutions are formed when small sized particles are homogenously distributed within the system. These are the neutral people who become part and are not easily separated from the system. Those individuals receive minimal support, as they are not reinforced by the government or by external parties. They also do not have willingness to control the government.


The colloidal dispersions are dispersed insoluble suspending particles. These particles are not fully dissolved in the system. The interaction between the particles is stronger than the interactions between the particles and the system. In the state these are the marginalized and

minorities. Their interaction with and among their groups is stronger than their interaction with the rest of the community and the government. Their weak interaction with the government is either voluntary due to their feel they are not part of the system, or is forced by the outward driving force of the government. Their support (that is the volume of the colloidal particle) is less than the elite. However, these minorities do in many cases receive support depending on the group they are affiliated to. It is an external support. It is in fact this support that makes them able to remain in the system since they receive minimal internal support. These are the colloids that you can observe easily in the system under certain conditions (same as with colloids that you can view easily within the system as in the milk example that reflects the light, although we do not visually observe these particles).

When colloidal individuals feel insecure or unstable; when they feel the gravitational force is not sufficient to hold them in the system or when they receive more support from external parties they tend to form opposition groups and thrive to gain control of the government. These are the individuals in the society who are not immersed in the system, who lack the sense of belonging or feel that they are not receiving proper services that suit their ideology. It is a similar behavior of the unstable colloidal dispersions that form flocculates (as is the case of oil in water; it forms a bigger spot of oil without being immersed).

Physically, flocs are either formed naturally (through internal forces) or through an external force. It can be accomplished either by a change in the pH of a suspension or by adding positively charged polymer. Likewise, individuals have the chance to flocculate when there is a change in the pH; that is when there is a change in the system either through neglect, corruption, or non-respect. They also have the tendency to flocculate when there is an external factor affecting with a positive charge towards the flocculation. This is attained by the increase of the external support. It is a destabilizing process that can be rather long. Flocculation starts as coalescence where smaller drops join together, these then form bigger drops; which ultimately can get to the braking phase where the drops float as one portion on the surface (see figure 10). In a similar manner, marginalized groups floccule together to form bigger groups and be detached from the system. These can form the insurgents if the ambitions and aspirations are high enough and the agents are forcing more flocculation.

Figure 10: Categorization of Individuals and Groups within the fragile State as compared to the Types of Solutions



Source: own design

In general, this is the spark of insurgency; where the insurgents seize to gain control or to enforce the ideological and economic change. These insurgents flocculate with their associates. They receive more external support. This is where they gain organizational strength, resources, popular support, and ideology. These are all factors that will help in their strong flocculation. Under these circumstances, there is also a tendency to affect the neutral population by providing more support and opportunities for increasing consciousness about the deteriorating situation and more willingness to change the government. These might not be the insurgents but these could be the pro-insurgents. They will receive support from the insurgents; hence their status will change from soluble to colloids. These are recruited by increasing support and increasing the willingness to change the government. In particles this leads to floating of affected ones to the surface and in some cases being part of the flocs. In the state, these are the individuals who are attracted by the insurgents for a simple reason of dissatisfaction and lack of trust in the government or for receiving support from the insurgents.

On the other hand, the elite and the pro-government people are benefiting from the existing state of being; they are receiving the utmost governmental concern and benefit. The government tries to widen this category by giving incentives and support for some of the

neutral. These will form the pro-Government category. That is the volume of the particle (the support received whether internal or external) defines to which category the individual is associated with. Support is not necessarily financial; support could be physical, emotional or any other type of support. It is the inward force alleviated by the government.

Both the government and the insurgents operate under two main factors: the willingness to control and the popular support. They are both looking forward for more control of resources, of power, legitimacy and of political control. They are also striving for more popular support; where both the insurgents and counterinsurgents are trying to attract or recruit individuals from the neutral section of the population.


The high support, the ambitions and aspirations, the development of the organizational strength, the empowerment of resources, the gain of popular support, and the ideology leads to stronger bonds of flocculation that leads to radicalization, violence, and active insurgency. This is then faced by counterinsurgency whether internal or external. As we are considering here a fragile state more external players will be part of the picture; there are the players supporting the insurgents, and there are others supporting the counterinsurgent or the government.

Throughout the process, the different individuals whether pro-insurgents, pro-government or neutral are still under the effect of the three forces: the gravitational, the buoyant and the dragging force. But the question is: what is the impact of the counterinsurgency on the conflict that has arisen? And, what is the impact on human security, whenever external players supporting insurgents or counterinsurgents are in place.

Elements of the society are driven by their ambitions and aspirations along with the support they receive. However, after the escalation of the external forces' role in the game the three main forces are distorted; it affects the ambitions and aspirations while affecting the perception of human security. Pro-government individuals perceive the government as the main source of human support, while those pro-insurgents perceive that the insurgents are the guarantee for their support. However, the majority of the population who are neutral, perceive things differently; in fragile states they perceive that under a weak government they should look for alternative solutions, either they rely on personal efforts or the support of the tribe and the community. The forces affecting them are shaken; hence, they perceive that services cannot be provided by the government or those supporting the government, especially due to the use of force affecting their daily lives. On the other hand, they do not see the insurgents a source of any service or benefit, as they are perceived the source of conflict or at least a driving factor of violence. The neutral part does not welcome the external forces as these

increase the intensity of conflict and the collateral damage. Rather they favor a nationalistic approach; through a different national party that could stabilize the gravitational acceleration and form a strong state. Additionally, they perceive that maintaining this gravity is not through the use of counterinsurgency, and surely not through the intervention of external sources. The two different opposing external forces lead to more conflict and hence the situation is trapped in a vicious cycle in which more interventions lead to more conflict and then to more interventions (see figure 8 below). Consequently, more conflict leads to an inexorable decline in the services while changing the structure of the whole system with a no possibility of returning back. The increase in conflict leads to an increase in the velocity of the cyclic motion similar to the movement within the ultra-centrifuge¹¹.

Figure 11: Effect of External Support for both Insurgents and Counterinsurgents (Start of the Vicious Cycle)



Source: own design

Richard Hartshorne (1954) analyzed the centripetal forces that bind the states together (including: national unity, religion, language, etc.) and centrifugal forces that pull them apart (including: diverse ethnic groups within a state). According to Hartshorne nations are either centripetal or centrifugal. For stability, the country must have centripetal forces of greater

¹¹ The ultracentrifuge is a centrifuge optimized for spinning a rotor at very high speeds, capable of generating very high acceleration, which imposes high centrifugal forces on suspended particles or molecules in a solution and causes separation of such matter on the basis of differences in weight. It is used in almost every blood test; where red cells are separated from plasma of blood.


magnitude than the centrifugal forces. This means that the forces that unite a country should be greater than the forces that tend to divide. When centripetal forces are greater, the country will be able to face global and internal challenges. When centrifugal forces are greater then there is a high potential that the government will breakdown. The centripetal force is mostly based on the attitude of the people towards the system. It is composed of the national identity that is reinforced through different events and symbols to ensure the national awareness amongst all. It is also related to the availability of sufficient resources and services where people perceive that these are provided fairly for all people. It is also related to the religion and language that insures a sense of unity amongst all. The centrifugal forces are the attitudes and the forces that tend to divide a state. These are composed of the diverse religious beliefs, culture and economic activities. If these forces become critical, the state might break down as a result of ethnic groups struggles. Centrifugal forces also include the lack of trust of the government or competing political ideology, or when people are mistreated. Also, the religious differences can also be a force that limits interaction and that might lead to separatist movements.

The analysis in this paper suggests that the impact of counterinsurgency leads to an accelerating cycle movement that helps create a centrifugal force¹². This metaphor helps explain the impact of the use of counterinsurgency and the possible outcomes resulting from this intervention.

The centrifugal force has its impact on the system of rotation. In physics, when the cyclic movement starts, all elements of the society will be subject to the centrifugal force. The more external interventions are used; the more the vicious cycle is experienced and the more instability there is in the system. Figure (12) below illustrates the vicious cycle as result of the external intervention supporting both insurgents and counterinsurgents.

¹² In Physics, centripetal force and centrifugal force are really the exact same force, just in opposite directions because they're experienced from different frames of reference. If you are observing a rotating system from the outside, you see an inward centripetal force acting to constrain the rotating body to a circular path. However, if you are part of the rotating system, you experience an apparent centrifugal force pushing you away from the center of the circle, even though what you are actually feeling is the inward centripetal force that is keeping you from literally going off on a tangent (Lucas, 2019). Hence, to understand the concept from an internal perspective and to consider the perception of the people about human security, this research has considered the centrifugal force.

Figure 12: **Impact of the external support on the conflict**



Source: own design

Where is the center of mass? Where is the human security?


In physics, the center of mass represents the mean position of the matter in a body. It is the unique point in an object or system which can be used to describe the system's response to external forces, the point at which the object can be balanced.

In an ideal and fully homogenous system the center of mass is located at the centroid; center of the system. This represents the point where human security is fulfilled for all. In a non-homogeneous system this is dependent on the mass distribution. In a fragile state under asymmetric warfare there are three distinct parts of the community and three types of masses: the pro-government, the neutral and the pro-insurgents, these have different densities and characteristics and therefore have a different center of mass for each. However, the center of mass for the system as a whole is far from the center of mass for the ideal situation (see figure 13 below). Since neutral people are recruited for either the pro-insurgents or pro-government this center of mass is subject to change and will be moving rapidly which affects the stability of the system.

The reference frame is the point of human security for all people. It is the centroid that has been discussed in the ideal state with fully homogeneous system. This point helps ensure

human security for all people. However, due to the recruitment and the change of the masses, the center of mass is not anymore that point of reference. It is a new point depending on the masses that is depending on the support provided and the willingness of the people to gain control of the government (see equation 7). The change in this position compared to the reference frame destabilizes the system and hence destabilizes human security. The high level of recruitment on both sides ensures a ceaseless deterioration of human security resulting from the persistent change in the center of mass.

Figure 13: **Center of mass for ideal case situations and fragile states under asymmetric warfare**



Source: own design

Vicious Cycle

The question is how does the vicious cycle start and how does it affect the system as a whole. As has been discussed earlier, in a fragile state people are driven by the support provided, they either stay neutral looking for personal or community support or they get associated to the government or insurgents in search of support. This support could be ideological, economic, political, societal and cultural or all of the factors combined. In a fragile state not all individuals see the government as the service provider; however, they might be recruited through special incentives provided by the government. The State is also able to maintain

loyal associates through some incentives. The insurgents are not service providers; however, in many cases they are able to provide services that comply with the neutral people. Insurgents try to attract and recruit fighters and associates through certain services and motives. Many of the citizens remain neutral, which is the market opportunity for both competitors. The use of foreign interventions on the side of the insurgents or the state (or both) leads to change in the center of mass and hence widens the distance from the human security that leads to more use of force and more external intervention. This is when the vicious cycle starts: more support, leading to more radicalization, then to more recruitment, and more distance from the human security and again to more violence. Figure (12) illustrated the various players in the field and how each party is working against the other causing this vicious cycle.

The more support received by the government and the insurgents and the more willingness to control the government by the two poles, the more intensive violence prevails. Moreover, the more extensive the military intervention, the more people feel that there is an inexorable driving force leading to increasing instability due to widening the distance from human security. It is a vicious cycle, with no way of return. Meanwhile the elements of society (individuals, groups, and classes) behave as objects traveling in a circular path – as a stone being whirled round on a string – that would react as if there were an outward force – the centrifugal force – affecting it.

The centrifugal force metaphor explains the effect of the various factors leading to change in human security of the people and their perception of instability, and hence on the unity of the nation. The feel of the outward force (the centrifugal force) disturbs the feel of stability, human security, and of national security. The imbalance impacts all elements of human security. It leads to diminishing freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity.

The centrifugal force is usually calculated by the following equation:

$$F_c = \frac{mv^2}{r} \quad (8)$$

where


F_c = centrifugal force

m = mass of the object

v = velocity

r = length of the string or the radius of the circular movement (see figure 14)

Figure 14: Centrifugal Force variables



As discussed earlier the mass (m) of the object is dependent on the volume and the density; this is represented by the support provided by the poles (internal and external) and the density (ρ) represented by the willingness to control the government ($S \times W$). This model suggests that the centrifugal force affecting the individuals and groups within a fragile state under asymmetric warfare could be calculated according to the following:

$$F_c = \frac{(S \times W)v^2}{r} \quad (9)$$

where

F_c = centrifugal force (it is the force that people feel disturbs all stability and their human security)

v = violence level during the conflict; originally this is the velocity

r = is the ratio of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; originally this is the length of the string or the radius of the circular movement, which is calculated according to the following:

$$r = 1 - \frac{\text{\# of those engaged in the conflict}}{\text{total \# of population}} \quad (10)$$


According to equation (9) of the model there is a positive correlation between the independent variables: support of the poles, the willingness to take control of the government, and the intensity of violence and military operations used; and the dependent variable the centrifugal force. The radius (r) ranges from zero to one; when $r = 1$ this means no one is engaged in the violent conflict, and when $r = 0$ all the population are part of the conflict. Therefore, when all the population are part of the conflict the state reached the state of chaos and the centrifugal force is infinite. Also, when the number of those engaged in the conflict increases the radius decreases and hence the centrifugal force increases.

Despite the fact that the counterinsurgency effort is trying to stabilize the movement of the object rotating in a circular motion (that is the state driven into the vicious cycle), the use of military force and the traditional means of warfare strategies is increasing the centrifugal force. In fact, it is a main factor that drives the centrifugal force. Many actors are playing a role; however, all the efforts are not contributing to enhance the security perception amongst the locals. As time passes the neutral segment of the society is pushed /pulled from the neutral position to the insurgents or counterinsurgents leading to more violence and higher rotational speed and stronger centrifugal force and more distance from human security.


As the conflict reaches the various segments of the community, the state becomes an ultra-centrifugal system; it separates the various elements. This separates the blood into three different layers in an ultra-centrifuge.¹³ This ensures more fragmentation of the society with more sub groups and more new groups that emerge.

¹³ This is similar to the blood test; where the blood sample is placed in a test tube in a machine called the ultracentrifuge. The test tube is then rotated at a constant speed called centrifugation; centrifugation is based on the centripetal acceleration. During this process the heavier part (red blood cells) moves outwards. The white blood cells and platelets (which are lighter) form the middle layer. The plasma (being the lightest) moves toward the upper layer.

The effect of the outward force leads to some being separated easily by leaving the whole system; those who are not willing to remain part of the system emigrate. They are similar to the particles with low density that are easily separated from the system in the ultracentrifuge. These represent those who are willing to immigrate from the country as a result of the conflict. Others remain within the system; their willingness to look for



alternative solutions makes it harder to break them and lose them from the system. Their alternatives might be participation in the conflict, or use of economic opportunities that might arise, or simply starting a new group of insurgents or a new political faction. These alternatives might be sufficient to keep them within the system, or they might end up with very little capacity and energy to maintain, and then they are also jolted away out of the system. The result in all cases is a separation of the constituent elements of the community, destroying all forms of unity, and leading to human insecurity. It leads to the formation of various parties, each trying to conserve its new characteristics, and each trying to ensure human security aspects – if any – for its own adherents. It is conflict that leads to more disintegration and to even more conflict. The balance between fighting and restoring human security to adherents drives the behavior of the competitors. However, this balance is not possible since it is a provision of human security to adherents only while dismantling human security of the rest; an equation that is never balanced and never possible to maintain.



Results of the centrifugal force

The causes of the centrifugal force are inauspicious; however, the results are even more disastrous. The results are more fragmentation and more deterioration of the economic, political and cultural aspects. The following are the results:

1. Gravitational force will be replaced with the much more powerful one “centrifugal force”. This implies that the state strength will not have an effect on the system and the solution then cannot be state empowerment, the solution should be to eliminate the

driving factors of the centrifugal force. It should be *the elimination of the external intervention, decreasing the violence used from all parties* (insurgents and counterinsurgents) and decrease the number of those engaged in the conflict or supporting the conflict.

2. According to the model an unrestrained particle would leave its orbit if the centripetal force is removed; therefore, any individual who feel there is no support provided and there is no ambition to change would leave the system. *This will escalate immigration level* from the system with no looking back. The increase in immigration is thus due to the lack of any support to the people on the ground and their lack of aspiration and hope in the system. The strength of the state for them is not a factor as the centrifugal force exceeds the state capability force. As such the driving factor to decrease immigration is to ensure service provision to the people directly even if not through the government. The solution for this goes beyond the humanitarian assistance to the developmental assistance.
3. The ultracentrifuge leads to more flocculation and creation of different layers. This result implies an unprecedented *creation of different parties, factions, opposition and isolated communities*. The new floccules have minimal connections towards the state; however, its main connection and loyalty is directed towards the faction or the group rather than towards the state. This entails full disintegration and more chaos. As a result, winning the hearts of the people will not be the solution for this case; any interventions should be directed towards the leaders of the new floccules rather than the individuals.
4. The fragmentation leads to different centers of mass this means different centers of gravity for the different segments of the society. The resultant is then a *massive deterioration in human security*; a life full of fear, with no needs fulfilled and a life of indignity. Affecting the economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. As a result, interventions of such cases need to tackle all aspects of human security while supporting the communities under such unrest.
5. The fragmentation and the diverse centers of mass also lead to *form a new community that is not anymore similar to the original structure*. It is a way of “no go back.” The one community is now multiple new communities; communities that cannot live together, and communities that are now of different aspiration, different cultures and

different wellbeing. This is when those communities believe the only way forward is claiming independence from the state, or maintaining the state of war.

6. The resultant of the vicious cycle is ***complete chaos and violence similar to the status that Hobbes called the “State of Nature”*** (Leviathan, 1651); it brought to the fore the grimmest dismay of a destroyed state structure. It is a ***failure of the social contract and a “war of all against all.”*** There are no constraints on behavior, anyone at any time can use the force, and all ready to counter the force with force. This disturbance of the social contract and the complete chaos created resulting from the vicious cycle has shown an irreparable and irreversible situation that completely alters the community structure and diminishes social cohesion. Hence, any solution should consider the nucleus of the system; including the center of mass and the social structure. The solution depends on the phase of the conflict. Prior to the conflict security should be considered a continuum that starts with conflict prevention (Heinbecker, 2000). Prior to the vicious cycle and the social contract failure a mixed *military and political strategy is needed*; with more focus on the political. The solution should be based on the factors defined in the vicious cycle model. Hence the following factors should be controlled: support provided to the poles, willingness to control the government, the violence level during the conflict, and the number of those engaged in the conflict.

“...no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” (Leviathan, 1651)

Impact on the Neighboring Countries

Spillover-Crossover model

Spillover Effect

Asymmetric warfare affects human security of the people within the countries involved into the conflict. Costs of asymmetric warfare include security, economic, and social costs. Furthermore, the costs of asymmetric warfare extend to reach the neighboring countries and the international community. “Peaceful countries that are adjacent to countries engaged in civil war suffer from direct and long-term effects caused by the civil wars of their neighbors” (Collier, 2003). Neighboring countries receive the most evident spillover of the conflict through the arrival of the refugees. The largest number of Syrian refugees is currently in Lebanon and Jordan, and the largest number of Afghani refugees moved to Pakistan.

Negative effects

Considering the different cases of asymmetric warfare, it is evident that the conflict’s spillover onto the neighboring countries stimulates political instability, economic instability, and influx of refugees.

Political instability of neighboring countries results from the spillover of conflicts, combatants, and arms. The spillover of refugees might entail crossover of the conflict on the different sectors. This could be possible through the use of refugee camps as a base for armed groups (Salehyan, 2008). During the refugee crisis in the Congo, the militias established training bases in the refugee camps; where they stored weapons, trained refugee fighters and launched cross border attacks (Lischer, 2006). A conflict between the neighboring countries erupted as a result. Hence, the spillover of a conflict onto another country can escalate into regional or international war. Lischer identified different types of political violence involving refugees; these include: conflict between sending state and the refugees, between the receiving state and the refugees, and among refugees themselves resulting in intra-state and interstate conflict (Lischer, 2006). In the case of Somali refugees, they served as domestic opposition groups in the host country, where they often worked closely with ethnic Somali separatists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (World Bank, 2010).

Researches show that instability in the region affects negatively the economic performance of neighboring countries (Ades & Chua, 1997). The effect is evident in the living cost and the trade cost affected by the conflict: “Mozambique doubled Malawi’s international transport

costs and triggered an economic decline” (Collier, 2003: 34). In another case “Congo closed the river route to the sea for the landlocked Central African Republic” (Collier, 2003, p. 35). Some recent research indicates that the economic benefits of refugee influx resulting from conflict conditions outweigh the costs of the influx to the neighboring countries. However, so far only the costs of the refugees’ influx have been discussed thoroughly in many researches indicating the economic strains and burden on the host communities (IMF & WB, 1999). The adverse effect on the neighboring countries may lead to a “contraction in growth, higher inflation, large fiscal and current account deficits, loss of reserves, and weakened financial system” (Sab, 2014). It has also been indicated that the economic impact depends on the initial economic status of the host countries along with the number and income of refugees they host (Sab, 2014). Others found that directly bordering countries receive negative spillover while non-bordering neighboring countries receives a positive spillover as those wealthier and more skilled are able to travel further distances (De Groot, 2010). Research has also revealed possibilities of transferring endemic diseases as a result of the conflict. For example, there is a high correlation between the increase in the malaria incidents and the number of war refugees (Collier, 2003, p. 35).

Positive effects

The results of several research projects reveal that the benefits of refugees’ influx to host communities exceed the costs (Jacobson, 2001). It has been shown that refugees often make positive contributions to the state economy. For example, in Uganda “these contributions are exemplified by the significant volume of exchange between refugees and Ugandan nationals, as well as by refugees’ creation of employment opportunities for Ugandan nationals” (Betts, et.al, 2014).

In Uganda, which received a huge influx of refugees from Rwanda, Sudan, Kenya and Congo; the educational sector has witnessed benefits to host communities. The assistance strategy was based on development rather than emergency projects. The policy used was “integrating refugee primary and secondary schools into the district education system” (Dryden-Peterso & Hovil 2003). Assistance that was provided for the refugees targeted the host communities including those who did not originally have access to educational services. The temporary infrastructure ends to provide support beyond the crisis such that it supports the host communities directly (Dryden-Peterso & Hovil 2003).

Another significant benefit is filling the gap in the labor force. Refugees usually accept lower-skilled jobs that are not filled or demanded by the host community labor force. Additionally, refugees coming from different backgrounds and educational levels usually pursue diverse job opportunities. The refugee labor force does not necessarily compete with, but complements, the host community labor force (Betts, et.al, 2014).

In the most adverse conditions, refugees find ways for income generating activities. Some are able to relocate their businesses from their country of origin to the host countries, while others start innovative ideas and activities. In Kenya, refugees were able to engage in creative income generating activities despite the challenging security conditions (Betts et.al 2015). In Uganda, several cases of successful innovative entrepreneurship were established, which were able to contribute to the local economy (Betts et.al 2015).

Generally speaking, the spillover of refugees has both negative and positive consequences, which depends on the host communities. In Tanzania, after the spillover of refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and Congo, “hosts who already had access to resources, education, or power were better poised to benefit from the refugee presence, while those who were already disadvantaged in the local context became even further marginalized” (Whitaker, 2002).

The spillover of refugees leads to interaction between the host communities and the refugees. This interaction has been heavily discussed in the acculturation theory. The theory was first suggested by Redfield and his colleagues (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). In the Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM) Bourhis and his colleagues proposed that the intergroup relations between the host and the refugees are defined by the “relative fit” between the two groups. The three levels of fit are consensual, problematic, and conflictual (Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997).

Spillover-Crossover Model¹⁴

This section provides an illustration of the spillover-crossover model to help understand the positive and negative consequences of asymmetric warfare on neighboring countries. The spillover of the refugees and arms starts as the asymmetric warfare erupts. The extent of spillover depends upon the level of conflict and its impact on the human security of the people. The number of refugees depends on the severity of the conflict. However, the distance to which refugees’ flow depends on the financial status of refugees, many would rather stay

¹⁴ The spillover-crossover model term is used in psychological research to examine the impact of the work domain on the home domain.


close to the borders in the hope of returning; however, this also depends on their financial capacity. Syrian refugees travelled to the neighboring countries; while many made it to Europe and reached further to Canada and the US. Those who were better off ended up in more distant countries and those who were worst off ended up in the neighboring countries.

Given the literature and arguments reviewed above, the spillover-crossover model is proposed (see figure 15). It suggests that during an asymmetric conflict there is lack of human security amongst certain groups. As the conflict intensifies, a larger sector of the community lacks human security. This starts to spill over into the neighboring countries. These could be part of the minorities or the neutral discussed in the first part of this chapter. The spillover is usually filtered by the border policies of the neighboring countries. Hence, those countries with strict border policies are able to prevent spillover more than those with flexible border policies. Border policies may filter armaments to enter the neighboring countries and may also be able to decrease the influx of refugees. For example, during the Syrian conflict border policies in Jordan and Lebanon were stricter towards the Palestinian refugees from Syria; therefore, the number of refugees was minimized to a certain extent.

The spillover may affect significantly the various sectors within the host countries, which is called the crossover effects. These effects could be either positive or negative depending on the original economic, social and political environment of the neighboring countries. They also depend on the historical engagement in civil war, and the relationship between the two governments and/or the people of the two neighboring countries. They also depend on the characteristics of the refugees. Those refugees who are better off from an economic and educational point of view have positive economic crossover and less of political or social burden.

The model suggests that there are five main possible consequences of crossover factors; these are: economic, political, social, educational and health consequential factors in the neighboring countries. These crossover factors are usually filtered by several economic indicators in the neighboring countries, which include poverty, labor market, and local economic policies. They are also filtered by the political environment, which includes internal conflict and the political system. Additionally, they are filtered by the cultural environment that include the acceptance of refugees, conflict and power differences, and feel of relevance to the country of conflict and its nature of conflict. Also, the crossover factors are filtered by political factors; including history of conflict in the area, history of refugee influx, internal conflicts, and different policies especially those targeting refugees.

Figure 15: **Spillover-Crossover Model**



Source: own design

Economic crossover is especially filtered by the economic environment; countries with stronger economic conditions are benefiting from the influx more than those with weak economy. This is also dependent on the local economic and investment policies. Some researchers suggest that due to the conflict investors might be discouraged to start their businesses in the region. However, those who started or planned to start in the area under conflict would rather move their investments from the area of conflict to the neighboring countries. Therefore, the neighboring countries will be a potential area of investment for internationals and for nationals of the area under conflict. Small and micro businesses would

be a big market attracting refugees. Upon their settling down, refugees would want to start new businesses to be able to cope with their new status. This could help create niche markets that did not exist or new crafts that originate from the sending country. It also helps create new jobs for the refugees along with the host communities.

Labor might be considered a threat to the local economy, as it forms a competition to the existing labor force. However, new labor force is a source of new skills and knowledge that could enrich the existing market. Moreover, in many cases the new labor force could help fill the gap in the labor market, either because of the lack of certain skills or the lack of interest of the locals to work in certain sectors. Additionally, it helps in providing diversified skilled labor and diffused competition (Betts et.al 2015). The refugees' competition on low-skilled jobs "doesn't hang native workers out to dry, but rather forces them to develop a set of complementary – and usually higher skilled – contributions to the labor force" (Shellito, 2016).

During the conflict, several humanitarian organizations start working in the neighboring countries, either to support the refugees in the host countries, or to support those in the area under conflict. However, due to security reasons they mostly operate remotely from the neighboring countries. These new projects usually create new job opportunities for the locals there. Accordingly, humanitarian organizations open huge opportunities in the neighboring countries depending on the severity of the conflict and the influx including new job markets and attraction of internationals.

Despite the possible advantages discussed earlier, refugee influx can also cause a huge economic burden on the neighboring countries. The costs of services provided to the refugees and the humanitarian attention are inevitable and include the educational, health and welfare support that brings strains and burdens on the budget of the host country.

The political crossover factor in the neighboring countries is another consequence that could cause disruption in a neighboring nation. However, this is filtered by the local policies of those receiving countries and the political environment in general.

The arrival of refugees is already filtered by the refugee policies in the neighboring countries. However, as the conflict increases even those countries that are strict in accepting refugees receive the spillover of refugee influx. Strict policies cannot eliminate the influx, it can only reduce and manage the numbers. The crossover effect of the refugees' arrival impacts the neighboring countries in various ways, depending on the local policies and of the characteristics of the arriving refugees; including their educational level and their economic status.

In some cases, the flow of refugees disrupts and alters the structure of the state, by imposing different religious, ethnic or cultural structures. For example, the majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are Sunni Muslims, while the religious structure in Lebanon is formed of Sunni and Shia Muslims, Catholic and Maronite Christians, and Druze, among others. The influx has led to a feeling of existential threat amongst some due to the disruption of the existing structure.

Within the huge influx of refugees, there is a high potential of an influx of carriers of conflict. The influx itself facilitates the flow of arms and combatants, which may lead to the onset of a conflict in the neighboring countries. This could be in the form of conflict among the refugees themselves, between the refugees and the host community and/or the host government, or with the sending countries. The host country could become a sanctuary for terrorism, where it becomes possible to recruit and arm combatants. However, this crossover is usually filtered through the political positions, security policies and the state strength of the host countries. Countries filter the flow of conflict by having strict security measures. In many cases the refugee influx is securely managed by accepting the refugees in temporary camps on the borders for security check until they are transferred to the refugee camps to mitigate the conflict, while some have very strict policies on the movement of refugees outside the refugee camps.

Radicalization is another crossover factor that may influence the neighboring countries. This is possible when the host community identifies a certain group or case of conflict as relevant either ethnically, religiously or even humanely. The host community might act vigorously to show their solidarity and sympathy to a certain group, or they might even demand their government for intervention as a result. This causes internal conflict within the host communities. Such crossover is filtered by the social environment within the neighboring countries.

Another possible crossover is the intervention of the neighboring country in the conflict. This happens when the government decides to support one group, or when conflict is foreseen to affect their own people. At this point the conflict is altered from a local to a regional or from an intra state to an interstate conflict. It is altered from a radicalization to war status.

Social crossover is possible through interactive acculturation. It is the interaction and the possible merge of the two different cultures. Although more changes tend to be experienced by the refugees, both the host and the refugees are affected by acculturation. It is possible that that refugees will face one of the four strategies suggested by Berry (Berry, 1997). These are: integration, assimilation, separation or segregation and marginalization.

Educational crossover is a factor that affects neighboring countries depending on their policies towards refugees. In general, the influx of refugees is a burden on all the public services including education. However, crossover may also have a positive effect on the educational sector, especially in the case of integrating refugees within the system. This integration helps create social diversity, mutual awareness of the societies and cultures, along with possible multilingual and multicultural communication and education. This integration through the inclusive educational system and the intercultural dialogue facilitates the integration in the society as a whole and the linkage of the diverse communities achieving mutual benefits for the two communities (LLLP, 2016).

Health is another main crossover factor resulting from the spillover. The refugee influx may bring cause strains that burden the health services provided by the host communities by increasing the number of beneficiaries. It may also facilitate the transfer of epidemic diseases causing a widespread health crossover effect. For example, researchers have observed an increase in the incidence of malaria during civil war in the regions under conflict and in the neighboring countries (Montalvo & Renyal-Querol, 2007).

Conclusion

Since the end result of any intervention should be human security oriented; interventions must be evaluated with this notion in mind. This chapter provided a model that helps analyze the implications of counterinsurgency starting from the causes that leads to insurgency and counterinsurgency.

The model used categorized the people in a fragile state to three different segments: the elite, neutral, and minorities. A simple analogy was used to compare those with the dispersions, solvents, and colloids. The comparison is based on the characteristics of each and the extent to which these are integrated within the system. The dispersed are the elite with the biggest mass and density that settles down as a result of the gravitational force. The solvents are the neutral that are fully dissolved given their small volume compared to the others. The colloids are the ones that neither settle nor get dissolved. The colloids are the minorities that easily flocculates as a result of some external or internal reasons.

The model suggests that due to the external forces the system is forced into a vicious cycle, where all the elements are affected. This escalates the fragmentation process of the society; where the different layers are visible and more disconnected with a no way of returning back. The centrifugal force that affects the system under this vicious cycle is dependent on the

violence used, the interference of the external parties, the population willingness to control the government, and the percentage of population engaged in the conflict. Therefore, to eliminate the effect of the centrifugal force, it is suggested that those factors should be considered.

This chapter also discussed the center of mass as the centroid point in a homogeneous system, referred to as the point of human security for all people. However, due to the change in support of the insurgents and counterinsurgents accompanied with the change in the number of people associated with those two poles, the center of mass point changes relentlessly.

Impact on the security of the neighboring countries was also discussed through the spillover-crossover effect. The model suggested that the spillover of the conflict is mainly refugees and armaments, while the crossover is the economic, political, social, educational, and health effects. These effects could be positive or negative depending on the policy of the hosting state.

According to the model conflict prevention should be the way to security through considering the external supporters of the insurgents and support of the government. It should consider security a continuum that starts with conflict prevention (Heinbecker, 2000). “At worst, counterinsurgency’s human security discourse may simply represent the ‘velvet glove’ surrounding the ‘iron fist’ of traditional war fighting” (Gilmore, 2016). However, counterinsurgency could be a “velvet glove” surrounding preventive measures that ensures human security.

Case Studies

This chapter aims at applying the viscous cycle theory presented in chapter four on three different cases, to discuss the applicability of the theory. It presents the structure of the society as per the three different types: government and elites, minorities and neutral (dispersions, colloids and solvents), how insurgency starts, and the impact of counterinsurgency on human security of the people.

Three cases were selected for deep analysis of the impact of counterinsurgency on human security; these cases include *Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya*. The cases were selected on the basis of the fundamental criteria:

1. They should compose the same context; insurgency starting after external intervention to change the existing regime. This better allows comparison between the cases.
2. They should have adequate and accessible information about them.
3. They are the most prevalent examples in the region for the chronological span: Afghanistan (2001-present), Iraq (2003-2011), Libya (2011-present)

The cases are examined within an analytic framework that helped use the same structure for the three cases. The analysis starts with a historical and geopolitical background of the country that helps understand the context of the conflict. Then the community structure along with a description of the minorities is described to help understand how and where insurgency starts. This is followed by listing the insurgents along with an analysis of the counterinsurgency. Lastly, a description of the vicious cycle and its impact on human security is examined. The analysis of human security is mainly focused on personal, community and political security; though it touches base on the other threats to human security. Personal insecurity will be discussed in regards of physical violence, human trafficking, and child labor; community insecurity will be discussed in regards of inter-ethnic religious and identity-based tensions, crime and terrorism; and political insecurity will be discussed through political repression, human rights violations, lack of rule of law and justice. Data sources in the analysis include both primary and secondary data. Secondary data include reports about the missions and previous researches; along with statistics of RAND; international indexes including corruption index, rule of law, and global terrorism index; and US and NATO mission reports. Primary data refers to the data from direct observation through the researcher's field visits.

Chapter 6: Case 1 - IRAQ (2003-2011)


Introduction

The History of insurgency and minority issues in Iraq precedes the 2003 invasion. The Arabization of the minorities affected their status, which was evident in different events and cases. Iraq is mainly composed of three main communities, the Sunni, the Shia and the Kurds (who are mostly Sunni). However, the Mosaic that forms the country is even more complex as it is composed of many ethnic, religious, and ethno-religious minorities.

The Iraqi government accommodated the Kurds during the Iraq-Iran war; a strategy they used to persuade the Kurds not to support Tehran. Nevertheless, the two Kurdish rivals the Kurdish Democratic Party KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK reacted to this accommodation differently. Despite this, in 1988, the Iraqi forces attacked Kurdish targets, including the Halabja incident where 5000 were killed (Katzman, 2010). Additionally, in 1988, the Iraqi government launched its 'Anfal campaign' against the Kurds forcing Kurds to leave their houses, thus setting up a "cordon sanitaire" along the borders with Iran. Yet, after the 1991 Gulf war, the displaced Kurdish people were able to return to their villages in that zone. (HRW, 2004: 13).

The 1991 Gulf war was followed by uprisings in the south by the Shia and in the north by the Kurds. This is when Kurdish Guerillas "occupied nearly all of the areas they considered historically Kurdish including Kirkuk. Some vengeance killings took place as the population acted out its anger against those associated with the Iraqi government, ... the government soon mounted a counter-offensive and quickly crushed the uprisings" (HRW, 2004: 13-14). This is when the "No-fly zone" was declared over northern Iraq. On October 1991, the Iraqi government withdrew from Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniyah granting de facto autonomy for the Kurds. This guaranteed the return of Kurds to the area while it led to expulsion of Arabs living in the area. Consequently, the Iraqi government focused on the Arabization of Kirkuk. "Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians came under constant pressure to sign "ethnic identity correction" forms relinquishing their ethnicity and registering officially as Arabs" (HRW, 2004: 15).

Figure 16: Map of Iraq showing the Ethno-Religious Population Distribution Before 2014



March 2003 marked the turning point in Iraq's history. This is when the invasion started, and this was a US call. In November 2002 President George W. Bush announced at the NATO summit the decision to assemble a "coalition of the willing." In March 2003 the initial list of countries was announced with forty-nine states, by the end of the year the list was reduced to forty-eight after Costa Rica left the coalition. Even though this number was announced

differently by different resources, only four nations sent troops during the invasion, these were the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland (Carney, 2011).

When the US removed Saddam Hussein from power aiming to replace the regime the region shifted to a protracted sectarian violence in a collapsed state. It produced security and organization vacuum; the security forces were not in place anymore and the level of crimes increased. Violence against the American forces started in the conservative religious city of Falluja. The attacks against the US forces and the counter attacks gradually increased in the city and then throughout the country.

On April 16, 2003, General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, issued a “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” in which he noted that “I am creating the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] to exercise powers of government temporarily.” (Dobbins et al, 2009, p. 11) President Bush said that the CPA would establish “an orderly country in Iraq that is free and at peace, where the average citizen has a chance to achieve his or her dreams” (Dobbins et al, 2009, p. 11). To develop the constitution of the new country, the US announced the formation of a constitutional council; however, this was rejected by the Iraqis. This formed two rivals the Americans with those working for them or part of the new administration structure on one side and those opposing the Americans. The conflict became even more complexed with the different sects being part of the conflict and with the rising of the different insurgencies leading to a low intensity war. The invasion of Iraq was initially a conventional war but developed into counterinsurgency campaign (Carney, 2011).

After the 2003 war there was a change in the sectarian relations in Iraq. With the Shi’a triumph, Sunnis had to familiarize themselves with the new “minority status” (Haddad, 2014, p. 69). “[T]he roles have been reversed: Sunnis have replaced their Shi’i compatriots as the self-perceived victims of sectarian discrimination. It goes without saying that the previous

Timeline of Events

- March 2003: invasion started
- April 2003: announcement of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) creation
- August 2003: explosion destroying Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad and another explosion targeting UN headquarters
- September 2003: Iraqi interim Governing council names new cabinet
- October 2003: UN Resolution 1511 legitimizes the US-led occupation
- November 2003: heaviest loss for the coalition troops in Fallujah
- December 2003: Saddam is captured

Inter-ethnic tensions and conflict with international intervention

2004 Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi established al-Qaeda in Iraq

regime was not a “Sunni regime” any more than today’s is a Shi’i regime” (Haddad, 2014, p. 82). The flipped status was attempted through compensating the victims (the Kurds and the Shiites) and punishing the transgressors (the Sunnis); where the victims were competing to take the lead. The first expansion of violence beyond the conflict between the two rivals was in August 2003. It was a car bomb destroying the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad killing 19 people. After two weeks another explosion targeted the UN headquarters, killing Sergio Viera de Mello, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, and 19 others (Metz, 2007).

Kirkuk witnessed the most severe inter-ethnic tensions between Kurds, Turkomans, and Arabs. Violence erupted between Arabs and Kurds and deadly violence exploded between Turkomans and Kurds. Kurds fought to achieve federalism, while the Turkomans and the Arabs were against this (HRW, 2004).

Since 2003 Iraq has become a battlefield for al-Qaeda. The marginalization of the Sunni community led to even more conflict and resurgence of al-Qaeda. Bombing Sunni resistance led to a high number of displaced and to a higher level of extremism, which created a humanitarian crisis that has ended up with targeting the Shia leading to a chaotic situation. In 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq started to implement his strategic priorities on the ground; expanding the region beyond Iraq and engaging in mass killings even of other Muslims. By the year 2007, the Iraqi people started considering this movement as terrorist. This is the moment when the al-Qaeda lost the hearts and the minds of the people. This extremism pushed more Iraqis to support the ‘Sahwa’ (Awakening) (Ross, Gartenstein-Ross & Jensen, 2015).

Al-Anbar tribe started its uprising against the al-Qaeda in Iraq in September 2006; this was referred to as Sahwa al-Anbar. This was due to the aggressive measures used by al-Qaeda. However, it is also related to the fact that al-Qaeda opposed any tribal structure that might affect the alliance with al-Qaeda (Ross, Gartenstein-Ross & Jensen, 2015). The disloyalty that al-Qaeda saw from the Sunni

Timeline of Events


- March 2004: Provisional Iraq constitution signed
- March 2004: four US contractors killed
- April 2004: the first battle of Fallujah known as “Operation Vigilant Resolve”
- November 2004: Second Battle of Fallujah which is considered the highest point of conflict
- January 2005: Informal independence referendum for Kurdistan Region
- September 2006: Al-Anbar uprising against al-Qaeda
- May 2006: 1st permanent government by Nouri al-Malki
- August 2007: Yazidi communities bombing
- January 2008: Turkish incursions into northern Iraq
- November 2008: attacks on Christians in Mosul
- December 2011: Full withdrawal of troops from Iraq

Inter-ethnic tensions and conflict with international intervention

communities and the Sunni's will for political participation led to massive executions. On the other hand, these measures raised awareness amongst the tribes questioning whether this is the right Islam and that tribal affiliation is a key social safety (Ross, Gartenstein-Ross & Jensen, 2015).

The first permanent government was formed by Nouri al-Malki in May 2006, as successor of the Iraqi transitional government that replaced the Iraqi Interim Government in May 2005. From 2006 to 2008 the State Fragility Index¹⁵ showed very high alert where the rank ranged between two and five. During the period 2009 to 2011 the index ranged from 6 to 9.¹⁶ Figure (16) below illustrates the State Fragility Index in Iraq in the period 2006-2011¹⁷. The graph includes some improvements, though it is still within the high alert category.

Figure 17: Overall Fragility Trend (2006-2011)



Source: Raw data retrieved from State Fragility Index

Different Categories... Different Interests... Segregation

“As the state collapsed, the illusory veneer of relative uniformity and harmony that the Ba’ath had forcefully and violently upheld was abruptly removed, unleashing passions and identities that had been at best, poorly understood, and at worst, completely overlooked.” (Haddad, 2014, p. 68)

¹⁵ In State Fragility Index countries ranking are according to the following: from 1-5 refer to those with very high alert, ranking from 6-9 refer to those with high alert, 10-31 alert, 32-60 high warning, 61-95 elevated warning, 96-119 warning, 120-132 stable, 133-149 more stable, 150-160 very stable, 161-171 sustainable, 172-178 very sustainable.

¹⁶ Source: Fund for Peace (2019), available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

¹⁷ No data available prior to 2006

The focus of communal groups in Iraq is mainly on Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. However, beyond this the other distinction exists between diverse ethnic, religious, sectarian, and linguistic groups. These minorities have faced intimidation and persecution resulting from this diversity and due to stereotyping of the majority. Some minorities have a distinct ethnic background; others have a different religion or sect, while others have unique ethno-religious background. Those diverse backgrounds embraced cultural distinction with different customs, traditions, clothing, and language.

Discrimination against minorities already existed prior to 2003 and also during the different phases of the insurgency. Discrimination existed and was evident in their daily life events. In some cases, discrimination was also reflected in the law. For example, Law No. 105 of 1970 prohibits the practice of the Baha'i faith, and a 2001 resolution prohibits the practice of the Wahhabi branch of Islam (UNHCR, 2018). The absence of recognition of some religious minorities in Iraq, such as Baha'is, Kaka'is, and Zoroastrians is still a systematic official denial (Salloum, 2016).

The following list consists of some minorities that exist in Iraq ¹⁸:

Turkmen

Turkmen are the third largest group in Iraq, with an estimate of 2.5 to 3 million (IILHR, 2016). An ethnic group of whom 60 percent are Sunni, less than 40 percent Shia, and the rest are Christians (Lamani, 2009). Most reside in the northern area of Iraq, mostly in Kirkuk (IILHR, 2016). Turkmen are perceived as remnants of the Ottoman Empire (Salloum, 2016). Some of the Turkmen support the Kurdish case, while others oppose their claims fearing assimilation under the Kurdish communities; therefore they oppose the creation of autonomous regions and strives for a strong central government that respects the diverse cultures (Lamani, 2009).

Turkmen were intimidated by the Kurds and the central government along with militias for religious and ethnic purposes (IILHR, 2016). Shia Turkmen were intensively targeted by ISIS.

¹⁸ Kurds are not considered in this section as in this period the Kurds already established their own independent regional government. Kurds are considered as separatists

Christians

Different Christian sects exist in Iraq including Armenian Catholics, Orthodox, Assyrian, Assyrian Orthodox, Chaldean Catholics, Evangelicals, Protestants, and Syriac Catholics. These are considered ethno-religious groups as they speak their own languages and some do not identify themselves as Arabs (IILHR, 2016). “[A] religious minority but not a separate ethnicity” (Lamani, 2009, p. 9). The Christian ethnicities include: Chaldean, Assyrian, Armenian, and Syriac.

Christians faced intimidation and were targeted by ISIS. However, Christians were different as they could stay in their homes if they agreed to pay taxes ‘*jeziya*’, though many were killed despite paying those taxes (Lamani, 2009). The number of Christians decreased from 1.4 million in 2003 to less than 250,000 in 2014 (IILHR, 2016).

Yezidis

Yezidi is an ancient religion that dates back to 4000 BC. They are based in northern Iraq, and some are based in Syria and Turkey. They are not thinly spread like the other minorities. They speak the Kurmanji (a Kurdish dialect) (IILHR, 2016).

Due to misinterpretation of the Yezidi religion, some perceive them as worshipers of the devil (Salloum, 2016). As a result, they were subject to continuous violence, by March 2015, 500,000 Yazidis, predominantly from Sinjar District, had been displaced, with the majority fleeing to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (UNHCR, 2019). By 2007, no Yezidis was left in Mosul (IILHR, 2016). In August 2014, around 3,100 Yazidis were killed in the Mount Sinjar area and 6,800 were kidnapped and many of Yazidi women were sexually abused. According to ISIS Yezidis have the choice between conversion, expulsion and execution (Lamani, 2009).

Mandaeans

The Sabian-Mandaean is the oldest monotheistic religion that follows John the Baptist. They are both an ethnic and religious minority in Iraq and are part of the endogenous Aramaic people. Mandaean refers also to the language, which is still spoken by the Mandaean in Iran. However, in Iraq it is used only in liturgy, as they lost their everyday language during the *Arabization* process especially between 1950 and the 1960s, an era that adversely affected the religion (MAU, 2009). They are spread in urban areas especially in Baghdad, which exposed them to sectarian violence. The Mandaean faced extinction through forced conversion, rape and murder as they are perceived as worshipers of planets and stars (Salloum, 2016). Being wealthier than the other minorities exposed them to criminal gangs (Lamani, 2009). As a

result of escaping from persecution, their number has decreased from 70,000 to less than 5,000 (Lamani, 2009). Taking into consideration this small population and the dispersion over a number of countries, this religion is under risk of extinction (MAU, 2009). See table (1).

Table 1: Change in Population amongst Minority Communities

Minority	Population in 2003	Population after the invasion
Christians	1.4 million	Now less than 250,000
Yazidis	700,000	Less than 500,000 ¹⁹
Mandaeen	70,000	5,000

Kaka'is

Kaka'i is also known as '*Ahl-e Haqq*' (People of Truth) or Yarsan, the total number of Yarsanis is estimated at around two million people living primarily in western Iran and eastern Iraq. These are about 200,000 living in south-east Kirkuk, Ninewa, and the Kursish region. Yarsanis are mainly considered a branch of the Shia faith and a Kurdish subgroup (IILHR, 2016). ISIS considered them as infidels who must be eliminated as they were perceived as a heretical religious group (Salloum, 2016).

Shabak

The Shabak is an ethnic and linguistic minority with distinct religious practices that are a fusion of elements of the various Islamic sects along with some the Christianity practices. In Ninewa and near Mosul their population is estimated between 200,000 and 500,000; although they are considered infidels. The majority of them are Shia Muslims and the rest are Sunni Muslims. They experienced persecution from both Kurds and Arabs during the dispute over control of Ninewa (IILHR, 2016). About 1,300 were killed between 2003 and 2014. Shabak homes were marked by IS militias with the letter 'R' signaling the word 'Rafida' a term that refers to Shia and other sects who did not conform to their dogmatic religious perspectives (Muwafaq, 2018).

Faili Kurds

Unlike the Kurds, the Faili Kurds are mainly Shia. They spread along the borders with Iran in the Zagros Mountains. They are perceived to be affiliated to Iran although they suffered

¹⁹ Including IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, while these numbers are not accurate due to the large number of Yazidis missing.

during the Iraq-Iran war (Salloum, 2016). However, Nationality Law (2006) was more inclusive as “it removes previous distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs for the naturalization process and repeals legislation that revoked the citizenship of Faili Kurds (DFAT, 2018a, p. 31).

Other Minorities

There are other minorities in Iraq including: Iraqis of African Descent (sometimes referred to as “Black Iraqis”), Palestinian (these are Palestinian refugees with no citizenship), and Jews.

Insurgency

There is a wide range of insurgency in Iraq that started after 2003, which has passed through different phases. The first phase of insurgency lasted from 2003 to 2011 following the invasion of Iraq. This refers to the period following the end of Saddam Hussein regime, where insurgency was mainly against the US led multinational force along with inter-ethnic tensions. The other phase started after the US withdrawal in 2011, however, a resurgence of the different groups spurred up in 2013.

Different groups with different ideologies and different levels of extremism have emerged, grown and affected the whole region. Some are fighting to change the government while others are striving to affect the people themselves, in many cases affecting the minorities and also facing also the majority. Some have operated in coalitions, while others clashed with the other insurgents. Some are supporting the return of the Iraqi security forces to the Sunni sect, while others oppose it. Many of them emerged in 2003, another significant number of them started in 2006/2007, while others came to life in 2013/2014.

The year 2006 marked the turning point of insurgency in Iraq. This is the so called “Al-Sahwa” translated for Awakening. The Sahwa movement refers to the change in the Sunni insurgency position, when they took up arms against al-Qaida in Iraq (Adnan & Reese, 2014). In 2011, the ground forces withdrew from Iraq, the moment where the Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki failed to integrate the Sunni and on the contrary started the exclusion policy that started by arresting the bodyguards of the Sunni Finance Minister. Then violence started with Sunni calls to support the armed resistance which included tribal militias and insurgent groups (such as the Ba’athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandia – JRTN) (Adnan & Reese, 2014).

Figure (18) below illustrates the different insurgent groups who were active during the period 2003-2018 according to Stanford University.


The following is a list of some of the insurgency groups active in Iraq during the period 2013-2019. The list shows the complexity in understanding the allies and rivals within the insurgency groups. It shows the different affiliations and the controversial support provided to both insurgents and counterinsurgents.

The Islamic State (IS)

The Islamic State (IS) is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is an Islamic Salafist organization that was established with the vision of transnational Islamic State. The IS traces its origin to early 2000 when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from Jordan became a militia and started Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in the Kurdish area of Sulaymaniya which was targeted by the US troops during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. This group had three major targets: the Shia, the international community, and Jordan; and hence their terrorist activities were conducted as such. In September 2004, Zarqawi announced the allegiance with al-Qaeda; where the group was then called al-Qaeda in Iraq. The relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda was tense due to the different visions and strategies of both groups. However, the group remained attractive for supporters and followers. Ideologically, all followers come from the Saudi Wahhabism, those who believed that the Shia is heretics. Zarqawi died in June 2006, and al-Qaeda in Iraq appointed Abu Ayyub al-Masri as the new leader. Four months later the Islamic State in Iraq the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) "Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq" was established with a fully structured cabinet (ISI) (Shamieh & Szenes, 2015). The group faced decline after 2011, but after it gained back its strength when it got involved in the Syrian Civil war, its name changed to ISIS.

ISIS used intensive attacks targeting civilians who do not accept their vision including Shia, Kurds and especially against minorities who did not accept this vision. ISIS also targeted the Iraqi Security Forces and international forces. On the ground ISIS fought against the Iraqi security forces, Iraqi militias, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Syrian government forces, the Syrian rebel groups, and the international forces.

Figure 18: Map of the Insurgents in Iraq (2003-2018)



Supporters of ISIS ranged from individuals to countries; though there is no clear evidence of any country support. Some claims refer to different countries in the region that supported ISIS including Turkey, Saudi Arabia among others (NRLS, 2019). Many of ISIS members arrived from different nationalities, including Arabs and non-Arabs, Asians, and Europeans. This was accomplished through the marketing strategies ISIS used to recruit new members; locals and internationals (Shamieh & Szenes, 2015).

The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries

The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR) is a Ba'athist militant group. It is estimated that there are 75,000 fighters affiliated to GMCIR, mostly concentrated in Anbar, Salahal-Din and Ninewah governorates (Hera, 2014). Reports also claim that the GMCIR are affiliated to the Jaysh Rajaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandia (JRTN – Army of the Men of the Naqshabandi Path). The relationship between this group and ISIS is also controversial, as they admit their participation in ISIS operations (Adnan & Reese, 2014). However, GMCIR do share the same ideological orientation of ISIS. ISIS fights were mainly against non-Sunni religious and ethnic communities; whereas GMCIR is mainly a nationalist movement seeking Iraqi unity (Adnan & Reese, 2014) despite the controversial operations in which they were included.

GMCIR seeks substantial changes in the socio-political system and are anti-Maliki and anti-Iranian. The challenges this insurgency faces include the rejection of the Shia, the association with ISIS, and its association with tribal militias (Hera, 2014).

Jaysh Rajaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandia (JRTN)

JRTN is considered to constitute the second largest insurgent group after ISIS. It was formed by Saddam Hussein's right-hand man, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri in 2006 as the main front for Baathist insurgents. This group is an amalgamation of the secular nationalism and the Naqshbandi Sunni Islam; however, it utilizes the jihad terminology to gain religious legitimacy. Despite its distinct ideology, JRTN worked closely with ISIS especially in 2014 during the capturing of Mosul (CISAC, 2019a).

The Fallujah Military Council

The Falluja Military Council was created to face ISIS operations in Falluja. On July 8, 2014 ISIS reportedly executed a number of Fallujah gunmen for refusing to pledge allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi (Adnan & Reese, 2014).

1920 Brigades

The 1920 Brigades group name refers to the 1920 revolution against the British colonial rule in Iraq. The group was established in 2003 to free Iraq from foreign occupation particularly from “American military and political presence” (CISAC, 2019), where the majority of the attacks were against the US soldiers and bases. In 2007 and after Al-Qaeda’s assassination of several group’s members; the 1920 Brigades were divided amongst themselves, opposing Al-Qaeda and cooperating with the US or vice versa. Those who decided to cooperate with Al-Qaeda and oppose the US formed a new group called *Hamas Iraq*. The assassinations, the division amongst the group and the internal conflict led to weakening the group. As of 2019, there is limited presence of the group with no publications or political activity (CISAC, 2019b).

The Islamic Army in Iraq


This Islamic Army group in Iraq (IAI) was formed in 2003 following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and coalition military forces. From 2003-2011, the group targeted the US military forces; while in 2006 several clashes were reported against Al-Qaeda. The group’s operations declined in 2008 and rose again in 2014. The IAI vision is to participate in a political solution for Iraq (Adnan & Reese, 2014, p. 19).

Counterinsurgency

Following 2003, the coalition forces removed all the traces of the previous regime; this led to high level of unemployment, lack of food security, lack of economic security, and lack of national security (Mabon & Royle, 2017).

Different nationalities participated in the Coalition and the counterinsurgency battles. A significant number of troops were composed of US troops included half of the ground forces and the other half formed by the other nationalities (see figure 19 below) (O’Hanlon & Livingston, 2013). During the invasion phase the belligerents included the United States the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, and the Peshmerga forces supported by Canada, Netherlands and Italy from one side and the Iraqi government from the other side. During the post invasion phase (2003-2011), the belligerents included the United States, the United Kingdom, the Coalition Forces, the new Iraqi government supported by Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan the Baath loyalist, Sunni insurgents, and Shia insurgents.

Figure 19: **International Strength Troops (2003-2011)**



Source: Raw data available in Brookings Report “Iraq Index”

Other players of the conflict were active, and in some cases, not clear if supporting the insurgents or the counterinsurgents. The ups and downs in the American-Turkish relations were also evident in the variation of support (Dağcı, 2012).

Private security contractors were also employed to provide services in Iraq. Services included: protecting fixed locations, guarding traveling convoys, providing security escorts, and training military personnel. The peak of private security contractors was in 2009 with more than 15,000 individuals (CRS, 2019).

Counterinsurgency experience in Iraq ranged from absolute failure as assessed by the different belligerents to some success. The ‘Operation Vigilant Resolve’ that started in April 2004 in response to the killing of four American contractors in the city was an example of a strategic failure characterized by poorly timed, planned and coordinated overreaction. It was the first Marine assault on Falluja, where two marine battalions began their attack on insurgent positions. This battle confronted 300,000 citizens along with 2,000 insurgents. The battle was considered unsuccessful, and a turning point in US counterinsurgency strategy:

“Two reinforced battalions were tasked with isolating and attacking a medium-sized city . . . Depending on the tactical situation, manpower

shortages may be compensated for by increased firepower, which the Marine commanders were unwilling-or unable-to apply in Valiant Resolve. Indeed, it appears that leaders at the scene quickly came to this conclusion. The operation never progressed beyond the foothold stage. Marines gained access to the urban area (in that case, outlying industrial neighborhoods), but did not penetrate to the heart of the city, much less take it.” (Matthews, 2010, p. 9)

Reports referred that the marines did not expect the high level of preparedness of the insurgents, which caused heavy losses. It was mainly a loss in the information operations (IO). The insurgents themselves considered this a great victory, where the city became totally controlled by the insurgents and the supporting foreign fighters (Matthews, 2010).

Other operations were successful. Following the Fallujah failure, Muqtada al Sadr’s anti-government Mahdi militia attacked government forces in the city. Within three weeks the Sadr’s militia was defeated. This opened eyes back again to Fallujah (Matthews, 2010).

In 2008, to achieve the long-term security plan the US paid salaries through the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki to the fighters, so that this could be the future responsibility of the ministry of defense, while providing support to the reconstruction fund. With the lack of transparency as to where this money went, a more chaotic situation was created. (Mabon & Royle, 2017).


“In essence, Sunni Arabs tribes became part of the Sunni ‘problem’, struggling for power and resources, and divided over how to respond to the worsening political-economic conditions. Al-Maliki was able to use these schisms for his own benefit, playing Sunni groups and tribes against one another across his tenure. As Sunni Arab tribal politics interacted with politics at the national level, the identity of the tribal movement that had been briefly established during the Sahwa eroded, and the tribes once again became fragmented.” (Mabon & Royle, 2017, p. 91)

Iraq’s neighboring countries were also part of the game. Kuwait for example had concerns of the Iranian influence and of the spillover of Iraqi Shia across its own borders; therefore, Kuwait provided support to the US military action. Qatar also supported the US military by

hosting the central command; though it also hosted the former Iraqi Baathists (Alterman, 2007). Iran has also supported the Iraqi Shiite insurgency with “material support” (CFR, 2008).

Sectarian violence escalated since counterinsurgency started, different parties are engaged in the conflict and the complexity and intensity of the conflict increased by time. Counterinsurgency operations were activated and support to the different parties were provided either internally or externally and either physically or financially. Different lines of communications were initiated either as rivals or supporters. Figure (20) illustrates the network of relationship between the different players on the ground. The various players on the ground strive to accomplish their objectives; the officially announced and the hidden agendas; these contradict in many cases the objectives of the other parties. Therefore, the numerous numbers of players created a chaos and a loss of human security.

Figure 20: **Network of Insurgents and Counterinsurgents**




Source: own design

Viscous cycle

The Mosaic that forms the Iraqi community has been distorted by external support of many players. However, many of the minorities in Iraq were not part of the violence due to their small demographic size, weak political participation, and their suffering from pre-conceptions stereotypes and social stigmatization (Salloum, 2016).

Community structure has changed after changing the regime in 2003. Although sectarianism has always been the key in the Iraqi community, it has never been explicit as it is nowadays. The regime pre-2003 was not Sunni in the sense that this is the ruling ideology; the ruling ideology was in fact a “Pan-Arabism”. Figure (21) below illustrates the difference in the structure pre and post 2003.

Figure 21: **Community Structure and Formation of Insurgency pre and post 2003**



Source: own design

The spark of insurgency started when the insurgents seized to gain control over territory or to enforce their ideology. This is apparent with the different Sunni insurgents and the Baathists. They received support, where they gained organizational strength, resources and popular

support. This helped form strong flocculation. They were able to affect neutral population by providing financial and physical support. The number and size of the colloids increased rapidly. The external support affects both the government and the insurgents. The different opposing external forces lead to more conflict and hence the situation is trapped to a vicious cycle. Affecting the center of mass for the system as a whole, where every community is concerned about their own human security creating more chaos within the system.

The centrifugal force affecting the individuals and groups in Iraq could be calculated according to the centrifugal force formula:

$$F_c = \frac{(s \times w) v^2}{r} \quad (1)$$

where

F_c = centrifugal force (it is the force that people feel disturbs all stability and their human security)

v = violence level during the conflict; originally this is the velocity. Since 2003 the level of violence escalated to a high level.

s = support provided by the poles (internal and external), not only did the support increase but also it was complex to the extent that it was contradictory; where formally announced support was different from the real agendas. The support came from governments and individuals. Around 41,500 foreign fighters took part in the battles (Cook & Vale, 2018)

w = the willingness to control the government, the analysis of the insurgents showed individual and group interests to control the government.

r = is the ratio of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; the number of those engaged in the conflict increased by time not only between the insurgents and the government but also amongst the insurgents' groups who were fighting for tribal survival and insurgents' survival.

With an increasing violence level (v), support provided by the poles (s), willingness to control the government (w), and number of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; the centrifugal force (F_c) increased to an alarming level.

Impact of the Viscous Cycle

According to the vicious cycle model, an unrestrained particle would leave its orbit under the impact of the centrifugal force. The feeling of lack of support provided and lack of ambition to change will facilitate immigration from the system with no looking back. This was evident with the high number of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) amongst the minorities receiving no support.

Although displacement was ongoing, there were two peaks; the first in 2006 when the Sunni-Shia violence forced thousands of minority families, the second in 2008 when violence against Christians, Yazidis forced thousands of families to flee their homes (Lamani, 2009). 25-30 percent of the population has been forced to leave their homes and are either internally or externally displaced (Lamani, 2009). More than 80 percent of the Mandaean population was forced to leave; 60 percent of Christians and other ethnic or religious groups are displaced. Most of the Yazidi and Kaka'i were forced from Ninewa and subsisting as IDPs (IILHR, 2016). Table (2) below shows the number of IDPs throughout the period. Despite the significant number of returnees, this displacement has not yet been over until this current period.

Table 2: IDPs in Iraq (2003-2011)

Year	Internally displaced
2003	400,000
2004	800,000
2005	1,200,000
2006	2,000,000
2007	2,740,000
2008	2,770,000
2009	2,764,000
2010	2,700,000

Source: Brookings Report "Iraq Index"

According to the model the fragmentation leads to different centers of mass this means different centers of gravity for the different segments of the society. The resultant is then a massive deterioration in human security resulting from competing positions of each respective center of mass, the following is a quick summary of the three most relevant human insecurity dimensions (community, political, and personal insecurity), with some insight around the other four dimensions (economic, food, health, and environment):


Community Security

Iraqis are facing breakdown of their families and communities as a result of the conflict, collapse of cultures; people are desperate that the community will get back as good as the pre-2003 era. Iraqis interviewed revealed that the suffering during Saddam regime is not harmful as the suffering they are now facing as individuals, communities and as a nation. They noted the inter-ethnic and identity-based tensions pre-2003, but they declared that the situation deteriorated since there is no potential of advancing back to that point.

"At his most vulnerable position, Saddam Hussein used sectarianism and nationalism as weapons against his internal enemies," the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) wrote in a recent briefing on the risk of a renewed breakout of large-scale violence. "Today's Iraqi Shiite parties and government appear to be doing far worse as governmental rule is justified on a sectarian basis." (IRIN, 2013, para 8)

The rise in terrorism was evident through the escalating number of terrorist attacks (see figure 22 below). Again, the attacks may have decreased later on; however, this has not approached the pre-2003 era. Moreover, it is clearly evident through the "unprecedented education, testing their [Al Qaeda] mettle against the best trained military in the world' (Stern & McBride, 2013, p. 2).


Figure 22: Terrorists Attacks per Day on Civilian Targets in Iraq



Source: Stern & McBride (2013)

Number of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks has also increased, figure (23) below shows the number of deaths resulting from terrorism. The number has been increasing since the 2003 invasion. Tensions including ethnic and religious tensions have affected all factions of the society. According to UNHCR statistics, about 700,000 Iraqis took refuge in Syria in the period between October 2003 and March 2005. In the same period 5,843 cases (15,855 persons) were registered as asylum-seekers by UNHCR in Damascus out of which 36% were Christians (UNHCR, 2005)


Figure 23: Deaths from Terrorism, 2000-2015



Source: IEP, (2016:p. 16)

Figure (24) below illustrates the rank of Iraq in the number of deaths from Terrorism from 1998 until 2017 (IEP, 2018)

Figure 24: Rank of Number of deaths from Terrorism in Iraq 1998-2017



Source: own design

Political Security

Severe human rights violations have been prevalent in Iraq. Violations include war crimes and crimes against humanity, terror attacks, and sexual abuse, leaving millions of civilians without a home and forced to flee.

Abuses during detention and imprisonment have been on the rise. Iraq is the world's third country in the number of prisoners. At least 169 prisoners were executed in 2013; this figure has been on the rise ever since (Amnesty, 2014). According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2010) there is serious delays in the judicial review, some detainees spend years in custody without trial or even charge. Detainees face torturing with no access to families or lawyers. In 2010, Iraq was one of the most dangerous countries to work in the media, with no freedom of expression and no freedom of assembly (HRW, 2010).

Human rights violation is faced through the government, militias and even the international forces.

"Thousands of classified files were published by Wikileaks. These showed, among other things, that US troops manning security roadblocks had shot dead many Iraqi civilians in previous years and that, contrary to their denials, the US military authorities had sought to keep a count of the number of Iraqi civilians killed in the conflict in Iraq. Revised estimates put the total number of civilian casualties in the conflict in Iraq between 2004 and 2009 at 66,081." (Amnesty International, 2011)

Corruption has also increased since 2003. According to transparency international the corruption index reached 1.8 ranked Iraq 175th countries in 2011, whereas it was 2.2 and ranked 113 in 2003.

Personal Security

Iraq was well known to be one of the richest countries, with high level of literacy and a high number of professionals and university graduate. However, this is not any more a matter of comparison. A huge number of those immigrated, while the remaining is working under strain and threats (Ihsanoglu, 2007).

Level of violence expanded to reach all the different regions and the different communities in Iraq. Minorities were the most affected; where they faced discrimination, violence and ethnic cleansing. Different massacres took place against different communities especially against the

Yezidis. Those minorities were not part of the conflict, but they ended to be victims of the war. Gender Based Violence (GBV) was also evident. In Basra, 133 women were killed in 2007 by Islamist militias. Their bodies were dumped in rubbish tips with notes warning others against "violating Islamic teachings" (IRIN, 2010, p. 15).

Human trafficking became a prevalent issue since 2003. Kidnapping especially in Baghdad increased noticeably. Houses were found that stored girls for selling in other countries, trafficking of kidnapped females to other countries have been on the rise since then. Statistics in this period are not available as the term human trafficking was not yet used.

In 2004, a survey was conducted for Women International revealed that 90% of women in Iraq feel there is hope for a secured future. However, this percentage declined by 27% in 2008 (NCA, 2010). Mass number of women accused of prostitution were killed between 2006 and 2008 (Khadim & Khrassn 2016).

Economic Security

After 10 years the unemployment rate is high, it is 18% for youth (15-24 years), with higher rates in the urban areas and for higher education (Rawaf et.al 2014). Also, Iraq's poverty headcount index is high at 22.9% with a poverty gap of 4.5%. (Rawaf et al 2014).

Iraq has transformed from an urban society to a weak society. It faced an enormous loss of economic and industrial infrastructure. It even went further to reach destruction in educational, health, cultural and artistic infrastructure (Ihsanoglu, 2007). "Iraq has now become one of the least developed countries in the region. The lack of electricity and energy resources, the scarcity of water, the pollution and serious problems in municipal services" (Ihsanoglu, 2007: 923)

Food Security

Interviews conducted in 2014 with the WFP in Iraq reveals the extreme reliance on the imported agricultural products, which was not the case prior to 2003. Not only that farms desperately lack the infrastructure and modern technology, but also Iraqis are reluctant to invest in the farming process due to the escalating violence that affects long-term process; where insurgents can overtake or destroy crops. WFP also revealed that around 22% of children are stunted due to chronic malnutrition (Rawaf et.al 2014).

Health Security

Around 96.4% of the families lack health insurance; on the other hand 40% deems the quality of health services as bad or very bad. Between 2003 and 2007 half of Iraqis doctors left the country; there are 7.8 doctors for every 10,000 people a number that is four times lower than all the neighboring countries (WHO, 2011). Mental health disorders and distress are also prevalent amongst the different communities in Iraq. According to the WHO, “mental health disorders are the fourth leading cause of ill health in Iraqis over the age of 5” (MSF, 2013).

Table 3: **Iraqis Perceptions of Human Security**

Freedom	Fears identified by respondents
Freedom from fear	No hope of future Lack of government capacity Tensions, genocide and terrorism Freedom of religion Increasing armaments High potential to be a victim of violence anytime in the coming future
Freedom from want	Hunger and poverty No basic income ensured Lack of government safety net No basic food provided (high reliance on import) Natural resources deprivation
Freedom to live in dignity	Human rights degradation Discrimination against women Discrimination against religious groups and ethnicities Hate and lack of acceptance of the other amongst the different new communities formed

Environment Security

WASH programme has faced several challenges on the national level. One of the main challenges is the limited water resources that was prevalent even before the crisis. In Basra the water is not suitable for human consumption (Rawaf et.al 2014). This resulted into an

effective disease control; the emergence of cholera has spread and expanded throughout the country (Rawaf et.al 2014).

Moreover, one of the main arising concerns is the water and sanitation amongst the IDP camps. Visits to those camps showed an effective water and sanitation system that affected the displaced and refugees.

When asked about their perceptions of human security in Iraq a convenient sample provided the following fears that were categorized according to the three essential freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

Most respondents declared that they do not see these securities getting any better not even to the securities they were enjoying prior 2003. They have deteriorated until 2011 and they continued to collapse until these days.

“Maybe things were not in its best shape during Saddam, but I remember I had Cristian and Shia friends, we used to visit each other and hang out together; now hatred is everywhere. It is not the same country, we are not the same people, it is not the same environment. We always feel threatened and insecure, it is not only threat to be a victim of violence; it is also the deteriorating educational system though we used to have the best educational system in the region, it is the threat of not finding proper health services though we used to have the best doctors in the region, it is the threat to have sufficient food since we are importing all agricultural products. This is not the life we are dreaming of, we have lost everything” (Hiba, 2019)²⁰.

Conclusion

The war in Iraq led to a complete chaos against all aspects of the society. The intervention has led to a vicious cycle and eventually it became under the impact of the centrifugal force. This has led to an increase in migration and displacement; it also led to fragmentation that created different centers of mass meaning various centers of gravity for the different segments of the society. The resultant is a massive deterioration in human security. The fragmentation and the diverse centers of mass also created a community that is not anymore similar to the original

²⁰ Hiba Ahmed. (2019). Interview on February 24, 2019

structure. It is in fact multiple new communities; communities that do not accept or appreciate the differences.

While conflict has declined in the last few years, the level of security has not returned to pre-invasion levels. Number of terrorist attacks, deaths, and violence against the different minorities is still on the rise. The protracted conflict and the failure to reconstitute the government created a fertile base for terrorists to form and fight; new groups of insurgents are still being formed until this timing.

Chapter 7 - Case 2: AFGHANISTAN (2001-Present)

Introduction

Afghanistan is a landlocked country situated at the cross road between the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia. It is the 37th populous country in the world with a population of 38.04 million in 2019²¹. The country has several ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Pashtun which has 600 different tribes (World Population Group, 2019).


According to Barfield (2010), the history of the twentieth century in Afghanistan underwent three different eras. The first era is the 1901-1929, this was under the rule of Habibullah Khan who was relatively a reform-minded, where he instituted various legal reform followed by his son Amanullah. This era ended in a brief civil war. The second era is the 1929-1978; this was the longest interval of peace and political stability ruled by the Pashtun tribes. In fact, the 1960s witnessed an accelerated economic and social development; a period known as the “golden age”. The third era is the era of war and anarchy (1978-present) (Barfield, 2010, p. 167-173).

The third era is important since this is what formed what Afghanistan is today. It is a control of the soviet to the control of the US separated by insurgency and empowerment of insurgency. According to Barfield (2010) this era could also be split into three different periods. The first refers to the declaration of the socialist regime in 1978 after the coup by members of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) where the Afghan communist party overthrew and murdered President Sardar Mohammed Daoud and the communist supporter Nur Mohammed Taraki took over. In 1978 the Soviet Union signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with Afghanistan. In September 1979, another coup toppled Taraki in favor of Hafizullah Amin a Muslim leader who was not welcomed by the Soviets. This drove the Soviets troops to move into Afghanistan in December 1979, where Hafizullah Amin was murdered. The soviet troops were facing resistance from different Muslim parties and guerillas. This period that was marked by destabilization and ten-years of Soviet Union invasion. During this period the *mujahedeen* (holy worriers) were based in Afghanistan and were supported by the US and Saudi Arabia. The Mujahedeen were “well armed with US supplied surface to air missiles” (Reuveny & Prakash, 1999: 697). The number of Soviet casualties mounted. This period ended in 1989 when the Russian troops in February 1989 withdrew from Afghanistan after it started affecting the Soviet domestic

²¹ The last census in Afghanistan was conducted in 1979, these numbers are based on UN data

politics. Soviet support to Afghanistan did not stop at this point; they provided aid including military aircraft. The PDPA being a communist party was affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union and was dissolved as a result (Reuveny & Prakash, 1999).

Figure 25: Composition of Nationalities in Afghanistan



Source: Katzman & Thomas (2017)

The cessation of the Soviet aid allowed mujahedeen to storm Kabul and form a coalition government (Barfield, 2010: 248). However, having a one common enemy was the only glue that held the guerilla groups together. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the uniting factor of the mujahedeen was gone, this is when the second period started and the civil war evoked. Every faction had the power to control its region but lacks the sufficient power to extend beyond that. Najibullah, who was the President of Afghanistan since 1987, tried to accommodate the demands of the mujahedeen after the Soviet withdrawal and was open to dialogue while making Islam the official religion of the country. On March, 1992, he announced his willingness to resign and make way to an interim government. However, in not time, Najibullah was toppled by Islamist coalition on April 1992, when Mujahedeen regime

started under the command of Rabbani (Katzman, 2015). In 1993, the country was divided into different provinces with different levels of security (Barfield, 2010: 252-253). The Taliban's policies provoked other factions to form the "Northern Alliance" including Pashtun Islamists (Katzman, 2015).

During this period Taliban movement was formed. In fact, many of the Taliban members and leaders are Afghani refugees who moved to Pakistan during the Soviet invasion, and where trained there. In September 1994, Mullah Mohammad Omar, with 50 students supporting his campaign to enforce Islamic law, founded the group that later became known as Taliban. The group grew to 15,000 within months, accompanied by financial support from Pakistan (CISAC, 2018). On November 1994, the Taliban took control of Kandahar City, and in 1996 they took control of Kabul, where they established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which marked the third phase of the Afghanistan life span (Barfield, 2010: 173). This period exhibited a notable popular support for the Taliban being the ones to bring stability against those who are weak, corrupt and anti-Pashtun (Katzman, 2015). By 1998, Taliban had

control of 90 percent of the country (CISAC, 2018). Three countries recognized the Taliban government: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Holtom, 2007).

Mullah Omar welcomed international militias. These included al-Qaeda Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Indonesians among others (Barfield, 2010: 266). On May 1996, al-Qaeda leader Usama Ben Laden located from Sudan to Afghanistan. Taliban lost international support when Mullah Omar refused to extradite Ben Laden. However, the US still recognized Taliban as the legitimate government. After September 11, Bush Administration decided to overthrow Taliban for not Ben Laden's extradition (Katzman, 2015).

Timeline of Events

(prior 2001)

- April 1978: Afghan communist party overthrew and murdered President Sardor Mohammed Daoud
- April 1978: Nur Mohammed Taraki (communist party) took over the control
- December 1978: "friendship and cooperation" treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed
- September 1979: Another coup toppling Taraki in favor of Hafizullah Amin (an Islamist leader)
- December 1979: Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan, and Hafizullah Amin murdered

Resistance against Soviet invasion

- February 1989 last Soviet Soldier left Afghanistan
- March 1992, Najibullah announced his willingness to resign and make way to an interim government
- April 1992, Najibullah was toppled by Islamist coalition

Civil War in Afghanistan

- September 1994: Mullah Omar with 50 students founded Taliban
- November 1994: Taliban took control over Kandahar City
- 1996: Taliban took control over Kabul
- 1998: Taliban controlled 90% of the country.

September 11, was a turning point for the whole world, but most specifically for Afghanistan. The combat in Afghanistan started in October 2001 with the “Operation Enduring Freedom” aiming to advance “Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban” (Katzman & Thomas, 2017: 7). The first major offensive, and in fact the first victory for the US-led coalition was the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif, which gave a “strategic foothold and an airport in northern Afghanistan” (Brown, 2003:14). Following this event, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1378 on November 2001 calling for a centralized role for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and encouraging member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery (UN, 2001a).

By late November 2001, the coalition focused on the area of Tora Bora, where Osama Ben Laden was suspected to be hiding. A fierce two-week battle took place between Afghan militias and al-Qaeda militias. As a result, Ben Laden and other leaders escaped to Pakistan (Perry & Kassing, 2015).

Military victory was spotted in the demise of the Taliban regime. It started with the Taliban fleeing Kabul in November 2001. Then it was anchored in December by surrendering the southern city of Kandahar. By this time, many key al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders fled into Pakistan, including Taliban leader Mullah Omar. This created vacuum leaving space for tribal law mainly under Pashtun leaders.

In December 2001, four Afghan opposition groupings, signed the Bonn Agreement creating an Afghan Interim Authority to serve as the “repository of Afghan sovereignty”, which was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1383. In the same month, another UN Resolution (1386) was endorsed, which authorizes the *“establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”* (UN, 2001b, RES/1386).

The first large scale battle was “Operation Anaconda that ensued during 2-16 March. The battle was built around 1,411 US soldiers and Special Operation forces from the US and six other nations. It aimed to clear the Shahi-Kot valley. The battle was “an object lesson in the complexities of planning and executing rapid air support for ground operations in a hostile, rugged environment” (US Air Force, 2005, p. 9).

On March 2002, the Security Council resolution 1401 authorized the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA’s mandate is to fulfill tasks

entrusted under the 2001 Bonn Agreement and to assist the Afghan government is achieving those objectives (Tanin, 2011). Adjustments in the mandate were made in the annual renewal of UNAMA’s mandate through UN Security Council Resolutions.

Another initiative of military engagement started in November 2002 through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRTs by the international community in Afghanistan. These teams comprised international civilian and military personnel that aim at conducting village assessments through liaising with regional commanders focusing on reconstruction, central government support and stability (Save the Children, 2004).

On April 2003 the UN requested that the NATO take command of the ISAF mission to which the NATO agreed unanimously. On August 2003 NATO assumed full leadership command of ISAF coalition of the willing such that it included UN plans for expansion across the whole of Afghanistan (Bowman & Dale, 2009). The number of ISAF troops increased from 5,000 to 128,961 as of April 2012 (Livingston & O’Hanlon, 2012).

On January 2004, a constitution for Afghanistan was agreed upon by around five-hundred Afghan delegates. This facilitated the first presidential elections, where Hamid Karzai won the elections with 55% of vote in October 2004 (Their, 2006). Hamid Karzai then signed a joint declaration of the United States-Afghanistan

Time line of Events
(post 2001)

- October 2001: US supported by Britain begin attacks on Afghanistan
- November 2001: First Major offensive in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif.
- November 2001: UN Security Council passes resolution 1378
- December 2001: The battle of Tora Bora against Taliban and al-Qaeda.
- December 2001: Ben Laden Escapes.
- December 2001: The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO led security mission, established through Resolution 1386.
- December 2001: The interim Afghan government is sworn in, with Hamid Karzai as interim administration head.
- March 2002: The first large scale battle “Operation Anaconda”
- March 2002, the Security Council resolution 1401 authorized the creation of (UNAMA)
- November 2002: US established “Provincial Reconstruction Teams”
- August 2003: NATO takes command of peacekeeping in Afghanistan.
- October 2004: The country’s first direct elections.
- July 2006: Bloody resurgence spiked

Fierce Combats
Casualties on both sides
Hundreds of civilians dead

- February 2009: Barack Obama announces plans to send 17,000 more troops
- May 2011, Osama Ben Laden was killed
- October 2011, Obama announced plans to withdraw all combat troops by 2014
- June 2013, NATO hands over control to the Afghan forces
- May 2014: Obama announces a schedule for US forces withdrawal by the end of 2016
- August 2017, Trump signaled an open-ended military commitment

Strategic partnership that aims at strengthening the ties between the two countries to help ensure long term security (Office of the Press Secretary, 2005).


Despite the democratic process, bloody resurgence spiked in 2006. The number of suicide bombings increased from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006; also, remote bombings increased to 1,677 in 2012 (Livingston & O'Hanlon, 2012). Furthermore, in 2007, 19 South Korean missionaries were held hostages, with claims that were freed after ransom was paid for freeing the hostages (Achakzai, 2007). Insecurity was the centre of the scene. Fierce combats went on with casualties on both sides leaving hundreds of civilians dead. On May 2007, the Taliban military commander, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in a joint operation. Dadullah was a leader of guerrilla forces organizing suicide bombing attacks (Wilner, 2010).

On March 2009, President Obama presented his "comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan" with the a "clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future." The main shift he explained is the emphasis on training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country (Lee, 2009).

In 2010 plans of withdrawal were revealed. NATO member countries signed a declaration to hand over full responsibility for security to Afghan forces by the end of 2014, at a summit in Lisbon in November 2010. On June 2011, President Obama presented a plan to withdraw thirty-three thousand troops by the summer of 2012. On October 2011, Obama announced plans to withdraw all combat troops by 2014. On June 2013, NATO hands over control to the Afghan forces to take the lead in security responsibility nationwide. On May 2014: Obama announces a schedule for US forces withdrawal by the end of 2016. However, on August 2017, Trump signaled an open-ended military commitment to prevent the emergence of a "vacuum for terrorists" (CFR, 2019).

On October 2004 Afghanistan witnessed the country's first direct elections, since then the state fragility index showed high alert. The best result was in 2006 and the worst in 2010. Although there was some advancement in the following years, it still remained in the high alert category and never reached the value of 2006 (see figure 26 below)

Figure 26: **Overall Fragility Trend in Afghanistan (2006-present)**



Source: Raw data retrieved from Fragile State Index ²²

Different Categories... Different Interests... Segregation

There are different ethnic groups in Afghanistan each have their linguistic, religion and ethnic identity. Originally these groups were isolated due to the topography of the country; however, communication between the groups increased by time and through the development of the country's communication and transportation system. All figures about these groups are estimates, as there has not been any census in Afghanistan for decades. Some consider the elite in Afghanistan are mainly from the Pashtuns. "The Pashtuns principally emerged as political elites who run the major institutions of the country including both military and bureaucracy" (Ghulam, 2015). However, others believe that the elite come from across the factional and tribal lines. Hence, the elite disunity led to distrust and lack of communication, which created political crisis. (Sharan, 2012, p. 188.).

Pashtuns

Pashtuns are the dominant group in Afghanistan; it comprises around 40% of the population. Some even consider that Afghan "implies Pashtun identity inside the country" (Barfield, 2010: 24). They speak the Pashto language (Indo-European group of language). The social

²² <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

structure of the Pashtuns is based on the Pashtunwali that is an amalgamation of tribal honor code and local interpretation of Sharia (MRG, 2019).

Within the Pashtuns there are several tribes and subtribes; however, they are mainly composed of four main groups who traces back to the sons of the common ancestor Qais Abur Rashid (575-661) (MRG, 2019). The “four maximal-descent groups” are: Durrani, Ghilzais, Gurghusht, and Karlanri.

Tajiks

Tajiks are considered non-tribal Persian speaking (Dari language) Sunni Muslims (5% of them are Shia), they constitute the second largest ethnic group with an estimate of 30%. They form the majority of the urban residents in Kabul, Herat and Mazar, while the bulk live scattered in the mountains. The group has little internal cohesion and usually identify themselves in accordance to the region (village and family) they come from rather than their ethnicity (Barfield, 2010, p. 26).

Tajiks make up the majority of Afghanistan’s elite, with considerable wealth, education and political power. While the leaders in Afghanistan had Pashtun origins, the Tajiks dominated the bureaucracy. Since the Tajiks were associated with the regime overthrown by the soviets, they received attacks during the war, which led to the formation of resistance groups (MRG, 2019).

Tajiks mobilized themselves politically, where many are associated with the Jamiat-e Islami party. However, they have not been engaged in armed rebellion (MRG, 2019).

Hazaras

The Hazaras are believed to descend from Mongol armies, they are Persian speaking, and Shia Muslims, they constitute 15% of Afghanistan population. The majority of this community lives in Hazarajat in the central mountains of Afghanistan (Barfield, 2010, p. 26).

One of the key moments for the Hazara was the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha that was central to the Hazara community identity. This resembled the Taliban’s targeting of the Hazara. Hazara’s culture, heritage, rituals were directly targeted (MRG, 2019).

Hazaras faced systematic discrimination and violence, being a Shia group exposed them to long-term persecution. In 2007 clashes flared between Kuchis and Hazaras resulting in 4,000 Hazaras displaced, 65 Hazara villages empty, and dozens killed. Despite these mounting battles, no police reinforcement was provided. In 2008, 60,000 Hazara were displaced, while May 2010 alone witnessed 1,800 families displaced with 68 homes burnt and 28 schools

closed. Although this is a Kuchis-Hazaras conflict, claims refer that this is flamed by the Taliban (Phillips, 2017). Socio-economic status and high poverty have created another level of discrimination through the class and ethnic divisions.

Uzbeks and Turkmen

Uzbeks and Turkmen are Sunni Turkish speaking groups that descend from nomadic tribal confederations; they constitute 10% of the country's population. The Turkmen play an important economic role in Afghanistan due to their production of major export earners (Barfield, 2010).

Uzbeks were part of the Northern Alliance that fought against the Taliban. Hence, they gained some military and political influence following the Taliban regime. However, the Taliban was able to recruit members from the Uzbeks and the Turkmen. The Taliban succeeded in this recruitment due to minority's discontent with the protection and services provided by the central government. This discontent has also led Turkmen to form new militias (MRG, 2019).

Aimaqs

Aimaq is originally a Turkish idiom meaning tribe, while Aimaqs are known to have Turkish descents mostly of Sunni Muslim origins (Barfield, 2010). The group was actively engaged in the battles against the Soviets. In contrast with the other communities, Aimaq women are accorded high status with high level of engagement and participation (MRG, 2019).

Kuchis

Kuchi means nomad in the Persian language. Kuchis are social group as they are Pashtuns. 200,000 of these are displaced in Afghanistan while an equal number are refugees in Pakistan. Since the fall of the Taliban, Kuchis have been discriminated against on the basis of their perceived association with the Taliban (MRG, 2019). Kuchis conflicts and battles with Hazaras took place leading to casualties amongst both communities, internally displaced, and deteriorated economic status. Political participation was limited to a certain class of a small political elite (Foschini, 2013).

Other Minorities

There are other minorities in Afghanistan that are diverse as it represents less than three percent. These include: Nuristani and Pashai, Qizilbash, Baluch, Arabs, Pamiris, Jugis and Jats, Kirghitz, and non-Muslims.

Insurgency

There are three main insurgencies operating in Afghanistan: Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Hizb-i-Islami who were able to recruit locals and internationals. These insurgencies were able to acquire local, regional and transnational support.

Taliban

The Taliban was a cross-border movement led by afghan Ghilzais Pashtuns. The group was motivated by radical interpretation of Sunni Islam trained in Deobandi madrassa in Pakistan that aims at creating an Islamic state along Salafists lines. Deobandis believe that they are obliged to wage jihad to protect the Muslims in the country (Jones, 2008b, p. 27). Their strategy to accomplish this is to overthrow the Afghan government.

By 2005, Taliban was growing in rural areas due to the vacuum resulting from lack of government capacity. Many mujahedeen commanders, especially those from Hizb-i-Islami and Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami–Islamic Unity Movement, were later absorbed by the Taliban (Johnson & Mason, 2007).


Taliban improved their combat skills, they received trainings in different aspects including removing the explosives and propellants, and repacking them with high-velocity. They adopted suicide tactics where the number increased from 1 in 2002, 2 in 2003, 6 in 2004, 21 in 2005, 139 in 2006, and 140 in 2007 (Jones, 2008b).

According to the BBC (2018) Taliban's annual income amounted to \$400m, though it has increased to \$1.5bn. The main income is drug business, where the estimated annual export of opium reaches \$1,5-\$3 bn (Azami, 2018). Taliban also received foreign funding from different sources including Pakistan, Iran, and Russia along with the Gulf countries including the United Arab Emirates, Saud Arabia and Qatar (Azami, 2018; Pankowski).

Hezb-i-Islami

Hezb-i-Islami traces its ideology and structure to the Muslim Youth Organization that was found in 1969 to oppose the Marxist and Maoist aiming to establish political Islam in an Islamic caliphate (Rahim, 2018). The group was founded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and was the one of the “two most prominent groups fighting the Soviet backed regime” supported politically and financially by the US and the Gulf countries (Rahim, 2018). The group was strongly active until 2016 (Jones, 2008a).

Figure 27: Network of Insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2001-2019)



Source: Stanford University (2019)²³

²³ Available at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/pakistan_un, accessed January 18, 2020.

The hierarchal structure of the group is divided into four groups: logistics support, financial and political support, guerrillas, and commanders. Financial and political support was primarily from tribal populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This included intelligence campaigns and counterintelligence operations along with logistical and recruitment services (Jones, 2008a).

Hezb i-Islami was active in the was active since the collapse of Najibullah communist regime. Since then they maintained their effectiveness and structure. However, in 2016 a conclusion of the resistance came through a peace agreement with the Ghani administration (Rahim, 2018).

Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network dates back to the mid-1970s, when Haqqani and his followers traveled to Pakistan to receive military trainings. He established the group in North Waziristan's Miram Shah. Haqqani was a member of the Hizb-i-Islami and also a supporter of al-Qaeda (Dressler, 2010). The network is well-funded by various resources. Haqqani and his sons travelled frequently to the Gulf countries to solicit funds, where it established a huge network with individuals and organizations (Dressler, 2010; Romaniuk & Webb, 2015). Haqqani also "maintained a relationship with the ISI [Pakistan's Directorate for inter-Service intelligence], American, and Saudi intelligence organizations (Dressler, 2010:8). The group was also able to recruit foreign fighters who played a significant role in the network. Foreign fighters included (but are not limited to): Arabs, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Turks (Dressler, 2010). The network also sought illicit ways of generating revenue by expanding into drug trade (Weinbaum & Babbar, 2016).

According to Weinbaum and Babbar (2016) Haqqani Network (H.N.) is *"thought to be the strongest and most disciplined force in the Afghan insurgency. Post-9/11, H.N. has executed some of the most carefully planned attacks on Afghan soil, undertaken numerous high-profile kidnappings, and been involved in a wide array of criminal activities"* Haqqani also conducted several suicide bombing attacks in Kabul and throughout Afghanistan targeting both the US troops and the Afghan forces (Dressler, 2010).

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is a militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization that was found in 1988 by Osama bin Laden that is based on a centralized decision making and decentralized operations.

The relationship between al-Qaeda and Taliban started in 1996, when the Taliban accommodated al-Qaeda under its protection, where they became allies.

Al-Qaeda's strategy developed by time and was able to adapt to regional changes. In 2007, it expanded its operation to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda was able to unite efforts of various militias in the region. Additionally, "al-Qa`ida has managed to maintain and restore a presence in Afghanistan while, at the same time, shifting many senior operatives to the Arab world" (Stenersen, 2016: 21).

Several incidents affected the effectiveness of al-Qaeda. Such incidents included the killing of ben Laden in 2011 along with the killing and arresting senior al-Qaeda members in Pakistan. Another important factor is the disruption of al-Qaeda communication and propaganda as well as weakening its finances; which curtailed its recruitment and its attacks. However, this has not led to defeating al-Qaeda (McNally & Weinbaum, 2016).

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)/ Jundullah

This is an Uzbek insurgent network adherent to a Salafist-Jihadist ideology allied with the Taliban. They switched allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015 after the death of Mullah Omar inflicting conflict with the Taliban. A northern group separated from IMU in 2009 forming Jundullah group (EASO, 2019).

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)

This is the Islamic State branch in Afghanistan that dates back to 2014. "The Nangarhar group envisages global expansion of the caliphate and designates the region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian republics as the Wilayat Khorasan" (EASO, 2019:37).

Local tribes

Tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan associated themselves with insurgent groups and provided them with support. These tribes worked as public relations and fundraised directorates for the for the insurgency groups.

Several individuals in the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe based in Wana, Pakistan, helped raise funds and recruited militants to fight in Afghanistan. There was also evidence that organizations such as Jamaat-

e-Islami and Wahhabi groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba cooperated with insurgent groups (Jones, 2008a: 46)

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency went through different phases and changes since it started in 2001; changes in the strategy, in the players and in the coordination between the players. The operations started with a US Led coalition in 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), later in the same year the Security Council authorized ISAF to operate in and around Kabul, which also witnessed a change in strategy from counterterrorism (2001-2002) to peacebuilding with focus on reconstruction and stabilization (2003-2008) and finally to counterinsurgency (2009-2012). OEF continued to be active in Afghanistan. Part of OEF (building up the Afghan army) was later brought under the responsibility of ISAF in 2009. In March 2002, the Security Council authorized the creation of UNAMA to lead international civilian activities and on the political process.

UNAMA is a political mission that was established by the UN security resolution at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Its mandate is revised annually. UNAMA has been involved in peacemaking through its facilitating the Bonn process with efforts in conflict resolution and outreach. The reconciliation role was challenged by the lack of will shown by NATO, US and the Afghani Government. "On the one hand, UNAMA is mandated to strengthen its field presence and conduct political outreach, but it is restricted to engaging in reconciliation issues on its own" (Larsen, 2010). UNAMA also played a peacebuilding role. It supported the humanitarian reconstruction provided by the more than 20 UN organizations, support in drafting the constitution, establishing various commissions, and holding elections on the different levels (Larsen, 2010).


OEF intervention in Afghanistan is contested. Some scholars claim that it is legal and that it was called in reference to the right of self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter (Dinstein, 2005:237). Other scholars believe that this act justifies unilateral attacks and violation of national sovereignty of other states, it is considered an occupation or military offensive (Williams, 2011). Legality of OEF is one issue; however, another critique is the violation of human rights and international law throughout the operations.

“U.S. forces have used excessive or indiscriminate force when conducting arrests in residential areas in Afghanistan... U.S. military forces have repeatedly used deadly force from helicopter gunships and small and heavy arms fire, including undirected suppressing fire, during what are essentially law-enforcement operations to arrest persons in uncontested locales. The use of these tactics has resulted in avoidable civilian deaths and injuries, and in individual cases may amount to violations of international humanitarian law... Afghan soldiers deployed alongside U.S. forces have beaten and otherwise mistreated people during arrest operations and looted homes or seized the land of those being detained.” (HRW, 2004:2)

ISAF establishment is based on Security Council resolution from Chapter VII of the UN Charter to support the Afghani government to restore and maintain security. The structure of ISAF changed between 2002 and 2005. ISAF started under the UK command, and for rotating purposes after six months under Turkey’s command, after which Germany and the Netherlands were scheduled to take over. However, before assuming the command a formal request was sent to NATO for support of command and control while maintaining the ISAF operations (Shroeder, 2014). Since then the NATO expanded its operations through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRTs that is based on reconstruction and development. This evolved to a network of 13 teams by 2004, which became regional hubs for reconstruction activities (Serena et.al. 2014).

NATO expanded in the relatively stable provinces including the north in 2003-2004 and the west in 2005. The south and the east remained with the US-led campaign, where it expanded its operations and adopted counterinsurgency measures. In 2006 ISAF expanded to the south and east and then to all provinces. ISAF has grown progressively by time, it started with 5,000 deployed in 2002 to reach the peak in 2001 (see figure 28 below). Despite the perspective that things were stabilizing; in reality, it was not. In 2006 the Taliban expanded their territory of operations to more than 400%, number of direct fire attacks increased from 1,500 in 2005 to 4,500 in 2006, attacks on coalition more than tripled, suicide bombings rose with more than sixty attacks in 2005, and casualties among coalition (see figure 29 below) and foreign civilians mounted (Shroeder, 2014). This led to reinforce of the OEF forces. This was accompanied by a marked expansion of the insurgency to reach its full momentum with popularity of other militia groups; namely: Haqqani network and Hezb-e-Islami.

Figure 28: **International Troops Strength in Afghanistan (2001-2017)**




Source: Raw data retrieved from Brookings Index Reports²⁴

Counterinsurgency was updated and codified in 2006 in *Field Manual 3-24*, jointly published by the U.S. Army and the Marines. The strategy was based on an alteration from an enemy-centric focus to a population-centric focus.

In October 2008, ISAF issued a classified Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). The JCP specified key objectives and approaches. It stated that the primary goal is the transfer of lead responsibility to the Afghans including planning and conducting operations.

²⁴ Raw data of years 2001-2005 comes from Brookings index report of 2005 (O'Hanlon & Albuquerque, 2005); and for years 2006-2017 from Brookings report of September 2017 (Livingston & O'Hanlon, 2017).

Figure 29: US and Partner Troops Fatalities in Afghanistan 2002-2018



Source: Dobbins, et.al. (2019)

In 2014, full responsibility for Afghanistan was handed over to the Afghan government and the ISAF mission was terminated. However, forces from the different nations are still operating in Afghanistan.

Throughout the years of intervention, the relationship between the OEF, ISAF and UNAMA changed resulting from alteration of legal foundation and for coordination efforts especially through the development of the PRTs that required civilian military cooperation (Nielsen, Syed, & Vestenskov, 2015).

PRTs evolved to be ISAF's main force element. However, PRTs received many critiques due to the process of delivery. There were no systems in place, and no systems for information exchange between UN offices and PRTs. There was lack of communication that placed lives of minority communities and international personnel at risk (Harsch, 2015).

"There is a lack of clarity regarding the role of PRTs. This stems from: an absence of a clearly defined set of operating principles for the PRTs; non-adherence on the part of PRTs to the existing, ambiguous operating guidelines; actual roles that differ from stated roles; and the differing ways in which the PRTs have been implemented... there does not appear to be agreement within

and between the military forces implementing the PRTs on how these roles are to be operationalised, the degree to which PRTs should engage in other activities such as intelligence gathering, or the degree to which PRTs should actively engage in relief activities” (Save the Children, 2004, p. 19).

Coordination between the different players is not sufficient and if available is not effective. In 2008, UN and NATO signed a joint declaration on headquarters cooperation; where UN formally recognized NATO as a partner in crisis management. This cooperation did not last for long. The UN was reluctant to engage in cooperation, as visibility of such cooperation affects its legitimacy. Additionally, in 2003 ISAF did not provide support for UN personnel when five UN staff were killed (Harsch, 2015).

Coordination amongst the different nations within the same body was also weak despite the shared vision and strategy.

“It was problematic that the Danish politicians did not understand that the mission was not a Danish mission but a multinational mission. They tried to steer the Danish efforts without really coordinating with our counterparts. The Helmand Plan was full of dates and tasks ...but without coordination with the British Task Force or the Afghan Security Forces, we, the battle group, ran out of options.” (Nielsen, Syed, & Vestenskov, 2015, p. 68).

Problematic cooperation also existed between UNAMA and NGOs. This forced ISAF to rely on national civilian ministries. Thus national foreign ministries managed the stabilization and state-building efforts including the German Technical Cooperation GIZ and the United States Agency for International Development USAID (Shroeder, 2014).


Financial aid was a problematic issue throughout the intervention. Though the financial aid provided was limited; however large portions of the disbursed amount never served the desired objective of state building. It was siphoned off by corrupt government officials, which empowered other players and in some cases was channeled to insurgent groups (Shroeder, 2014).

“This is the chaos that is foreign aid in Afghanistan, a place where every mistake ever made in every underdeveloped economy is now being repeated. This is a country in which all the best people are being hired away from the national government by the alphabet soup of aid agencies on the ground; in which the same alphabet soup of aid agencies is driving up real-estate and food prices; in which millions of dollars are squandered on dubious contractors, both local and foreign; in which the minister for rural development says he doesn’t know what all the NATO reconstruction teams in rural districts do; in which the top U.N. official, given a mandate to coordinate the donors, says the donors don’t respond to his attempts to coordinate them”
 (Applebaum, 2008, p. 2)

Support Provided for the Two Poles

Violence in Afghanistan has been increasing by time, since 2011 different parties are engaged in the conflict and the complexity of the conflict is increasing. Counterinsurgency operations were activated and support to the different parties were provided either internally or externally and either physically or financially. Different lines of communications were initiated either as rivals or supporters. Figure (30) below illustrates the triangular framework of relationship between the different players on the ground.


Figure 30: Framework of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan



Source: Jones, 2008a

The players are seeking to achieve their formally announced or hidden agendas, which are in most cases contradictory to the other player's agendas causing more chaos and complexities. Figure (31) below illustrates the network spotlighting the different players that are identified in the literature. There are the pro-government forces that include the Afghan National Security Forces, the International Military Forces, and the pro-government militias. The pro-government militias are the “arbaki” or tribal armies that were utilized by the international military forces for conducting searches, night raids or executions; who were responsible for abuses and civilian casualties (EASO, 2019). On the other hand, there are the anti-government elements these include Taliban, Haqqani network, Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Jundullah), Islamic State Khorasan Province among others.

Figure 31: Network of Relationships between Internal and External players in Afghanistan




Source: own design

Support of insurgencies from external players affects their probability to succeed in their attacks. According to Jones (2008a) insurgencies that received support from external states won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from non-state actors and diaspora

groups won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time (see figure 32 below).

Figure 32: **External Support for Insurgents and Success**



Source: Jones, 2008a

Viscous Cycle


The preconditions for insurgency in Afghanistan was structural, a fruitful environment was created ensuring an escalating growth of insurgency. Following the overthrow of Taliban and establishment of the new government, this government was weak and could not provide the essential and basic services or even to establish law and order that has led to lose the confidence in the state's ability to enforce systems, law and order. Weakening the government as such leads to population supporting insurgencies rather than the government, thus perceiving the insurgencies as human security providers due to the lack of interest and/or will amongst the government. The more vulnerable the community is, the more the chance the insurgency will boost and establish an alternative system and alternative government and an alternative service provider and human security provider.

The diverse ethnic breakdown in Afghanistan created competing ethnicities for power; competition was even amongst the Northern Alliance. Rivalry was amongst the Pashtuns and the Tajik, where the former felt they were left behind following the control of the Tajiks on

many of the ministries. It is a fragmented society; however, the Afghani government was able to relatively balance representation of the different ethnicities. However, the external support and the historic fragmentation were leading to more societal destruction.

Community structure has changed after changing the regime in 2001, although tribalism has always been a key in the Afghani community. The government-insurgent structure has been reversed after the change; those who formed the government became insurgents and vice-versa. Figure (33) above illustrates the difference in the structure pre and post 2001.

Figure 33: **Community Structure and Formation of Insurgency pre and post 2001**



Source: own design

The centrifugal force affecting the individuals and groups in Afghanistan could be calculated according to the centrifugal force formula:

$$F_c = \frac{(S \times W)v^2}{r} \quad (1)$$

where

F_c = centrifugal force (it is the force that people feel disturbs all stability and their human security)

v = violence level during the conflict; originally this is the velocity. Since 2001 the level of violence escalated to a high level.

s = support provided to the poles (internal and external), not only did the support increase but also it was complex to the extent that it was contradictory; where formally announced support was different from the real agendas. The support came from governments and individuals (see figure 7)

w = the willingness to control the government, the analysis of the insurgents showed individual and group interests to control the government.

r = is the ratio of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; the number of those engaged in the conflict increased by time not only between the insurgents and the government but also amongst the insurgent groups who were fighting for tribal survival and insurgents' survival.

With an increasing violence level (v), support provided by the poles (s), willingness to control the government (w), and number of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; the centrifugal force (F_c) increased to an alarming level. Thus, affecting the center of mass of the system, forming multiple centers of mass different for the different communities; and thus decreasing the common interest and the unity of the communities.

Impact of the Viscous Cycle


According to the vicious cycle model described in chapter four, the support of insurgency and counterinsurgency increases the centrifugal force, which drives unrestrained particles to leave their orbit. This is evident the high number of refugees and IDPs amongst the different parts of the Afghani community.

In 2001, the majority of those fleeing Afghanistan sought refuge in rural areas causing more poverty and aggravation of food security. This was due to the fact that all Afghanistan's neighboring countries formally pushed back new influxes of refugees. Pakistan relaxed its borders control allowing Afghans to enter into rural areas that are not secure especially for

Hazaras (Marsden, 2002). A similar array still resides in 2019, since the beginning of the year 1,000 Afghan civilians are displaced by the conflict (crisis group, 2019).

According to the UNHCR, there is around 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan. They comprise the largest protracted refugee population in Asia, and the second largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2019). In the second quarter of 2019, numbers of Afghani asylum seekers were 2555 applications in France, 2,240 in Germany and 2,740 in Greece (EC, 2019). The number of asylum seekers in Europe during the last 24 months amounted to 44,340 (EC, 2019). However, in recent years Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Germany, Austria, Finland, and Turkey have forcibly returned tens of thousands in clear breach to the non-refoulement principle (AI, 2019). Pakistan currently hosts around 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees and another one million unregistered Afghans, while there are 1.5 to two million “undocumented” Afghan refugees in Iran (AI, 2019). Figure (34) below illustrates the refugee population since 2001.

Figure 34: Refugee population 2001-2018



Source: Raw Data retrieved from World Bank statistics (2018)²⁵

According to the vicious cycle model, the centrifugal force leads to more fragmentation of the society, which in turn create different centers of mass and thus different centers of gravity, which creates a massive deterioration of human security resulting from competing positions

²⁵ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR?contextual=default&end=2018&locations=AF&start=2001>

of each. The following is a quick summary of the three human insecurity dimensions (community, political, and personal insecurity), with some insight around the other four dimensions (economic, food, health, and environment):

Community Security

Interethnic conflict has been in the for a more than a century. The Post-Taliban period witnessed a revival of the Hazara's social status, where they were an oppressed minority before then. "Ethnicity has become increasingly salient in Afghan politics and society during the years of war" (Simonsen, 2004). Although the constitution recognized the different ethnicities, religions and sects; their ties link Afghans with ethnic conflicts in neighboring countries. The ethnicization during the Bonn agreement "prioritized the resolution of the ethnicized Afghan conflict" whereas Afghan people needed "good governance, basic services and transitional justice" (Siddique, 2012, p. 6). Although interethnic conflict is not the main factor underpinning the dispute; however political elite has used this to gain more power and affiliation to certain ethnicities has driven the people towards specific insurgents.


"Within the government, however, Civil War divisions arose and materialized into modern day political groups. Ahmad Shah Massoud's and Burhanuddin Rabbani's Northern Alliance became today's Jamiat-e-Islami, a primarily Tajik organization. Uzbeks organized under Rashid Dostum's Junbesh-e-Milli. Abdul Ali Mazari's followers were now under the Hazara Hezb-e-Wahdat. And Pashtuns followed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami." (Frishta, 2015, p.10)

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace Afghanistan is currently the least peaceful country in the world; where the peace Index of 2019 is 3.574 ranking 163 amongst the surveyed 163 countries. The economic cost of violence in 2018 amounts to 47 per cent of GDP (IEP, 2019). In 2017, Afghanistan ranked the first in the number of deaths from terrorism (see figure 35 below).

"While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-

related deaths in 2016, which are nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts". (IEP, 2017, p.3)

Figure 35: **Rank of Number of deaths from Terrorism in Afghanistan 1998-2017**




Source: Raw data retrieved from (IEP, 2018)

Afghanistan ranked number one in the number of fatalities replacing Iraq that ranked number one for a couple of years. Figure (36) below illustrates the total number of fatalities targeting combatants and non-combatants in Afghanistan compared to Iraq and the rest of the world. In general, the safety and security domain index according to the Institute for Economics and Peace 4.198 ranking the worst amongst the 163 countries surveyed in 2019.

These attacks are ongoing; the latest of which are the Taliban attacks in September 2019 aiming at deterring people from participating in the presidential elections.


Figure 36: Total Fatalities in Terrorists Attacks 2000-2016



Source: Cordesman, 2017

Level of crime and its risks are alarming. It ranges from transnational organized crimes conducted by local, regional and international individuals and organizations and organized criminal syndicates, to lower-level street crimes including theft and assaults” (OSAC, 2019, p.1). One of the major acute crimes is the drug trade that has been financing insurgents especially the Taliban. Figure (37) below illustrates the poppy production in Afghanistan starting from 2000 until 2018.

Figure 37: **Poppy Production (cultivation Area and Production)**



Source: World Bank, 2019

Political Security

Human rights violations have been prevalent in Afghanistan, including war crimes, terror attacks, and sexual abuse driving a huge influx of IDPs and refugees in the region and all over the world.

According to Human Rights Watch, 2018 witnessed “the highest level of torture of conflict-related detainees in police custody since 2010” (HRW, 2018, p.3). Although the Afghan Government ratified the UN protocol to the convention against torture in 2018, it failed to hold police accountable for systematic torture.

Additionally, after all those years of political reform, Afghanistan failed to improve the rule of law index with all its components (especially fundamental rights, order and security, and regulatory enforcement. Table (4) below illustrates the rule of law index since 2014²⁶. The order and security declined from 0.42 in 2014 where it ranked the 100th amongst the surveyed countries to 0.30 in 2019 where it ranked 126th.

²⁶ No data available prior to 2014

Table 4: **Rule of Law Index (Rate and Rank) 2014-2019**


	2019 Rate(rank)	2017/2018 Rate(rank)	2016 Rate(rank)	2015 Rate(rank)	2014 Rate(rank)
Constraints on Government powers	0.43(98)	0.43(95)	0.43(97)	0.44(82)	0.43(78)
Absence of corruption	0.28(119)	0.27(109)	0.23(113)	0.23(102)	0.24(99)
Open government	0.37(107)	0.36(103)	0.40(99)	0.43(89)	0.34(89)
Fundamental Rights	0.40(108)	0.39(102)	0.40(100)	0.38(95)	0.39(91)
Order & Security	0.30(126)	0.32(112)	0.34(112)	0.42(100)	0.42(100)
Regulatory Enforcement	0.35(122)	0.34(109)	0.36(106)	0.36(97)	0.33(97)
Civil Justice	0.38(119)	0.38(104)	0.34(110)	0.32(101)	0.27(99)
Criminal Justice	0.28(119)	0.28(108)	0.28(109)	0.24(100)	0.28(96)
Rule of Law Index	0.35(123)	0.34(111)	0.35(111)	0.35(101)	0.34(98)

Source of raw data: World Justice Project Reports 2014-2019

Personal security


“Battle deaths thus far in 2019 nearly outnumber the combined toll in Syria and Yemen. The number of civilian casualties is poised to reach, or even surpass, the country’s previous records since 2001” (Crisis Group, 2019, p.3). Figure (38) illustrates the increase in the citizen casualties by time. Citizens lack the feel of personal security; everyone is subject to security threat, and the situation remains volatile with high level of insecurity incidents. Citizens indicated that they often fear their personal and family security; this fear has been increasing by time, figure (38) illustrates the increase of this fear. Afghanistan has been torn by violence, it is estimated that half of the population has experienced depression, anxiety, or post-traumatic stress; which affects people mental health and wellbeing (HRW, 2019)

Figure 38: Estimated Yearly Civilian Fatalities as Result of Fighting Between Pro-Government Forces and Armed Opposition Groups 2006-2016



Source: Livingston & O'Hanlon (2017)

Figure 39: Fear of Personal or Family Security (2006-2016)




Source: Livingston & O'Hanlon (2017)

Although Afghan constitution sets the legal protection of women's rights, inequality is deeply rooted in the culture. "Women have historically not been part of the political, social, and economic decision-making process" (Sevastik, 2019). The conflict has severely impacted women in Afghanistan; UNAMA documented a 33 percent increase in women casualties attributed to ISKP. "Beyond the direct impact of armed conflict on women, they are

disproportionately affected by the broader effects of the armed conflict, which exacerbates their vulnerability to marginalization, poverty, discrimination and violence” (UNAMA, 2019, p.10)

Around 48% of the Afghani population are younger than 15 years of age; a large population torn by conflict. Save the Children listed Afghanistan as one of the ten worst countries (SC, 2019). Children are seriously impacted by the conflict in Afghanistan; child deaths reached record high levels in 2018 (see figure 40 below), where they accounted for 28 percent of all civilian casualties (UNAMA, 2019). Over and above, Afghani children were direct part of the conflict as both the anti and pro-government forces recruited children and used them for combat roles. Moreover, children have been victims to sexual violence by parties of the conflict (UNAMA, 2019). Children, among others in the Afghani population were also affected by heavily targeting health and educational facilities and personnel (UN, 2019). Children in Afghanistan engage in the worst forms of child labor; 7.5 percent of those aged 5 to 14 participate in the labor force. Only 41.8 per cent of them attend school, while 60% of the 3.7 million out-of- school children are girls (SC, 2019)


Figure 40: **Children Deaths and Injured January to December 2009-2018**



Source: UNAMA, 2019

Economic Security

Figure 41: Poverty rate (% of population)




Source: World Bank (2019) employment, day labor, or unpaid work” (World Bank, 2019).

The poverty rate for Afghanistan was estimated at 54.5 percent in 2017. Households relying on agriculture and livestock for their main income sources experience higher poverty rates, 65 and 66 percent respectively (World Bank, 2019). “Few Afghans have access to productive or remunerative employment. A quarter of the labor force is unemployed, and 80 percent of employment is vulnerable and insecure, comprising self - or own account

Food security

According to FAO, “13.5 million people in Afghanistan are severely food insecure, of whom 9.9 million are facing crisis and 3.6 million are facing emergency levels of food insecurity” (FAO, 2019, p.3). “The results of the IPC [Integrated Food Security Phase Classification] analysis show that Afghanistan is experiencing a major livelihood crisis. This crisis has been primarily caused by the severe drought, which limits food production and depletes farmers and livestock keepers of assets and

Figure 42: Acute Food Insecurity Situation in Afghanistan



livelihoods” (IPC, 2019).

Health Security

Although the World Bank Report has recorded progress in health indicators (World Bank, 2019), the trend in targeting health facilities and personnel by all parties of the conflict is alarming, leading to more people denied health services. In 2019, as of 22 October 98 incidents targeted health care in 23 provinces and 72 districts during which 234 health care facilities and 62 health care providers were affected (WHO, 2019). In July 2019, Taliban militias have ordered the closure of 42 clinics run by the Swedish aid group (Farmer, 2019). Over and above, the protracted conflict in Afghanistan is driving a mental health crisis. Generations in Afghanistan are coming to life amid relentless violence and are witnessing nothing but violence, killing and maiming, sexual abuse leading to trauma and a sense of hopelessness.

Environment Security

According to UNICEF-WHO joint monitoring report 2015, 68 percent of Afghans don’t have access to improved sanitation and nearly 15 million, 45 percent use unimproved water sources (UNOCHA, 2017).

According to UN personnel working in Afghanistan, the air is deadlier than the war in Afghanistan. Interviewed UN personnel mentioned that while serving in the camps they had to “work with the masks on, to help breath clean air; clean air is a luxury that not every person enjoys in Afghanistan”²⁷

“According to the State of Global Air, a collaborative initiative between the Health Effects Institute and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, more than 26,000 Afghan deaths could be attributed to pollution in 2017. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented nearly 3,500 civilian deaths from pollution for the same time period. The root cause is the burning of anything possible to get Afghans the energy and heat they need in harsh winters—including plastic, coal, and rubber. Mixed into that is the use of leaded fuels banned in the West decades ago, as well as waste energy plants and heavy industry” (Flores, 2019, para 2).

²⁷ Martin (2019). UNHCR official serving in Afghanistan, 27 September 2019.

When asked about their perceptions of human security in Afghanistan a convenient sample provided the following fears that were categorized according to the three essential freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

Table 5: **Afghanis Perceptions of Human Security**

Freedom	Fears identified by respondents
Freedom from fear	No hope of future Lack of government capacity/ Bad government Tensions, genocide and terrorism Suicide attacks Increasing armaments High potential to be a victim of violence anytime in the coming future Too many foreigners are getting involved in the Afghani case Youth feel terror, helplessness and fear Gender based violence and sexual abuse Children traumatic stress causing physiological reactions No clear air to breathe
Freedom from want	Hunger and poverty No basic income ensured Lack of government safety net Unemployment Bad economy No basic services provided, health and educational services are deteriorating
Freedom to live in dignity	Human rights degradation Discrimination against women

'We do not have any hope for the future, and we don't see things going in the right direction; everything is deteriorating. We can't see any future for our children, no health, educational, or cultural security. We have

lost the connection with the land and the people. I do not remember a day in my life without conflict, and I do not imagine my children will have the chance to enjoy security. It is not only the conflict and the battle; my children had to go to the hospital due to respiratory problems. The pollution is killing us all; the skies turn black during the winter, the smog and the pollution is everywhere. My eternal dream is to leave this place and secure my children in a better place to ensure a better future” (Ahmed, 2019).²⁸

Conclusion

The protracted conflict in Afghanistan is deteriorating by time, following the counterinsurgency; insurgency groups did not decrease, on the contrary it increased and grew. The counterinsurgency has been focusing on traditional security thus temporarily eliminating some human security threats but not able to achieve sustainable security on the long term. The strategy is said to be political; however, the strategy, planning and implementation was military-led. The solution is obviously after all these years not a military one. The counterinsurgency and decentralized system has led to lack of confidence and trust in the central government, which led to more conflict and in fact it supported the vicious cycle, which altered the entire situation and reached to a point of no return. The counterinsurgency is trapped in a situation of no win and no loss. A continued presence is not ensuring any security; however, withdrawing is even more problematic. In fact, it will not be a withdrawal of the military, it will be a withdrawal of the international presence leading to empowerment of militias. It will not be a culmination of the military use, it will be an even more chaotic situation due to the continuation of the vicious cycle. It will be a loss of influence and legitimacy of the Afghani government, an increased and empowered insurgency, and a collapsed human security.

The decades of protracted conflict and increased number of players combined with the climate change, gender inequalities and underemployment has increased all threats and insecurities. Thus, limitation of insurgents support accompanied with sustainable development initiatives should largely replace the traditional military use.


²⁸ Ahmed, Safi (2019). Interview on 24 July, 2019

Chapter 7: Case 3 - LIBYA (2011-Present)

Introduction

The conflict in Libya that started since 2011 has a strong sectarian and tribal basis. The foundation for the conflict existed during Ghaddafi regime; however, catalysts of change including both internal and external factors dragged the country and region into an irreversible complexed conflict.

Figure 4344: Libya Civil War Map (November 2019)



Source: Pol Geo Now²⁹

²⁹ source: www.polgeonow.com

Libya's geophysical state of affairs is privileged in some sense given that it is located at the top of the African continent and close to Europe. Nevertheless, it has been destined by succession of invasions who usually controlled and occupied the coast and who pushed the Berbers and the Arabs to the interior regions, from the Ottoman Empire to the Italian colonization.

Berbers are believed to have begun their migration from south-western Asia in the third millennium BC (Metz, 1987). The Berbers refer to themselves as *imazighan* meaning "free men." They never developed a sense of nationhood rather they associated themselves with their tribes, families and clans (Metz, 1987).

The Ottoman Empire administered Libya as three provinces: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fazzan (Vandewalle, 2012). However, during this period the tribal system was the governing structure, which was possible through the loose hold of the Ottoman rule.

The Italian colonization started in 1910, when Italy attacked Tripoli in claims to liberate Libya from the Ottoman Wilayat. The opposition against Italian rule was most aggressive in Cyrenaica where the Sanusi religious and political leaders were active. This is where the "Grand Sanusi" (Muhammad ibn Ali as Sanusi) settled in 1830, and where Idris Sanusi (later King Idris) was leading the movement (Siebens & Case, 2012). He remained as a leader even while exile in Egypt from 1922 to 1947.

On 21 November 1949, the UN adopted a resolution stipulating Libyan independence no later than 1 January 1952. This came after the failure of the Bevin Sfora Agreement that advocated for a division of the former Italian colonies between Italy, Britain and France. On 24 December 1951 Libya gained its independence under the leadership of King Idris al-Sanusi with the proclamation of the federal monarchy of Libya. The three provinces "Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fazzan" that formed the new state had different interests and outlooks (Vandewalle, 2012).

The new Libyan state had to face political social and economic challenges. The new state had to start institutionalizing systems although only 10 percent of the population was literate and lacked any existent industry (Kawczynski, 2011). A state formed out of three different provinces, lacking any common interest. The only unifying factor was an economic concern rather than a national one. "During the first decade of independence, geographical and cultural differences between the provinces led to regionalism and rivalry that threatened the unity of the fledging country" (Siebens & Case, 2012, p.5). Idris' rule was not well accepted especially among the rural notables of Cyrenaica and even less in Tripolitania. His main

priority was rebuilding the religious and social network of the Sanussiyah in Libya (Morone, 2017). However, the federal system reinforced the regional divisions preventing any possibility of the national unity (Morone, 2017).

On September 1, 1969, a group of young officers led by Lieutenant Muammar Gaddafi launched a coup (or revolution as the Gaddafi names it) toppling King Idris, where Gaddafi became the chairman of the governing Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This was successful given the weak kingdom and the regional environment (Ladjal, 2017). In his first few years of ruling, Gaddafi decreed the end of the tribal system, replacing the tribal elites and politicians by supporters of the revolution; he dissolved the

monarchy while strengthening ties with the Arab nationalist governments (Ben Lamma, 2017). Gaddafi changed the basis for the legal system to sharia, nationalized the industry, abolished parliamentary institutions, and prohibited political parties.

On April 1973, Gaddafi initiated a "Popular Revolution" that he called "people govern themselves by themselves" (Vandewalle, 2008:12). Practically, this was activated through the formation of 450 people's committees to take control over the national administration of universities, hospitals, schools, factories and farms (Otman & Karlberg, 2007). The people's committees embodied the concept of direct democracy stipulated in Gaddafi's publication "The Green Book" (Gaddafi's blue print for a new Libya); a new system presenting the General People's Congress (GPC) to replace the RCC. The second volume of the green book formulated the solution to the economic problem through economic goals.

One of the main challenges faced by Gaddafi was from the RCC. In 1975, RCC member Major Omar Mihayshi failed an attempted coup after disagreements over politico-economic policies. This failure forced the technocratic elite to flee away from the country. Further attempts took place that was faced by executions and punishments.

In March 1977, Gaddafi dissolved the Republic and created the *Al-Jamahiriyah al-Arabiyya al-Libiyya al-sha'abiyya al-ishtirakiyya* "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." The Jamahiriya refers to the political community that is based on consultation rather than

Timeline of Events

- December 1951: Libya becomes independent under King Idris
- September 1969: King Idris deposed in a military coup led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi
- April 1973: Gaddafi bans political parties and institutes a system of "rule by the people"/Popular Revolution
- 1975: RCC member Major Omar Mihayshi failed an attempted coup
- March 1977, Gaddafi creates the "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."
- December 1979: the US Embassy in Tripoli was attacked. This is when the US listed Libya as sponsor of state terrorism
- June 1996: Killings of Abu Salim Prison

representation (Vandewalle, 2008). For Gaddafi that was the real democracy as opposed to the Western democracies.

Libya was isolated on December 1979 when the US Embassy in Tripoli was attacked. This is when the US listed Libya as sponsor of state terrorism (Hagger, 2009). This isolation and sanctions increased by time.

Despite the sanctions Libya society was in a state of transition from the underdeveloped into the modern socialist state:

“By the 1980s, most Libyans enjoyed educational opportunities, health care, and housing that were among the best in Africa and the Middle East. Responsibility for the care of the old and the needy had been largely shifted from the extended family to a comprehensive system of social security. Education and medical care were free, and when necessary the state subsidized housing and other necessities. Life expectancy, perhaps the ultimate measure of living standards, had lengthened by ten years since 1960, and social stability was much improved... The status of women continued to undergo modification at the behest of the Revolution’s leaders” (Metz, 1987 p. 63-64)

Despite all these developments, the country was suffering from a high level of inflation that needed proper management of the revenue flows. However, this was managed by abandoning planning, non-transparent budgeting procedures, no reporting systems or assessments of the country’s economic performance. This provoked a massive brain drain and expulsion of expatriate labors (Vandewalle, 2008).

The governing system was not in any case an inclusive one. “Old ethnic and geographic divisions among Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania were still very evident” (Metz, 1987: 64). Systematic exclusion to participate in governing the country amongst different segments of the populace was the norm. Moreover, a sense of belonging, identity, and national unity was missing.

Gadhafi had strained relationships with the West. He had a leading voice against the West and Israel. In the 1970s, he nationalized the West-owned oil companies. He was also accused of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing

On June 1996, stories about the mass killings in Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison went viral, though with minimal details. Around 1,270 prisoners were slaughtered and buried at the spot (Winer,

2019 & HRW, 2006). This incident among many others and these socio-economic conditions built into the moment of Revolution.

On February 2011, civil protests started against the corruption, the entrenched systems of patronage, and the deteriorating economic conditions with 30% unemployment rate. Later in the same month the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) was announced in Benghazi, and on March, the Council issued a statement declaring itself as the only legitimate body in Libya; a legitimacy that was acknowledged by the International community. Within days And, by 30 November 2011, more than one hundred UN states recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative body in Libya (Nesi, 2011). On 26 February 2011, the Security Council adopted resolution 1970 “recalling the Libyan authorities to protect its population” and demanding all member states to “immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”³⁰ Thus, the resolution formed a responsibility to prevent. On 17 March 2011, following the non-compliance of the Libyan authorities to Resolution 1970, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973. The resolution called for the imposition of a No-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and authorized member states to act nationally or through regional organizations to guarantee protection³¹. This authorization is considered a new era in employing R2P. In response, two days later a coalition of 12 countries established the Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn and took immediate action to enforce the resolution, and within 72 hours the no-fly zone was enforced. Within a week the Task Force succeeded in stopping the advancement of the regime forces allowing space for the rebels. Following this force, and in an unprecedented speedy manner, NATO states agreed on an operational plan for the “Operation Unified Protector (OUP). After three weeks of operation little progress were achieved, while rebels were inexperienced and lacked equipment. However, on 21 October 2011, one day after Gaddafi’s death, NATO decided to end the operations by the end of the month, where NATO considered it had served its scope. This is when the NTC declared Libya a free country (Mueller, 2015).

On September 2011, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2009 to establish the United Nations Support in Libya (UNSMIL) authorized for an initial period of three months, which was requested by the new transitional government in Libya. The mission was mandated to establish rule of law and security in the aftermath of the civil war for a period of three

³⁰ <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1970-%282011%29>

³¹ https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf

months, which was later extended for another three months; a period that was not sufficient to incorporate long-term cohesive plans. Subsequently, UNSMIL was extended year after another and is operating until today where the country is in turmoil (WPF, 2016).

The first public elections of the General National Congress took place in July 2012. The results were unexpected given that it was preceded by sporadic attacks against official buildings and foreign diplomatic missions. This is when the GNC replaced the NTC. It is also unexpected in the sense that the majority of the seats were the NFA³². However, this central authority proved its weaknesses through the deadly clashes between military councils in the different regions that formed de facto local governments. The security situation worsened in the midst of the bombings and attacks on the US embassy along with other representatives of the international community. Furthermore, violent crimes and political violence became the norm (Ghanmi & Hakala, 2013).

When JCP became part of the newly elected government, they favored working with the radical elements and opposed the disliked liberal forces, which pursued a zero-sum game (Trauthig, 2019a). The government strived to undermine all other parties; this was possible through the isolation law (Amirah-Fernandez, 2013).

The isolation law meant discrediting and removing political opponents including seculars who were part of the new government (Amirah-Fernandez, 2013). However, the isolation in Libya's case was difficult as it meant purging against individuals rather than parties given that the Gaddafi system excluded political parties and movements. Affiliation to Gaddafi became a contamination that was not easy to disprove, and was a sufficient reason for dismissal from the GNC. The exclusionary policies of the JCP led to an Islamic-dominated GNC (Trauthig, 2019a). As a result, on February 14, General Khalifa Haftar announced taking control of the main institutions and the dissolving of the GNC (Winer, 2019). On May 2014, the Libyan National Army under Haftar attacked the parliament (Trauthig, 2019a). This is when the GNC set the date for the new elections on June 2014. Again, the JCP found them in an unfortunate position; they were defeated and thus rejected the results. Through these elections the GNC was replaced by the House of Representatives HOR (Neale, 2018).

³² Libya's Key political parties include: the Justice and Construction Party JCP (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood), the National Forces Alliance NFA, and the Loyalty to the Martyr's Blood bloc (Kutlat al-Wifa li-Damm al-Shuhada). Although these parties do not have their own arm forces, they are affiliated to certain arm groups.

June 2014 elections were the spark of a new phase of civil war. The JCP who rejected the June elections reconvened in the form of a new GNC to replace the HOR and to be based in Tripoli; while the HOR relocated to Tobruk and aligned themselves to Haftar (Toaldo, 2017). The country was then divided into two: Tripoli and Misrata controlled by the GNC, while Tobruk controlled by the HOR. This turbulent and militarized atmosphere became more infected with the presence of ISIS that became apparent by 2015.

To curtail the civil war and reach an agreement between the rival governments, the UN envoy in Libya (whose impartiality was doubted by some scholars due to his stance with the United Arab Emirates (Eljarh, 2018)) recommended creating a new transitional government with the two rivals sharing power. The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) known as the Skhirat Agreement was signed on December 2015 between individual MPs because leaders of both parties did not agree on this compromise, which gave the LPA a fragile basis. The LPA assigned a Presidency Council (PC) that was formed from a “loose coalition of militias” (Toaldo, 2017: 119). Within this PC, the HOR would remain as the legitimate parliament; whereas the GNC will be integrated in the consultative High Council of State (Arraf, 2017). On December 2015, through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2259, it was agreed that states would “cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions claiming to be the legitimate authority, but which were outside of the Political Agreement” (SC, 2015). By January

Timeline of Events

- February 2011: Protests starts in Benghazi that leads to a full-blown revolution
- February 2011: Libyan National Transitional Council was announced
- February 2011: UN Resolution 1970
- March 2011: General Assembly suspends Libya from Human Rights Council
- September 2011: UN Resolution 2009, to start the UN Mission UNSMIL
- October 2011: Gaddafi dies
- October 2011: NATO ends its mission
- October 2011: Gaddafi is captured and killed
- July 2012: First public elections of a Libyan National Congress
- February 2014: Haftar announced taking control of the main institutions and dissolving the GNC
- June 2014: Elections, JCP fails, GNC replaced by HOR
- June 2014: Libyan government splits in two, Tripoli and Tobruk, GNC vs HOR

CIVIL WAR

ISIS PRESENCE


- December 2015: Libyan Political Agreement signed
- December 2015: Libyan Political Agreement signed (Skhirat Agreement), PC GNA formed
- January 2016: most states recognized the PC
- August 2016: HOR gave the GNA a vote of no confidence

Three Governments in One Country

ONGOING CONFLICT

2016 most states recognized the PC; however, by August 2016, the HOR “gave the GNA a vote of no confidence” (Arraf, 2017).

Figure 4445: A State with Three Governments




Source: own design

The security situation was deteriorating more than ever, with the different players on the ground, each time a government is formed it is an additional rather than a substitute government, which created a country with three governments (see figure 45 above). Suicide attacks inflicted major setbacks and protests against financial shortages and power cuts in Tripoli increased. The UN-supported government was not able to provide the basic services for the people. Meanwhile the Libyan Military Army LNA was installing its military forces (Fitzgerald & Toaldo, 2018).

Throughout 2017 and 2018, LNA became stronger where it captured Benghazi and Derna. On January 2019, LNA captured Sabha.

The transitional process from a government to another was complex and embraced turbulent and violent actions. The governments themselves were fragile and were not able to provide the basic services. Figure (46) below illustrates the state fragility from 2006 to 2019.

Figure 4546: Overall Fragility Trend in Libya (2006-present)



Source: Raw data retrieved from Fragile States Index³³

In 2010 Libya ranked 111 out of 177³⁴. Two years later, Libya set the record as “the most severe year-on worsening of a country in the history of the index” to reach the 50th place in 2012. Currently, it ranks 28th with a continuous trend of deterioration (FOP, 2019).


Different Categories... Different Interests... Segregation

Libya is historically built around a tribal system that has been strengthened by the Ottomans and the colonizing powers; a system that prevailed during the Sanusi Monarchy and during the Gadhafi whiles it is still existing and affecting the current civil war. The country is composed of different tribes that are confounded with many small tribal enclaves. This system formed the loyalties and sense of belonging amongst the people in Libya, but it also affected the economic and social status along with the services each tribe is provided.

³³ Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

³⁴ 1 refers to the most failed state

Figure 4647: Tribes in Libya according to their localities



Source: own design

The number of tribes in Libya is estimated at 140 tribes though only 30 are of particular significance (Reuters, 2011). In general, the tribes are divided in accordance to ethnic identity Arabs and Amazigh or Berber. The Arabs are descended from Bani Hilal and Bani Salim including some Arabized Berbers. The Amazigh were marginalized during the Gadhafi regime; they suffered from the “absence of legal recognition as a distinct and indigenous ethnic group, legislation (‘Law 24’) banning Amazigh or Berbers from giving their children non-Arab names, and a reluctance to provide official documentation attesting to their citizenship” (Wood, 2012, p.11). There are 140 Arab-Berber tribes in Libya, although 30-50 are believed to have a critical political and social role (Wood, 2012). Figure 47 illustrates a range of those tribes.

Toubou

Toubou are subdivided in two groups: the Teda and Daza. These are semi-nomadic Muslims (Taha, 2017). Although the group converted to Islam during the Sanussi they still maintain their unique religious culture and their own language (MRGI, 2018).

In the 1970s Libya invaded the Aouzou, and the Toubou population was forced to move there, thus most Toubou hold the Aouzou documentation. In 1996, Gadhafi passed Decree No. 13(1485) which declared that all those holding Aouzou documentation are considered foreigners. As such, this population was never integrated within the society (DFAT, 2018b).

This group was politically and culturally marginalized during and post Gadhafi regime (Wood, 2012, p.11).

The outbreaking post-revolutionary violence led to the breakdown of the “century-old peace agreement” between the Tuareg and the Toubou in 2014” (DFAT, 2018b:22). Though these clashes decreased by late 2017 after aligning with and the domination of the LNA in the south.

Tawerghans

Tawerghans are the descendants of the slaves brought to Libya in the 18th and 19th centuries; they live in a town with the same name. This is where the Gadhafi loyalists based while besieging the city of Misrata. As a result, the entire population was driven out of Tawergha (around 40,000) in 2011 by anti-Gadhafi forces as collective punishment. Since then, they were dispersed around the country, suffered arbitrary arrests and their women were raped. In 2018, the Misrata forces prevented the Tawerghans from returning to their town despite calls from humanitarian organizations (IAGCI, 2019 & DFAT, 2018b).

Tuareg

The Tuareg moved to Libya under the Gadhafi to work as soldiers, their knowledge of the desert opened work opportunities to work with merchants. Their alliance to the government during the Gadhafi was in return of the promised identification documents (Taha, 2017). Although not all Tuareg are supporters of Gadhafi, they were treated as such. They faced societal discrimination and violence, where they were held in detentions and were forced to leave their homes (IAGCI, 2019). Tuareg in general receive political and societal

discrimination; however, undocumented Tuareg receive devastating official and unofficial discrimination.

In 2014, clashes erupted between the Tuareg and the Toubou over oil, water resources, and control of the lucrative smuggling and trade of arms and drugs. These clashes resulted in massive displacement of the Tuareg population, with an initial number of 18,500 people (DFAT, 2018).

Mashashiya

The Mashashiya are originally nomadic tribes who were resettled by the Gadhafi regime. During the regime, this population from the limited resources which fueled conflict with the other tribes.

The outbreaking post-revolutionary violence resulted in a massive displacement of the Mashashiya population displacing 10,000 and burning their homes for their alleged support of the Gadhafi. Whether IDPs or returnees, the Mashashiya are still lacking safety, security, access to basic services and political and social discrimination (DFAT, 2018b).

Amazigh/Berbers

The Western Amazigh/Berber are indigenous to Libya with a unique culture, language and alphabet. The Amazigh were politically and socially marginalized during the Gadhafi regime, which inflicted their persistent engagement in the revolution. Following the revolution, violence erupted between the Amazigh and the Arabs due the lack of trust from each and the discrimination experienced from both sides (Wood, 2012).

Magarha

Magarha is the second largest Arab tribe that originates from the Fezzan. The Magarha and the Warfalla are both known for their important alliance with the Gadhafi regime (Cole & Mangan, 2016).

Warfalla

An influential tribe due to its numerical weight across Libya; it is the dominant tribe in Tripolitania (Cole & Mangan, 2016). Their alliance with Gadhafi granted them access, power, and infiltration to state and security institutions. This power and position prompted them to change and take part in the revolution, although many remained amongst the last bastions of

the regime. The tribe repositioned itself in 2012 by forming the “Social Council of Warfallah Tribes SCWT” (Ben Lamma, 2017).

Qadhadhfa

A small Arab tribe based in Sirte, these were placed in the key security and government posts during the Gadhafi regime, as he himself comes from this tribe. Although this was a marginalized prior to the regime, it took a central political position and real power during the regime (Cole & Mangan, 2016).

Al-Abaidat

Al-Abaidat is one of the most powerful tribes in the Cyrenaica region. They have a strong military position and have occupied the head of all security institutions in the region since the Ottoman era (Ben Lamma, 2017).

Al-Awaqir

Al-Awaqir was one of the aristocratic tribes during the Idris monarchy; however, they lost this power during the Gadhafi regime. The tribe had an effective role in fighting against “Ansar Al-Sharia and the Islamic State (Ben Lamma, 2017).

Insurgency


There are four distinct directions of association of the insurgents in Libya; LNA, HOR, PC and Jihadists groups. In 2014, Libya had approximately 1,600 armed groups (El Kamouni-Janssen & de Bruijne, 2017). Figure 48 below illustrates a map of some of the significant insurgent, militias and forces active in Libya. Some of these existed during Gadhafi; many were established in 2011 during the regime change, while many others were established on 2014 during what is called the second civil war in Libya.

Libyan National Army LNA (2014-present)³⁵

Although it is called a National army, it is in fact composed of various militias and tribal armed groups. It includes Chadian and Sudanese forces and tribal militias (Pack, 2019). It emerged in mid-2014, when Khalifa Haftar launched the Operation Dignity.

³⁵ Sarcastic comments on this Libyan National Army by some Libyans: “it is not Libyan, it is not National, and it is not an Army”; it is not Libyan as it includes other nationalities, it is not national as the leaders are regional representatives, and it is not an Army as it is composed of different militias.

Figure 4748: Mapping of Insurgents in Libya



Source: own design

Over time, the LNA grew in number through the support of various actors gradually imposed militarized governance. And the group presented itself as the “security sector reform project” aiming at dismantling the other militias especially the Muslim brotherhood affiliates and jihadists (Pack, 2019). “Egypt, the UAE and Russia. All these players have steadily supported the House of Representatives in Tobruk and likely provided General Haftar with weapons and air power in his efforts to drive other groups out of Benghazi and Eastern Libya” (Mezran & Varvelli, 2017).

Libya Dawn (Fajr Libya) (2014-2016)

These are the forces that supported the GNC elected in 2012, they seized Tripoli in 2014; they were formed in response to Haftar’s Operation Dignity (Toaldo, 2017). By March 2016, the coalition started to fracture along political and geographic lines (Glen, 2017). Among the groups that it encompassed are the Libyan Shield Forces who are composed of three brigades: the eastern, the central and the western. Misrata militias and the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room are also two factions in the coalition.

Shield Forces (2014-present)

The Libya Shield is composed of several militias under the same name operating in various parts of the country. The Central Libya Shield is viewed as part of the “Ministry of Defense Forces” (BBC, 2016).

Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room (2014-present)

The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room is an umbrella for Islamist militias that was created in 2013 to support the GNC. The group joined Libya Dawn coalition in 2014; while in 2017 it joined the Libyan National Guard, a new umbrella group for opposition militias (Glen, 2017).

Abu Salim Central Security Force (2014-present)

The force is also known as Kikli Militia and was part of the Dawn Coalition (Pack, 2019)

Bunyan Al-Marsous (2016-present)

Bunyan al-Marsous is a coalition of Islamist militias originating from Misrata. This militia was formed in 2016 to defend Misrata from the Islamic State fighters. The group pledged allegiance to the PC and campaigned to be recognized as the national army of Libya. The group defeated the Islamic State in Sirte. Clashes between the group and the LNA took place after defeating the IS in Sirte. The foreign policy of this group placed them at odds, especially in their relationship with Russia, and their official visits to Qatar (McGregor, 2017).

Zintan Military Council (2011-present)

The Zintan Military Council was established in 2011 from a coalition of 23 Zintan and Nafusa Mountains militias that is considered one of the most organized and powerful militias in Tripoli (TRAC, 2019).

Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade (2011-present)

The Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade was established in 2011 and is still operating as the most powerful Tripoli-based militias. The Brigade has been supportive in the establishment of the GNA (Pack, 2019).

Islamic State in Libya (2014-present)

Many fighters returned from Syria in 2014, where they organized themselves as the Islamic Youth Shura Council, and later in the same year they pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Wehrey & Alrababa'h, 2015). Currently, IS in Libya is in the process of regrouping and regaining strength with an increasing level of asymmetric threats, their incidents and terrorists attacks are spread between the eastern, western and southern regions, between March 2018 and March 2019 they have committed 71 incidents showing brutal attacks all over Libya (Trauthig, 2019b).

Ansar Al-Sharia (2012-2017)

Ansar Al-Sharia was formed in 2012 in Benghazi and expanded to reach Derna, Sirte and Ajdabya. Ansar al-Sharia aimed at the imposition of the sharia law. In 2014, the UN listed Ansar al-Sharia on the sanctioned list alongside of Al-Qaeda that had a presence in Libya. The group

had its training camps for foreigner fighters. In order to face Khalifa Haftar they formed the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council; a coalition with other militias (Glen, 2017). In May 2017, the group announced its dissolution following the heavy losses that have “wiped out its leadership and decimated its fighters” (Reuters, 2017).

International Intervention from R2P to Counterinsurgency

Responsibility to Protect

The intervention in Libya started through the United Nations Security Council resolution to impose a no-fly zone and the protection of the civilians. In the process of voting a number of permanent and non-permanent members abstained from the vote (China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany); which proved reservations and tensions within the international community even before the implementation. However, the resolution was adopted on the basis that all members condemned the Libyan government’s repressive measures.

The Arms Embargo commenced on 23 March 2011, the no-fly zone commenced on 25 March 2011, the protection of civilians commenced on 31 March 2011, and the mission ended on 31 October 2011. Approximately 8,000 troops participated in the Operation Unified Protector OUP, over 260 air assets, 21 naval assets and 26,500 sorties were used. It covered over 5,900 military targets including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 600 tanks or armored vehicles (NATO, 2011). The main contributors to the NATO mission were the US, UK, and France.

Many scholars discussed the illegality regarding the international intervention in Libya. Assessing the legality means assessing the principles of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects and proper authority (ICISS, 2001). The last resort criteria has not been met given the favor of military over the different political and diplomatic options available to engage with Gadhafi (Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2017; Rijke, 2014; Pommier, 2011). Also, the “just cause” criteria was absent given that there is no clear evidence to suggest that the Libyan regime was on the verge of committing mass atrocities against civilians” (Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2017, p.242). The proportionality is another failed criterion, this is apparent through the extensive military support of the opposition. Having destroyed airports, telecommunication installations, government troops, Gadhafi’s compound and his home town though no fighting was taking place in that region is a flagrant breach of proportionality (Corten & Koutroulis, 2013). The act was

also criticized as it stipulated for the protection of the Libyan people but it did not specify the timeframe, the exact result of the mission, or the exit strategy (Forte, 2013).

The Security Council resolution 1973 mirrors the protection by demanding member states “to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians” (UNSC, 2011). In fact, the term “all necessary measures” was referred to both: enforcing No-fly zone and protection of civilians. However, the term “all necessary conditions” allowed the coalition to use all means of military equipment, excluding boots on the ground that was clearly expressed through the “foreign occupation force.”

“Nothing has been respected. No real negotiations towards a ceasefire have taken place. The exclusive control of the air was used to support the insurgents. Protection of civilians was the pretext to justify any operation.... It was no longer a question of protection, but of regime change.... The principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ died in Libya, just as ‘humanitarian intervention’ died in Somalia in 1992.” (Pommier, 2011, p.1079).

Not only scholars criticized the legality of the intervention, but also the execution of the intervention and the amount of force used against civilians and non-combatants. This is evident through the negative effects mirrored by the high number of casualties. The intervention went beyond the mandate to “protect civilian”, it was an entry point for foreign interventions (Forte, 2013: 242). According to Paris (2014) NATO’s operation was gauged for regime change rather than protecting the civilian population. Also, NATO “sided with the anti-Gadhafi rebel forces by providing them air coverage and supplying them with arms and ammunitions, primarily by France” (Nurruzzman, 2015).

“There was no effort to institute a No-fly zone. The triumvirate at once interpreted the resolution as authorizing direct participation on the side of the rebels. A ceasefire was imposed by force on Qaddafi’s forces, but not on the rebels. On the contrary, they were given military support as they advanced to

the West, soon securing the major sources of Libya's oil production, and poised to move on" (Chomsky, 2011).³⁶

Other critics of the NATO mission were related to destroying objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. This is clear in the NATO bombing of the Great Man-Made River; severely affecting the civilian access to water (HRI, 2011).

The discussion above reflects that the intervention in Libya was focused on the regime change rather than the humanitarian conditions in Libya. Measuring the success of the intervention means measuring the impact of the act on human security. The intervention not only deteriorated the human security but also led to a civil war, to insurgency, and to the growth of the Islamic State. "Implementation of R2P must be reformed to address these unintended negative consequences and the dynamics underlying them. Only then will R2P be able to achieve its noble objectives" (Kuoerman, 2013).

In 2014, with no boots on the ground, Internationals were evacuated to Tunisia. The EU Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) was relocated to Tunisia and the UNSMIL was relocated as such.

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration DDR

Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration were considered since the rise of the conflict, even though the UN resolution that considered the arms embargo; however, little was achieved in this regard. The first initiative that considered the DDR was the Warriors Affairs Commission WAC, which was established in October 2011 as part of the transitional government. The WAC was mandated to "register, rehabilitate and reintegrate those who fought in the front lines, defended cities and political prisoners into formal state institutions, private-sector enterprise or education" (LPRD, 2015: 4). Currently this programme is known as the Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development LPRD. However, according to Allen et.al. (2019), the current security conditions in Libya do not make a comprehensive DDR realistic.

³⁶ Saranti, Vasiliki (). Pro-Democratic Intervention, Invitation, or Responsibility to Protect? Challenges to International Law from the Arab Spring. (In) Panara Carlo & Wilson Gary (eds) The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden. (p.200)

Counterterrorism

Following the R2P and the DDR initiatives another phase of intervention started that was a clear breach of the arms embargo. This was justified by counterinsurgency and war on the Islamic State. However, this phase is characterized by different foreign forces engaged some on the side of the UN recognized government and others on the other part of the conflict.


After the toppling of Gadhafi, and following the end of the Unified Protector mission, low level counterterrorism efforts started through training or intelligence sharing (Anaizi, Dotolo & Lakehal-Ayat, 2015). These initiatives included the European Border Mission Libya (EUBAM) that was established on May 2013 under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to “support the capacity of Libyan authorities to enhance the security of their land, sea and air borders in the short term and to develop a broader Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy in the long term” (EU, 2019). Americans provided intelligence support and trained Libyan Special Forces (Anaizi, Dotolo & Lakehal-Ayat, 2015).

Counterinsurgency

Following the formation of the GNA, on May 2015, Sirte fell to the Islamic State. On August 2016 the Pentagon announced Operation Odyssey Lightning that will join the GNA in its war against the IS. Supporting operations against the Islamic State include Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, and Bahrain. This operation was reinstated on January 2018 at the request of the Libyan government to strike Islamic State camps outside Sirte.

Violence escalated since the conflict started. Counterinsurgency has not decreased this conflict; on the contrary, the level of violence has increased. During the conflict support was provided for the different parties either internally or externally and either physically or financially. Different lines of communications were initiated either as rivals or supporters. Figure (49) illustrates the network of relationship between the different players on the ground. The various players on the ground strive to accomplish their objectives; the officially announced and the hidden agendas; these contradict in many cases the objectives of the other parties. Therefore, the numerous numbers of players created a chaos and a loss of human security.

Figure 4849: Network of Insurgents and Counterinsurgents



Source: own design

At the outset of the conflict the decision to intervene in Libya came with many odds. Initially, the two countries that pushed towards the intervention were France and the United Kingdom. The US was first split on the issue, but then the decision was made to support the intervention, which then had the leading role. The role of the US started with a firm decision and decisive intervention against Haftar. However, the complexing role was evident when Trump praised Haftar for combating terrorism and safeguarding Libya's oil, which gave a "de facto US support for Haftar's Advance on Tripoli" (Megerisi, 2019). "He [Haftar] can count on a wide array of international patrons, which includes Egypt and the UAE and, more recently, Russia, though Putin's support for the Libyan "Field Marshall" (Toaldo, 2017).


The support of the Arab nations "undercut political criticism of the intervention as neo-colonialism" (Boeke & van Zijldewijn, 2016: 26). The support of the Arab nations was through agreement among the Arab League who supported the attack on Libya in 2011.

Turkey and Qatar played a significant role in supporting the rebels since the rise of the conflict. Turkey allowed establishing Turkish-based Libyan networks and took actions to oppose Haftar's advance. Qatar on the other hand shifted to the financial support (Megerisi, 2019).

In 2011 the UK deployed its first *International Stabilization Response Team* ISRT. The ISRT focused on five thematic areas: political settlement, security and justice, basic and social services, economy and infrastructure. A sixth thematic area was the communication and engagement, which was identified in the interim findings and was a critical enabler of the other five (ISRT, 2011).

In general, the two opponents formed alliances and militias. On one side there is the Arab nationalists and federalists led by General Khalifa Hafter and supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. On the other side there is a loose coalition of Islamists supported by the Amazigh tribes with support from Qatar Turkey and Sudan. Figure (50) below illustrates strikes in Libya by year and belligerent showing the different players in action.

Figure 4950: Strikes in Libya by year and Belligerent




Source: New America (2019) ³⁷

³⁷ <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/airstrikes-and-civilian-casualties-libya/the-conflicts-in-libya-2011-2018/> Accessed January 15, 2020.

Viscous Cycle

Tribalism has been the basis on which the Libyan structure was formed. This has been maintained throughout the history of Libya and currently this is the basis on which the conflict is structured. However, the percentage of those engaged in the conflicting is growing by time. Figure (51) below illustrates the difference in the structure pre-Gadhafi, between 2012 and 2014, and post 2014.

Figure 5054: Community Structure in Libya between insurgency and counterinsurgency



Source: own design

The support of the different parties has also led to the centrifugal force.

“The competition between forces backed by Qatar and Turkey on the one hand, and by Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (and later, Russia) on the other hand, played a substantial role in the ultimate splitting of the country into two governments in June 2014, neither of which controlled much territory outside their respective capitals of Tripoli in the west and Tobruk in the east. The decision by ISIS to enter Libya soon thereafter and to supplement the largely domestic al-

Qaeda entities and their affiliates with foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq focused the attention of these regional actors.” (Winer, 2019, p. 10)

The centrifugal force affecting the individuals and groups in Libya could be calculated according to the centrifugal force formula:

$$F_c = \frac{(s \times w)v^2}{r} \quad (1)$$

where

F_c = centrifugal force (it is the force that people feel disturbs all stability and their human security)

v = violence level during the conflict; originally this is the velocity. Since the spark of the conflict level of violence used increased.

s = support provided to the poles (internal and external), not only did the support increase but also it was complex to the extent that it was contradictory; where formally announced support was different from the real agendas. The support came from governments and individuals.

w = the willingness to control the government, the analysis of the insurgents showed individual and group interests to control the government.

r = is the ratio of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; the number of those engaged in the conflict increased by time not only between the insurgents and the government but also amongst the insurgent groups who were fighting for tribal survival and insurgents survival.

With an increasing violence level (v), support provided by the poles (s), willingness to control the government (w), and number of those engaged in the conflict to the total population; the centrifugal force (F_c) increased to an alarming level.

Impact of the Viscous Cycle

According to the vicious cycle model, an unrestrained particle would leave its orbit under the impact of the centrifugal force; the situation also leads to a deteriorated human security. This section illustrates how this impact is evident and clear in the Libyan case.


The influx of refugees started since the toppling of Gadhafi; this influx went through two different phases; the first phase was the regime change and the second one was after the second elections in 2014. This escalating influx is increasing drastically, where the level of conflict is increasing. Although the number of refugees in 2018 amounted to 13,874 (see figure 52 below), this does not reflect the real numbers as the Libyan refugees in the neighboring countries are not registered as refugees. According to the Libyan Ministry of Displaced People's Affairs of the Presidential Council the number of Libyan refugees in Egypt is around 500,000 while there are around 300,000 in Tunisia³⁸. According to the UNHCR, the number of Libyans internally displaced as of 29 November 2019 amount to 301,407 while the returned IDPs amount 447,025. On the other hand, Libya hosts 46,126 registered and asylum seekers.

According to the UNHCR, in 2016, 887 Libyans crossed the Mediterranean and arrived in Italy. In 2017, despite the 34 per cent decrease in those crossing the Mediterranean 1,234 arrived in Italy (UNOCHA, 2019).

The vicious cycle model also illustrates that the centrifugal force leads to more fragmentation of the society this has been apparent in the number of groups that were created following the end of the regime. This in turn creates different centers of mass and thus different centers of gravity, which creates a massive deterioration of human security resulting from competing positions of each. the following is a quick summary of the three human insecurity dimensions (community, political, and personal insecurity), with some insight around the other four dimensions (economic, food, health, and environment):

³⁸ Interview with IOM Official

Figure 51.52: Refugee population 2001-2018



Source: Raw data retrieved from World Bank statistics <https://data.worldbank.org>


Community Security

Libya hosts a wide range of conflicts that results from different ethnic, historical, land disputes, grievances, attempts to gain political power, and crimes. In many cases the conflicts originate from more than one conflicting factor. The lack of trust amongst the people and between the different regions and the different militias has made the situation worst. This makes the conflict complex and not supportive of any intervention. “It is not possible to identify who is who in Libya, you find policemen working with different militias, it is not possible to identify their affiliation and direction, which makes counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism very complex. Communities in large are facing threats, women and children are targeted. You are a target because you are a woman or a child, you are a target because you come from a certain tribe, you are target because of an ideology or religious affiliation, the situation is complete chaos with lack of communal security” X-military attaché in Libya³⁹.

³⁹ For confidentiality reasons, the military attaché refused his name to be revealed.

The absence of state structures and uncontrolled land created an ideal opportunity for the expansion of terrorism. It paved the way for the expansion of the Islamic state. Terrorism risks were raised significantly in 2019, were Libya ranked number three amongst the world's riskiest states for terrorism (Marsh, 2019). According to the Global Terrorism Index Libya changed from a rank of 93 in 2012 to a rank of 12 in the impact of terrorism; in 2015 it was amongst the worst 10 countries (see Figure 53 below).

Figure 5253: Global Terrorism Index in Libya (2012-2019)




Source: Raw data retrieved from GTI Reports (2012 to 2019)

The diverging political orientations along with the hostile tribal relations have intensified the violence within the different communities. Communities faced threats of killings, looting, property destruction and forced displacement while the UN failed to protect civilians and to challenge the ongoing abuses. Crimes against humanity and mass atrocities are increasing with impunity.

“Statistics are missing in Libya, International Organizations are conducting their studies, but results are not revealed. There is no source of accurate data that NGOs can rely their work on.”⁴⁰ This absence of data is apparent in the statistics of casualty figures that researchers rely on from different sources of data (see figure 54 below).

⁴⁰ Interview with Hala (Woman activist in Libya) 12, November 2019.

Figure 5354: Published Casualty Figures in Libya by actors 2011-2017



Source: Salama, 2018

Although freedom of religion is not a recurrent factor in Libya it came to the fore since 2011. Witnesses of attacks on religious minorities including Sufism Ibadis and Christians along with destroying religious sites. Since 2011, armed groups destroyed dozens of religious sites including mosques, shrines, tombs and libraries; they have also killed Sufi sheikhs table (6) below illustrates some of the documented incidents against Sufi sites.

These incidents might be incidental; however, there are some that form a norm. In 2017 religious edict (Fatwa) was issued by the Supreme Fatwa Committee under the General Authority for Endowments and Islamic Affairs, which stipulated that the 'Ibadis' a minority sect of Islam is "misguided and aberrant group"

Table 6: **Incidents against Sufi Sites in Libya**

Date	Site	Location
August 2012	Sidi Sha'ab Mosque	Tripoli
August 2012	Uthman Basha Mosque along with 30 graves	Tripoli
July 2017	Four Sufi sites	Benghazi
October 2017	Sidi Abu Gharara Sufi Mosque	Tripoli
November 2017	Zawiyat Sheikha Radiya Sufi Mosque	Tripoli

Political Security

Libya has three entities working as governments, a status that created competing institutions and undermining the ability of the central government. This has resulted in the growth of the local governance. On the other hand, it fueled more conflict and insecurity.

Courts operate at reduced capacity and are closed down in some parts of the country. This has led to abusive arbitrary detentions. In cases where those courts are operating are fatigue with process violations “including forced confessions, ill treatment and lack of access to lawyers” (Salah, 2019). Additionally, “the UN Human Rights Council shut down its commission of Inquiry on Libya in 2012 leaving inadequate public reporting on crimes committed by all sides in Libya” (Salah, 2019).

Prison authorities are being operated under the authority of one or another of the rivals, they are also run by politically aligned armed groups that are outside the state’s structure. Prisoners are guarded against attacks by armed groups. Prisons hold thousands of prisoners in long-term arbitrary detentions without charge. Inmates live in overcrowded facilities that are not originally designed as prisons. Death penalties are stipulated in 30 articles in the penal code “including for acts of speech and violation” (HRW, 2018).

“No one perceive the Tripoli - based government as credible. It is very dangerous to go out, to discuss anything. Religious discourse became

politicized. The problem is not about tribes, it is about our personal security versus them trying to control resources.” (Khawla, 2020)⁴¹

Libya is considered an entry point to Europe, and refugees from the African continent are stuck in Libya on their journey. Many holding camps are run by smugglers. These are overcrowded camps with lack of security and safety. People there are subject to sexual exploitation, sold as slaves and are suffering and dying from various diseases. Tens of thousands of refugees and migrants have been locked in Libyan detention centers after they were caught crossing the Libyan coast by the Libyan coast guards who receive massive support from the European Union. They are taken to underground rooms and tortured. Estimates range from 400,000 to one million detainees in overcrowded detention centers (DFAT, 2018b). “Inside Libya’s detention centers, thousands of refugees and migrants are deprived of food, sunlight, and water, and many become victims of sexual exploitation and assault, forced labor, and even torture or slaying” (Hayden, 2019)

The dual and sometimes triple existences of parallel institutions have institutionalized the segmentation. It created multiple economic and social systems. The mechanism in which the LNA funds itself has affected the security community in Libya. It was able to develop parallel banking sector; a mechanism that waged economic war on the east’s banking system. With this the LNA had access to state funds and is involved in smuggling activities (Global Initiative, 2019).


“The impression of a now well-rooted political economy of predation is palpable, as if the country is fueling its own crisis with its own resources to the benefit of the few and the frustration of the many” (Salame, 2017).

The World Bank measures what it calls the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), where it reports on six broad dimensions of governance over the period 1996-2018: (I) Voice and Accountability; (II) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (III) Government Effectiveness;

⁴¹ Khawla Ahmed. (2020). Interview with a Libyan woman activist on January 27, 2020

(IV) Regulatory Quality; (V) Rule of Law; and (VI) Control of Corruption. These indicators help give an overview of the political security within the countries. In Libya it provides data of the rule of law index⁴² from 1996 to 2017. The average index throughout the period was -1.18, with a minimum of -1.82 in 2016 and a maximum of -0.82 in 2008. Figure (55) above illustrates the Rule of Law index across the period 1996-2017.

Figure 5455: Rule of Law Index in Libya




Source: The World Bank, 2018⁴³

Figure (56) illustrates the different governance dimensions. It depicts that political stability and absence of violence was positive and reached its best conditions in the year 2008. Control of corruption, rule of law and regulatory quality; although negative, were in its best conditions in 2008. Voice and accountability did enhance in 2011; but declined since then.

⁴² Rule of law index according to the World Bank ranges from -2.5 weakest to 2.5 strongest. The World Justice Project reports do not provide data for Libya.
⁴³ https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Libya/wb_ruleoflaw/

Figure 556: Governance Indicators in Libya 1996-2018



Source: Raw data retrieved from World Bank WGI⁴⁴

Personal Security

The alarming factor in Libya is that criminal actors include both the militias and state-embedded actors. A reason for which people lost hope and trust in the government and all security forces imbedded within. “There is no one whom you can trust even police officers are not trustworthy”⁴⁵

Organized crimes have become the norm; it includes drug trafficking, human smuggling, human trafficking and illicit oil smuggling. This has caused Libya to be one of the highest criminality scores in Africa. It ranked 7th overall in Africa and the first in North Africa. Table (7) below illustrates the score and rank of the most common crimes.

⁴⁴ https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_Name=WGI-Table&Id=ceca4d8b#

⁴⁵ Interview with Ahmed a youth activists 13 November 2019.

Table 7: **Crime Index in Libya**

Crime	Score	Rank (worst)
Total criminality Score	6.27	7 th
Human trafficking	9.5	1 st
Human smuggling	8.0	1 st (same rank as Sudan & Eritrea)
Arms trafficking	8.5	4 th
Cannabis trade	8.0	3 rd (same rank as Tanzania and Nigeria)
Synthetic Drugs Trade	7.5	2 nd worst

(Source: Raw data retrieved from (ENACT, 2019)

Although media seems to be open in Libya, people cannot express themselves openly and freely. There are more than 20 TV channels, along with radio stations, website and extensive use of social media. However, it is very dangerous to freely express oneself. Several incidents of attacks on activists, journalists and media professionals have taken place. In many cases those people go missing with no possibility to be traced, other get killed or imprisoned (HRW, 2019).

Women in Libya are subject to sexual exploitation and discriminatory restriction. Women also face discriminatory policies as in the order issued in 2017 requiring adult women to have a male guardian with them when they travel (HRW, 2017). “Migrant women and girls are particularly vulnerable to rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence. Many are exposed to forced prostitution and sexual exploitation in conditions amounting to sexual slavery” (UN, 2019). Women face sexual violence while trafficking, under detention, and in front of their children. These cases are underreported for fear of stigmatization and rejection” (UN, 2019). Libya does not have a formal United Nations Security Council Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (Security Council Resolution 1612) nor a Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangement (MARA) on conflict-related sexual violence (Security Council Resolution 1960) (UNICEF, 2019).

“Civil society Organizations in Libya is very new, it was banned during Kadhafi, however, the security challenges faced limits the opportunities in which these organizations can serve.

Women rights was a taboo, now it is possible to discuss these issues; however, the problem is the high level of violence.

We are all insecure, I don't feel secure because I a woman, I don't feel secured because I am not from a certain tribe, I don't feel secure to speak about my rights. I don't feel secure because I cannot get proper health services, I do not feel secure because I cannot send my children to school.” (Hala, 2019)⁴⁶

LGBTI rights are out of question in Libya. According to DFAT (2018b), at least three people were executed for alleged sodomy. LGBTI individuals receive high level of official discrimination and violence by police and militias.

Children's recruitment in armed groups especially with IS in training camps are well documented. These are subject to sexual violence and have also committed suicide attacks (DFAT, 2018b).

Healthcare workers have also been subject to arbitrary detentions. In many cases they are released only after paying a ransom. An act that is faced by political activists, lawyers and human rights activists.

Economic Security

Despite the fact that Libya owns the tenth largest oil reserves in the world, one third of the population lives in poverty. This is due to the war and corruption. The gap between the official exchange rate and the black-market rate of the dinar to the US dollar led to “draining the country's reserves of hard currency and depreciating the value of the Libyan dinar, leading to an unprecedented liquidity crisis and a significant rise in commodity prices” (Global Initiative, 2019) and led to a rising inflation (Dirsus & Eaton, 2019). This increased poverty rate and unemployment which amounts to 17.3% in 2018 (trading economics, 2019).

⁴⁶ Interview with Hala a human rights activist 28 December 2019.

LNA armed forces were able to control private and public facilities by force, demanding a share of economic assets. They have also used blackmail to get cash from public servants and bank employees. Furthermore, LNA was able to gain access to the country's cash reserves and control of illegal export businesses including oil export.

Food Security

Limited cash disposal and high prices affected food access. According to World Food Programme, “12 percent of the households in Libya are food insecure, leaving the majority of 70 percent vulnerable to food insecurity and 18 percent food secure” (WFP, 2018).

Health Security

Healthcare services remain a challenge, with many people lacking access to health services.

“2019 is characterized by the challenging conditions of the Libyan health system: lack of lifesaving medicines, insufficient experience and distribution of doctors in the remote areas, shortages of qualified nurses in rural areas, insufficient capacities to use the medical equipment where it does exist. The medical system is underperforming, especially at a primary health care level” (WHO, 2019).

Over and above, the conflict in Libya is driving a mental health crisis. A critical issue that needs to support.

Environment Security

Limited water resources have been a stressing problem in Libya; which has been sorted by the Great Man Made River Project. However, the bombing the river along with the destruction of the water infrastructure has further limited access to drinking water (CE OBS, 2018).

Pollution problems have also been prevalent from oil and petrochemical industries, and oil storage facilities. However, this problem has further deteriorated during the conflict due to rivals targeting of those facilities (CEOBS, 2018).

“All aspects of our life are affected, even the air we breathe. Destroying oil pipelines not only affect prices but also leads to more pollution. The people are frustrated from the endless cuts in water and electricity” Abd Al-Lateef, 2019⁴⁷

When asked about their perceptions of human security in Libya a convenient sample provided the following fears that were categorized according to the three essential freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

Table 8: **Libyan Perceptions of Human Security**

Freedom	Fears identified by respondents
Freedom from fear	Fear of being kidnapped, killed or raped when walking in the neighborhood
	No hope of future
	Destructions and demolitions
	Lack of government capacity/ Bad governance
	High potential to be a victim of violence anytime in the coming future
	Youth feel terror, helplessness and fear
	Gender based violence and sexual abuse
	Children traumatic stress
	No party provides security even the security forces
Freedom from want	Hunger and poverty
	No basic income ensured with high increase in prices
	Lack of government safety net
	Unemployment

⁴⁷ Interview with Abd Al-Lateef, December 20, 2019

	Bad economy No basic services provided, health and educational services are deteriorating
Freedom to live in dignity	Human rights degradation Discrimination against women Inhuman way of living No hope for a better future

Conclusion

The conflict in Libya is a form of multiple interconnected conflicts with many theaters. The governance system has become militarized and the policies created are exclusionary. Although tribal association has been critical in the Libyan conflict; it has been noted by scholars and practitioners that these are not static, and people seek the affiliation to the tribalism during conflict and when seeking security and better services.

In fact, the intervention along with the increase in the number of international players has caused an irreparable and irreversible situation that created the vicious cycle. This cycle increased the number of IDPs and refugees, and has also led to human insecurity.

The situation in Libya is a complete chaos. It has reached to the situation discussed by Hobbes “the state of nature” without a political state living in tribal communities.

Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter presents the conclusions that were achieved based on the literature review along with the analysis of the three cases based on the vicious cycle model presented. It also presents recommendations for counterinsurgency strategies along with recommendations for future research.

Conclusions

The aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of the consequences of counterinsurgency following regime change by the international community. This has been addressed through the analysis of the three case studies that underwent similar phases in the conflict: civil war, regime change through international intervention, immense level of insurgency, third-party counterinsurgency, followed and accompanied by complete chaos with a state of nature (a condition without government according to hobbes).

This thesis demonstrates that counterinsurgency following change of regime is heavily and negatively impacting the entrenchment of political stability, thus creating economic and social challenges along with extensive militarization of the polity, demographic implications, and deterioration of all dimensions of human security.

Throughout the analysis of the three cases it has been evident that the insurgency was a status of social contract failure. However, the international intervention formed the base for a weak national unity and shared identity. The intervention has caused an irreparable and irreversible state of affairs thus jeopardizing national reconciliation.

Despite the differences between the three cases, they passed through the same three phases: ***regime change, insurgency and counterinsurgency***; and they ended up with similar results and state of nature. The resultant included an ***escalation of immigration*** level due to the lack of any support to the people on the ground and their lack of aspiration and hope in the system. This was evident with the increasing number of migration by time. The resultant was also an unprecedented ***creation of different parties, factions, opposition and isolated communities***, the new floccules have minimal connections towards the state; however, its main connection and loyalty is directed towards the faction or the group rather than towards the state. This

fragmentation led to different centers of mass, thus creating different centers of gravity for the different segments of the society. The resultant is a ***massive deterioration in human security***; a life full of fear, with no needs fulfilled and a life of indignity. This fragmentation and diverse centers of mass also lead to ***form a new community that is not anymore similar to the original structure***. The one community is now multiple new communities; communities that cannot live together, and communities that are now of different aspiration, different cultures and different level wellbeing. This is when those communities believe the only way forward is claiming independence from the state, or maintaining the state of war. The resultant of the vicious cycle was ***complete chaos*** approaching the status that Hobbes called the “State of Nature.” It is a failure of the social contract and a “war of all against all.” The vicious cycle increased by increasing the support provided to the poles, ***increase in people willingness to control the government, the violence level used and the percentage of the population engaged in the conflict***. Hence, followed the formula suggested through the metaphor.

Sequence of Events in the Three Cases

How insurgency starts

Although the inception period of the insurgency life span is not necessarily detected due to its operation under confidential entrenchments; however, they usually commence by establishing grievance and group identity, forming leadership, and starting to recruit and stockpile armaments. It starts out of grievance in areas with no governmental access or areas served by the government; a complexed situation where lack of services is blended with an economic crisis. This strengthens the division of the local communities and creates more grievances; a fact that is utilized by the insurgents to recruit members. Simply creating a basis for fortified insurgency seeking to mobilize the population; thus, forming a group identity centered by ethnicity, religion or political affiliation.

The heterogeneous societies in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, created heterogeneous political structure and fragmented societies. This structuring and restructuring following regime change opened a Pandora’s Box of internal conflict and fragmentation; this is evident in the resultant deep fragmentation. The sociocultural conditions led to the warlords gaining power and the rest denied all services leading to populace support of insurgency. The connection to tribes, clans and communities were deeply strengthened following the spark of the conflict and during those

situations of insufficient and inappropriate services provided and lack of security. This drove the change from the national interest to the regional interest.

Regime change

The cases under study have all went through the regime change; a factor that was supported and implemented by external parties. In general, people in the three countries perceive that the governments are not credible and illegitimate enforced by the external parties. According to the saying “if you break it you own it” meaning if you bring down a government you will become the government. Although not directly, but it could be indirectly by affecting and guiding the new government. This limited and is still limiting the possibility of a successful counterinsurgency. According to the US doctrine “Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government” (US Army, 2014, p.199); however, this was not the case in the spark of the counterinsurgency. This illegitimacy empowered the insurgency, and helped increase populace support of insurgents. It is evident that escalation of insurgency followed the regime change in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq.

The new regime itself generally is fragile. It lacks the capacity of power sharing and lack of accommodation of the different factions. The state was constructed on the basis of tribalism with a centralized system; thus, exclusion was evident more than the previous regime.

The change of regime in the three cases has encountered change of person or party with no involvement of institutional building. It does not involve formal and informal institutional change; it encourages maintaining or reconfiguring the political elite, to institutionalize the community fragmentation. The de facto is that the regime change creates a paradoxical system that oscillates between a new government that strives to ensure its survival to satisfy citizens’ aspirations or to satisfy the intervener’s agenda which undermines the credibility of the new regime.

In fact, interventions and regime changes were not analyzed as per the results or the costs. The result was a real vicious cycle. And the cost encompassed military fatalities along both the local and international armies and civilians.

Escalating Levels of Insurgency

Counterinsurgency levels increased following the regime change with the population being physically connected and protected by the insurgents. This was possible when insurgents became the safe haven offering economic benefits, security from violence and basic services undelivered by the new regime.

In the three cases, the international intervention was the response to insurgency striving to support the new regime. However, in no time, this was the reason for the escalating level of insurgency as it was the international intervention itself that illegitimated the new regime and escalated levels of insurgency while increasing populace support of these insurgencies; at least passively supportive population.

How and why did Counterinsurgency fail?

Insurgency in the three countries is still ongoing; meaning counterinsurgency hasn't been effective. In fact, counterinsurgency failed. Common factors were analyzed in the three cases that explain counterinsurgency failure on a policy or procedural levels.

In the three cases counterinsurgency had no clear political aims; it was completely in contrast with the Galula's principle to establish a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable. The focus was mainly on defeating insurgents rather than defeating political subversion. The intervention was not based on winning the population; it supported the disempowerment of the local population. Furthermore, counterinsurgency in the three cases used a platform that was inappropriate for the realization of human security principles. On the contrary, it led to the deterioration of all human security dimensions. It aspired a near-term stability that limited possibilities of sustainable stability but also did not resolve the issues over grievance, greed, power-sharing, and separatism.

Empowerment of both insurgents and the government was a main factor behind the failure of counterinsurgency. Allowing external interventions to support the two poles increased the level of conflict. Support was provided to both sides of the conflict (flow of funds, fighters and supplies) that not only strengthened the insurgency but even led to establishing shadow governments. In Iraq there was the demand of the independence of the Kurdish Iraq, in Afghanistan it was Taliban that was capable of providing services for the people, and in Libya it was two competing governments working alongside the UN supported third government. All

insurgents or shadow governments were able to provide services to their people while the government was unable or unwilling to provide the services. Insurgents in the three cases started providing social and administrative services including health care, and even court system. This decreased the percentage of neutral population and increased the level of conflict and the number of those engaged in the conflict. As a result, number of insurgent attacks, losses and fatalities increased drastically over time with no trend of decrease.

Human Security is the Response and the Answer

The resultant of counterinsurgency after regime change has been analyzed from a human security perspective. In fact, neither human security was the response or the answer; though the de facto should have been a human security response and an answer. The resultant in the three countries was a status of human insecurity; people living in fear, want and indignity.

Political Security

Following the intervention, the three countries are barely more democratic or in better conditions than before the regime change. It created weak fragile systems with minimal services addressing the new political elite. Indirectly, the intervention empowered insurgencies who claim to fight corruption and provide basic services. In general, systems created are characterized by political repression, human rights violations, lack of rule of law, justice, and political exclusion. A system that is indulged in corruption mistrusted by the people.

Community Security

The three countries reached a point of magnified division and marginalization. They witnessed a collapse and breakdown of the communities according to tribes, ethnicities and religions that reassured diverse identities and tribal or religious identities. This created interethnic tensions, magnified levels of crime, terrorism, escalated the level of conflict, multiplied corruption levels and increased level of fragmentation.

In general, threats were faced on the group level (ethnicity, religion or tribe) and on a personal level. Communities and their members were exposed to threats; threats to individual cultures and contexts, threats to group cultures and contexts, and threats to civil society cultures and contexts.

Personal Security

Physical violence became the norm in the three countries. People are exposed to violence by different parties including insurgencies, the governments and the shadow governments. Organized crimes multiplied including drug trafficking, human smuggling, human trafficking and arms smuggling. Leaving people with no hope leads to leaving the country.

Economic Security

The three countries experienced flourishing of illicit economy on the expenses of the economic development. They all suffer ill-economic development, increase in poverty level and high level of unemployment. The countries became largely dependent on financial, material and technical assistance.

In general, the resultant of the intervention is a complete chaos; even in cases of stability it is only temporary stability. In Iraq, although stabilization was sensed amongst the people, this was a temporary condition and conflict started again.

Vicious Cycle Model Conclusion

The metaphor suggests that the people behave like particles within a solvent. Some people are fully dissolved and conceive themselves as part of the system while others are not dispersed. Although the dispersed people are part of the solution they are only separated when subject to external forces. Everyone in the system is subject to three forces: (1) Gravitational force to the state (perception of human security, support received and the state strength); (2) up thrust or uplift force (ambition and aspiration); and (3) the governments precaution measures to preserve the system (imposed whenever there is a difference between the individual's disposition and that of the government). There should be a balance between perception of human security and the ambitions and aspirations. Also, the government aspires to balance any movement within the system through its policies and precautions.

The vicious cycle starts upon the start of counterinsurgency following regime change. The force affecting is dependent on the following factors:

1. ***Support provided to the poles:*** by increasing the support provided to the poles whether internal or external, the centrifugal force increases. By time, the support provided to the governments and the insurgents was increasing, whether by individuals, institutions, or countries. This support was increasing in all three cases.
2. ***The willingness to control the government:*** the new regime was striving to sustain their government. This is evident in the Iraqi system, in Afghanistan and especially in Libya; where governments remained effective even after failing the elections. Insurgents on the other hand were striving to overthrow the control and gain control of the government.
3. ***Violence level during the conflict:*** violence levels have been increasing and the extensive use of armaments and attacks have been evident in the three cases. It was attacks on people and destroying objects that are indispensable for the survival of the people.
4. ***Number of those engaged in the conflict:*** with an increase in the level of those engaged in the conflict the centrifugal force increases. The percentage of neutral population declined by time, in many cases supporting the insurgents or the shadow governments; which has further weakened the government and increased the centrifugal force causing destabilization.

Since these are the four factors that drive the centrifugal force, this vicious cycle could be adjusted by conforming those factors. The support provided to the insurgents and the counterinsurgent should be controlled, inclusive political system should be utilized, the use of violence should be controlled, and the number of those engaged in the conflict should be analyzed and addressed.

This centrifugal force affected the system to behave as an ultracentrifuge; causing the different elements to be separated from the system. Others remain within the system as they find alternative existential measures. Their alternatives might be participation in the conflict, or use of economic opportunities that might arise, or simply starting a new group of insurgents or a new political faction. The resultant of the centrifugal force includes increase in migration and internally displaced people; increase in connection towards the tribes, ethnicities or religions as opposed to the connection towards the state, different centers of mass are created leading to a

massive deterioration in human security amongst the different people, which has been evident in the analysis of the human security dimensions in the three countries; and the countries changed to multiple communities that are not in any way similar to the pre-intervention community. It is an irreversible situation leading to a collapse in the social contract.

Verification of Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare deteriorates human security dimensions.

An analysis of the current human security dimensions in the three countries as compared to the previous status prior to the regime change and the counterinsurgency, shows that there is a deterioration of community security with less social cohesion and more conflict. It deteriorated the personal security as well, which was evident by people perceptions of lack of safety and security. It has also deteriorated political security with the lack of rule of law and increase in the level of corruption. Moreover, it deteriorated the other dimensions of human security including economic, food, health, and economic security.

Hypothesis 1.1: A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to increase in the level of conflict.

The three countries started with a divergent community structure, many marginalized communities were not real part of the structure, which led to insurgency followed by regime change and escalating levels of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This situation led to an increase in the level of conflict, number of attacks, and number of fatalities.

Hypothesis 1.2: A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to an increase in the number of people engaged in the conflict.

The increase in insurgency and in the escalating number of emergent insurgencies increased the number engaged in the conflict. In the beginning they only formed the people who were

supportive of the regime change, and then it started increasing to high levels of engagement and different types of engagement.

Hypothesis 1.3: A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare lead to a vicious cycle.

A vicious cycle started in the three countries under analysis. More financial and arms support was provided to the insurgents and counterinsurgents whether by individuals or countries, which led to an increase in the vicious cycle and the centrifugal force. When support to the insurgents increased, support to the counterinsurgents increased. The new regime was striving to sustain their government as they were considered illegitimate, while the insurgents were striving to overthrow the government and gain control. Violence levels also increased as a result and the number of those engaged in the conflict also increased.

Hypothesis 2: The vicious cycle diminishes the level of cohesion within the community.

Social cohesion amongst the communities deteriorated as a result of the vicious cycle. The ethnic, religious and tribal conflict increased drastically. People felt threatened because of their affiliation to certain tribes, ethnicities, sects or religions. This has affected disruption of social networks and the loyalty of the people against the system towards the tribe or sect.

Following the regime change, there is an absence of real political leadership leaving the mantle of leadership with the ethnical or tribal leaders who are using the troubled regions for their tribal or ethnical advantage. This has led to religious-radical or ethnic-radical movements; thus, disturbing social structure and social cohesion.

Hypothesis 2.1: The vicious cycle increases the influx of refugees and IDPs

The vicious cycle affects the people by increasing the influx of refugees and internally displaced people. It affects the population connectedness with the system; thus, people behave like particles in an ultracentrifuge and leave the system. This is evident in the three countries; where the level of refugees and internally displaced increase as the counterinsurgency following the regime-change started.

Hypothesis 2.2: The vicious cycle increases the possibility of separatism.

The vicious cycle escalates the fragmentation and disturbs the social network of the society; where the community reached to an irreversible status with of multi disconnected communities. The centrifugal force that affects the system under this vicious cycle is dependent on the violence used, the interference of the external parties, the population willingness to control the government, and the percentage of population engaged in the conflict. The resultant is more insurgents who perceive they cannot be part of the community as whole and seek independence

Hypothesis 3: The vicious cycle creates different centers of mass and deteriorates human security.

The creation of a non-homogeneous system led to the disturbance of mass distribution. In a fragile state under asymmetric warfare there are three types of masses the pro-government, the neutral and the pro-insurgents, these have different masses and therefore have a different center of mass for each. However, the center of mass for the system as a whole is far from the center of mass for the ideal situation. This affected the different dimensions of human security especially personal, community and political security.

Hypothesis 3.1: The vicious cycle deteriorates personal security.

The vicious cycle increased the level of physical violence in all its forms, human trafficking, and child labor as compared to the situation before the regime change and increased during the lifetime of the new regime.

Hypothesis 3.2: The vicious cycle deteriorates community security.

The vicious cycle in the three countries increased inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions. It also increased crime and terrorism incidences as compared to the situation before the regime change and increased during the lifetime of the new regime.

Hypothesis 3.3: The vicious cycle deteriorates political security.

The vicious cycle increased the political repression and human rights violations as compared to the situation before the regime change and increased during the lifetime of the new regime. Moreover, the countries witnessed lack of rule of law and justice.

Scientific Findings

This research has helped develop theoretical frameworks and identified models that could be used in future research in the area of human security

1. A divergent community structure mixed with counterinsurgency following regime change in fragile states under asymmetric warfare degrades human security dimensions. The disturbed community security diminishes social cohesion and increases the level of conflict. It deteriorates the personal security; thus, dwindling the feel of safety and security. Political security is also missed with the lack of rule of law and increase in the level of corruption. Moreover, it exhausts the other dimensions of human security including economic, food, health, and economic security.
2. The vicious cycle created as a result of supporting both the insurgents and the government diminishes the level of social cohesion within the community and alters the community structure. The ethnic, religious and tribal conflict increased drastically. People felt threatened because of their affiliation to certain tribes, ethnicities, sects or religions. The vicious cycle disrupts social networks, where loyalty to the tribe or sect increases against the loyalty towards the system and the nationality. Following the regime change, there is an absence of real political leadership leaving the mantle of leadership with the ethnical or tribal leaders who are using the troubled regions for their tribal or ethnical advantage. This generates religious-radical or ethnic-radical movements.
3. The creation of a non-homogeneous system led to the disturbance of mass distribution. The center of mass for the system as a whole is far from the center of mass for the ideal situation and leads eventually to an irreversible condition. The main results of the centrifugal force resulting from the vicious cycle include: increase in migration and internally displaced people, increase in connection towards the tribes, ethnicities or religions as opposed to the connection towards the state, and different centers of mass are created leading to a massive deterioration in human security amongst the different people.
4. The physical metaphor of the vicious cycle is unique as the model used a simple analogy between human security under the influence of asymmetric warfare in fragile states and the intermolecular forces and Newtonian laws. It provides a proxy model that helps

[SzZ1] megjegyzést írt: Use synonym words

understand the relationship between different variables while mapping the structure of the two domains. The thesis utilized a process model that considers both the concepts and the processes. The centrifugal force in the three cases was dependent on the variables suggested in the metaphor; these include: the external support to the insurgents and the government, the willingness to control the government, the level of violence used, and the percentage of the population engaged in the violence. The solution should be based on the factors defined in the vicious cycle model. Hence the following factors should be controlled: support provided to the poles, willingness to control the government, the violence level during the conflict, and the number of those engaged in the conflict.

[SzZ2] megjegyzést írt: Needs to be shortened

5. The dissertation has suggested the insurgency life cycle that should be confronted in accordance to the phase in which insurgency operates. The model suggests that following the maturity phase insurgency will start the decline phase if its capacity is limited. However, if it is not defeated in this level it further develops and then will reach to the chronic level with more power, more capacity and more public support. This finding helps in defining the appropriate counterinsurgency strategy.

Recommendations

Recommendations are presented here on four levels: recommendations for future research, policy recommendations, education and training recommendations, and recommendations to resolve the cases under analysis:

Recommendations for Future research

The following is a list of recommendations for future research based on the results of this research and its limitations:

1. Conduct a comparative research between the countries that underwent the similar conditions: insurgency, regime change, insurgency and counterinsurgency. This will help identify the trends by time.
2. Test the model for countries that did not experience the regime change and understand the impact of counterinsurgency on human security in fragile states. This will help generalize the model of the vicious cycle.

3. Conduct deep analysis of the seven dimensions of human security rather than focusing on personal security, community security and political security.

Recommendations on Policy Level

The following is a list of recommendations on the policy level:

1. **Use the Inspect-Control-Protect mechanism of responsibility to protect**, this ensures protecting the people by making sure that there is no empowerment of the competing poles. Inspect interventions and support of the countries and individuals, control the support to the poles by imposing sanctions on those providing support to the poles, and then provide protection to the people by empowering the government to enhance services provided to all. Interventions should be UN-Led and UN-Decided.
2. **Use an inclusive participatory governance approach:** this is ensured by sharing information, dialogue with the community as a whole, and making decisions based on the consultation and dialogue with the public.
3. **Control the level of violence:** Violence level creates more violence even when directed by international interventions aiming to counter the insurgency. Hence, interventions should be based on strengthening and empowering the systems rather than increasing the level of conflict.
4. Ensuring human security and equitable services: all interventions should be based on human security. Moreover, they should be focused on empowering the government to enhance service delivery.
5. COIN should start with state building, in which role of military should include tasks that are traditionally the responsibility of civilian organizations.
6. COIN doctrines should be analyzed to ensure sensitivity to human security in the process, the objectives to be accomplished and in the evaluation of the process.
7. Integrate social cohesion in human security and community security programs
8. Intervention should be based on empowering the government and ensure a good governance system that promotes equity and protection of fundamental rights.
9. Interventions should focus on full integration of civil society to help improve service delivery, ensure social cohesion.

Recommendations for Education and Training

The following are two recommendations one for education and another for training:

1. Military and Security educational courses should embed “human security” as a cross cutting subject to be included and sensitized upon.
2. Military personnel should receive training in human security prior to their deployment

Recommendations to Resolve the Conflict in the three cases

Any solution of the three cases should consider the nucleus of the system; including the center of mass and the social structure. As a result, the solution should include building a new social contract amongst the different parties according to the suggested metaphor:

1. Control the support provided to the poles: UN Responsibility to Protect should be based on controlling the support of the different poles. Inspect, Control, Protect: Inspect interventions and support, control the support to the poles by imposing sanctions on those providing support to the poles. Interventions should be UN-Led and UN-Decided.
2. Controlling the insurgents’ willingness to control the government: An inclusive participatory governance approach should be enabled through sharing information, dialogue with the community as a whole, and making decisions based on the consultation and dialogue with the public. Any intervention should be a community based approach to security by involving civil society organizations in identifying risks and planning for implementation. This could help improve relation with the state while reassuring state legitimacy.
3. Control the violence level during the conflict: Violence level creates more violence even when directed by international interventions aiming to counter the insurgency. Hence, interventions should be based on strengthening and empowering the systems.
4. Control the number of those engaged in the conflict: Ensuring human security for all and providing services for all, which will minimize the number of those involved in the conflict.

Following the failure of the social contract and the deterioration of human security especially the community security and the social cohesion, *a new system is needed and a new social contract is vital to reconstruct the new state*. In fact, the possible options include the following:

1. ***Accept partitions*** based on ethnicities, religions and or tribes. However, this solution doesn't clean bitterness and hatred; rather it maintains unresolved boundaries and disputes.
2. ***Build a new social contract based on a strong authoritarian government***, which will help control the different sects and ethnicities and keep the peace. However, this solution is not sustainable as the willingness and awareness of the people has increased to a level that will lead to new levels of conflict.
3. ***Build a new social contract based on a Consensus Democracy***: Transforming the state from the "state of nature" to a new agreement and new social contract based on consociational. This is a form of government based on the preoperational representation or grand coalition. "[A]n institutionalized superstructure constituting the arena for formal and informal bargaining between segmented elites, based on a fundamental willingness of the actors to follow the rules of the game" (Butenschøn, 1985).

Hence, the suggested solution to get out of the vicious cycle is to build a new social contract based on a "consociational." This ensures broader participation and accurate representation, which protects minority interests and rights thus leading to minimal exclusion.

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Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
CFC	Civil-Military Fusion Centre
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Border Mission Libya
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Technical Cooperation
GMCIR	General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries
GNC	General National Congress
GPC	General People's Congress
H.N	Haqqani Network
HOR	House of Representatives
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IA	Islamic Army group in Iraq
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMF	The International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force []
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Sham
ISKP	Islamic State Khorasan Province
JRTN	Jaysh Rajaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandia
LNA	Libyan National Army
LPA	Libyan Political Agreement
LPRD	Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NTC	Libyan National Transitional Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development- Development Assistance Committee
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
OUP	Operation Unified Protector

PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	United Nations Support in Libya
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAC	Warriors Affairs Commission
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

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